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INTRODUCTION 
 
POLITICS OF GRAMMAR 
 
In this dissertation, I establish various connections between Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar and Michel Foucault’s concept of power and argue 
that these connections reveal deeper implications and impacts of their thoughts on 
political philosophy. I mainly focus on two similar aspects of power in Foucault and 
grammar in Wittgenstein. First, the authority of grammar in Wittgenstein is constructive 
in the sense that it maintains and sustains itself by opening up fields of experience and 
new paths of communication. Similarly, in Foucault power relations proliferate 
themselves by inventing new ways to speak and act. Second, both power and grammar 
are decentralized and impersonal and therefore rather than having localizable origins in 
individuals, social classes, and civil and state institutions, power and grammar are 
immanent to the field of human experience. 
As opposed to the idea of power as a repressive force originating and radiating 
from a sovereign political agency, Foucault’s portrayal of modern power as a historically 
established grid of strategic relations underlines the productive (i.e. constructive) and 
impersonal character of these power relations. Foucault is specifically concerned with the 
ever-increasing hegemony of the discourses of human sciences on this grid of strategic 
relations. He argues that these historical forms of rationality establish various spaces of 
subjectivity like madness, sexual perversions, and criminality, and thereby bound the 
field of human experience in the name of truth and knowledge. Even if disciplinary 
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institutions such as prisons and psychiatric asylums appear to be the sovereign agencies 
of modern power that isolate the abnormal from the normal, Foucault claims that the 
terms and concepts of subjectivity produced by human sciences are pervasive in our 
practices of self-intelligibility as well. I argue that Foucault’s conception of the authority 
of human sciences and the consequent power effects should be understood as similar to in 
terms of Wittgenstein’s depiction of the authority of grammar in the lives of language 
users. In Wittgenstein, intricate grammatical agreements among language users are the 
primary medium in which language users construct and change the world they share. The 
sophisticated network of these grammatical agreements among language users forces us 
to give up monolithic philosophical articulations and embrace the multiplicity of 
language users’ linguistic engagements if we wish to make sense of the ways the human 
experience is bounded and shaped into various forms of life. In this context, 
Wittgenstein’s grammatical inquiries and Foucault’s genealogical works reveal a level of 
limitations and struggles in the field of human experience that are not reducible either to 
legal constraints or to struggles in institutionalized politics. Since this grammatical level 
is also the site of the emergence of our categories and concepts of self-intelligibility, the 
picture of power as imposing itself on language users from without becomes an untenable 
one. Instead, both Wittgenstein, especially in his remarks on language acquisition, and 
Foucault, in his genealogies of the emergence of the deviant subjectivities, point to the 
immanence of power relations in the field of human experience.  
Such an understanding of grammar and power steers Wittgenstein and Foucault 
towards an incessant questioning of the limits and constraints imposed on our lives by 
grammar and the discursive order. Both specifically seek those moments in our speech 
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and actions where grammatical and discursive limits and constraints are established and 
articulated in accordance with some necessities perceived as inevitable. Wittgenstein and 
Foucault question this sense of necessity that accompanies our speech and actions and 
claim that most of the time what is given to us as necessary and universal is in fact 
arbitrary and contingent. In this sense, politics is an ongoing struggle against false 
necessities that deny us a wide range of possibilities available in our human form of life. I 
call such a philosophical/political endeavor a politics of grammar because both 
Wittgenstein and Foucault point to the level of the grammar of our concepts as the site in 
which these false necessities are formed and sustained. Accordingly, they both suggest 
that a critique of the grammar of our concepts is a critique of our form of life shaped by 
the constraints of our grammar. The form of this critique is therapeutic in the sense that it 
renders them accessible and available for political interventions and negotiations.  
Both Wittgenstein and Foucault acknowledge that forms of intelligibility render 
human speech and action possible by drawing boundaries in symbolic space. In this 
sense, being bounded by grammatical rules and discursive regulations is the human 
predicament, and by itself, this inevitable fact in the lives of language users does not 
necessarily point to the possibilities of a political life. In other words, the ethos of 
freedom does not problematize the existence of grammatical and discursive boundaries as 
such; on the contrary, it is a form of acknowledgment of them as conditions of possibility 
of speech and action. What it problematizes is our multifarious and complex relations to 
the existing boundaries that make possible not only a shared world, i.e. our ordinary 
context in our present time, as the necessary background for our language games, but also 
spaces of subjectivitity as available forms of self-intelligibility to inhabit that shared 
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world. Some of these forms of self-intelligibility create moral and political injuries, when, 
in the name of a necessity, they suppress the possibilities of articulating the discontents 
and dissatisfactions they cause.  
The sense of knowing as a morally and politically hazardous and risky human 
practice informs the morality and politics of Foucault’s works. I find in the context of 
Stanley Cavell’s thought my philosophical convictions that Wittgenstein’s thought is also 
motivated by similar philosophical interests and concerns with regard to our forms of 
intelligibility as the sites of our freedom and captivation at once. It is for this reason that 
the Wittgenstein I discuss in the following pages of this dissertation is Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein. For Cavell, in establishing forms of intelligibility, language users establish 
forms of joining to each other in a community. Therefore what kinds of forms of 
intelligibility we historically establish has direct bearings on our presence in the 
community and the community’s presence in our lives. In his philosophical questioning 
of our forms of intelligibility, Cavell establishes a dialectic of freedom in which we 
recognize the possibilities of the presence of community in the lives of language users 
both as an assembly of oppressive and suffocating forces and as a combination of forces 
that enables them to exercise their freedom to explore and experiment with ways of being 
in the world which does not have an established place in the construction and projection 
of a ‘we’.  
This dialectic of immanent freedom is expressed in the way Cavell describes the 
emergence of the ‘we’ in our speech. He questions the authority of the ‘we’ in our 
appeals to ordinary language in statements such as ‘We say X, when…’. For him, it is not 
an insignificant detail that the ‘we’ in such statements occupies its authoritative position 
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not when our conversation flows in its usual pace, but when it is obstructed by 
disagreements about the meaning of our words. Our language has rich resources to end 
such disagreements and restore the usual flow of our conversation. However, some 
disagreements are unresponsive to such ways of sustaining and maintaining our 
attunement to each other, and consequently, language users have to face the fact that the 
‘we’ they appeal to in their disagreements is simply not a shared ‘we’. This is because:  
The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we 
say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to community is always a search for the 
basis upon which it can or has been established. I have nothing more to go on than my conviction, 
my sense that I make sense. It may prove to be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction 
isolates me, from all others, from myself. That will not be the same as a discovery that I am 
dogmatic or egomaniacal. The wish and search for community, are the wish and search for 
reason.1  
 
In such discussions, language users face each other not as isolated individuals who 
happen to disagree, but as members of different communities voicing and defending 
different sets of grammatical criteria in the name of a community. 
However, it is crucial not to forget that the ‘we’ each language user appeals to is 
always a projection of what kind of a community the language user ‘wishes and searches 
for’. It is this projective character of the ‘we’ that defines our language as the site of our 
political struggles for freedom and justice. For Cavell, ‘the wish and the search for 
community’ (and reason) are always open-ended, tentative and exploratory, and therefore 
the ‘we’ is always subject to further questionings and re-articulations.  The satisfaction of 
the wish and the completion of the search for community and reason do not point to 
perfect conditions of communication but to the lack of it. In the same fashion, when the 
‘we’ is definitively and exhaustively articulated, that is, when language users identify 
                                                 
1
 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Reason (Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 20. 
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themselves fully with the ‘we’, the need to raise claims to community disappears. This is 
also the end of community and communication. Cavell’s use of the concept of claim in 
this context signifies not only the unsure and unconfirmed status of our rationality and 
sociality but also his conviction that the claim form is the primary form of our 
connections to other language users. In this sense, what keeps our conversations going 
incessantly is precisely our commitment to call and invite other language users to join us 
in a shared ‘we’. Other language users are always in a position to repudiate or confirm 
our claims to community and reason as much as we are able to repudiate or confirm their 
claims on us. Cavell’s dialectic of freedom points to the fact that the ‘we’ has an 
inevitable place to give form to and bound what we say, yet this does not mean that our 
speech is the site of blind conformity. On the contrary, the need to project a ‘we’ as the 
community we ‘wish and search for’ is what renders our speech as the site of freedom. It 
is through the projection of such a ‘we’ that we can address the injuries (and subsequent 
justice claims) caused by the unprojected ‘we’.   
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 I develop my argument in three chapters. In the first chapter, I focus exclusively 
on the early works of Wittgenstein and Foucault to reveal a common formalist 
methodology shared by them in their earlier works. My central argument is that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical investment in the concept of totality in the Tractatus, and 
that of Foucault in the idea of a historical outside as it emerges in his archaeological 
inquiries, are the central critical terms that define their earlier periods. More importantly, 
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these terms occupy such central critical spaces in their early works at the expense of the 
suppression of the themes of the ordinary and the present, which sustain and maintain the 
critical/normative content of their later works. In this sense, what characterize and 
motivate the transformations of Wittgenstein and Foucault’s later thoughts are the 
insufficiencies and dissatisfactions in the ways the concepts of totality and the historical 
outside respond to the demands of the ethics of freedom.2  
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a self-destructive philosophical device in the service 
of seeing ‘the world aright’ which means in the Tractarian context to see the world and 
language as a limited totality. For the totality to appear as total, it should be seen from a 
perspective outside the totality. However, all available perspectives of articulation made 
possible by logic are, by definition, within the limits of logical space. In this sense, the 
very structure of logic forbids the articulation of the totality of logical space. Wittgenstein 
develops his formalist methodology to bypass this logical prohibition on the articulation 
of totality at the expense of the intelligibility of the entirety of the Tractarian project. The 
formalist methodology is a (self-destructive) articulation of the conditions of the 
possibility of meaningful speech to show the limits of language. Wittgenstein thinks that 
the point of drawing a limit to the world and language is to show the insignificance of 
what we can meaningfully articulate and state within the boundaries of logical space in 
contrast to the infinite resistance to our forms of intelligibility of what is significant in our 
lives. In the Tractatus, what is significant is the ethical and aesthetical life of the subject 
                                                 
2
 By its very subject matter, the argument of the first chapter overlaps with some polemics and discussions 
about the philosophical impacts and stakes of the periodization of Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thoughts. 
However, the problematic distinctions and contrasts between their earlier works and the later ones are not 
directly relevant concerns to my argument in this chapter. Rather, my argument is limited to the changing 
place of the concepts of the ordinary and the present in their works with respect to the normative/critical 
claims of their thoughts.    
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that resides at the limit of the world. The subject is the bearer of ethical and aesthetical 
value, yet she cannot articulate and represent it because the structure of logical space does 
not allow articulation and representation of anything other than the possible combination 
of facts in the world. In other words, when everything meaningful gets said, there remains 
an excess outside the limits of the logical representational order. For the early 
Wittgenstein, the object of loyalty for critical thought is precisely this ethical and 
aesthetical excess. Since the existence and significance of the ethical and aesthetical 
excess can be shown only in reference to its exclusion from the world and logical space, 
the totality of the world and logical space is the condition of the possibility of the excess 
to emerge as a central critical term in the Tractatus.  
Foucault’s concept of episteme displays significant resemblances to the Tractarian 
conception of logic. The episteme is the unthought in thought in the sense that it cannot 
be articulated and cannot become a discursive object. More importantly, just like the 
Tractarian conception of logic, the unrepresentability and inarticulability of the episteme 
are due to the fact that it is the ‘historical a priori’ of our thought. Since it is what makes 
the discursive articulation possible, the order and concepts of the discourse are 
unresponsive to the episteme.  At this point, Foucault faces the same problem 
Wittgenstein faces in the Tractatus: How is it possible to say anything about that which 
resists articulation and representation? Foucault’s answer is in the concept of ‘historical 
discreteness’. As a reaction against certain teleological narrations of the history of 
thought that stress the unity and continuity of the historical movement of our thought, 
Foucault the archaeologist underlines the discontinuous and fragmented existence of the 
structures of intelligibility in historical space. Accordingly, the emergence of new forms 
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of rationality in historical space should not be understood within the terms of an 
evolutionary narration in which the old historical forms of rationality give birth to new 
and better forms of rationality. Instead, as the metaphor of archaeology implies, Foucault 
the archaeologist takes the historical difference among discourses as a matter of 
belonging to discrete historical layers. As the claims of the episteme on the forms of 
intelligibility at a given historical period are effective only within its own historical time, 
the historical distance between the archaeologist and the past forms of intelligibility 
enables the archaeologist to delve into the intricacies of these forms of rationality without 
falling under the spell of their episteme. It is, in this sense, the historical discreteness of 
epistemic structures that allows the archaeologist to articulate the episteme of discourses. 
In this picture, each and every archaeological layer is a historical outsider with respect to 
every another and the condition of possibility of archaeological knowledge is precisely 
the standing of the episteme of the archaeologist as a historical outsider to that of the 
discourse under scrutiny. Similar to Wittgenstein’s logic, Foucault’s episteme can only be 
articulated within a dialectic of the inside and the outside. 
Aside from its metaphysical and idealistic implications, the main problem with 
Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s formalism is that even if it enables them to express their 
critical concerns, the claims of these concerns on us become null and void at the moment 
they get articulated. In the Tractatus, ‘logic takes care of itself’, and in a certain sense, 
‘we cannot make any mistakes in logic’.  If logic and the ethical and aesthetical life of the 
subject resist articulation and representation in virtue of their transcendental status, why 
does the early Wittgenstein have the philosophical urge to draw a limit to representational 
discourses? And, if the epistemes of past forms of intelligibility have no claim on our 
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existing forms of rationality, the voice of the archaeologist gets stuck in the analyses of 
these ‘exotic’ forms of rationality, never being able to address the concerns of the 
present.  
After addressing these problems, I finish chapter 1 with the argument that these 
insufficiencies of formalist critique lead Wittgenstein and Foucault to give up their ideas 
of totality and a historical outside in favor of the ordinary in Wittgenstein and the present 
in Foucault. The appearance of these new themes in their philosophy has methodological 
and normative implications for the entirety of their later thoughts. Methodologically, both 
Wittgenstein and Foucault manifestly prefer descriptive philosophical accounts as 
opposed to explanatory discourses. They both think that the question ‘how?’, as opposed 
to the question ‘why?’, is more in line with our philosophical concerns. This 
methodological shift is forced by the very structure of the ordinary and the present. Both 
Wittgenstein and Foucault think that the methodological difficulty of establishing a 
reflexive relationship with the ordinary and the present is not about their being distant, 
hidden, and inaccessible to us. On the contrary, the difficulty lies in our embeddedness, 
and hence the lack of distance to, the structures of the ordinary and the present. The 
difficulty, in this sense, is not the hiddenness of the ordinary and the present but the fact 
that their structures, being there in plain view all the time, saturate the horizon of our 
intelligibility. Minute description of the ordinary and the present, then, is a philosophical 
device to create a reflexive distance between us and them by constantly reminding 
ourselves of ‘the uncanniness of the ordinary’ and the present. Aside from these 
methodological implications, we can also detect in Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s 
preference for descriptive accounts an acknowledgment of the place of the contingent and 
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the arbitrary in our lives. The ordinary and the present resist the demands for an abstract 
and all-inclusive ultimate explanation of the various forms the ordinary and the present 
take. Since there is no ultimate explanation for the ordinary and the present, they become 
at once objects of acknowledgement and the sites of political transformations.  
My argument in the second chapter makes its point in four steps. One of the 
common themes in and around the discussions of Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s politics 
is the constructive, productive, or formative character of modern power. Therefore I start 
developing my argument in the second chapter by a discussion of some social 
constructionist philosophical positions to prepare the ground for my argument. More 
specifically, I follow these discussions to demarcate the place of grammatical criteria in 
the construction of social space.  
Social constructionism as a broader philosophical subject does not necessarily 
point to the political dimensions of collectively making a world. I underline the fact that 
the issue of grammatical criteria, their applications, and the source of their authority in 
our practices of making a world come up and stick out insistently in these discussions. I 
interpret this fact as a road sign pointing to the place of the political in our constructive 
practices. The issue of grammatical criteria is also an important point where 
Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thoughts converge. In the second step of my argument I 
read Foucault’s claims about the productive (i.e. constructive and formative) character of 
modern power in the context of Cavell’s discussion of grammatical criteria. Cavell refers 
to Rousseau’s social contract theory in discussing the authority of grammatical criteria. 
His discussion of the formation of criterial authority points to the dialectic between the 
impersonal character of criterial authority and our personal authority in accepting, 
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repudiating, or negotiating grammatical criteria. Foucault’s characterization of modern 
power as a subjectless, i.e. an impersonal, grid of strategical relations, and his criticism 
that the head of the king is still attached to the king’s body in political thought are points 
of convergence between what Foucault says about power and Cavell’s discussion of 
Wittgensteinian criteria. Accordingly, I draw a picture of Foucault as a grammarian of 
politics, arguing that his genealogies are grammatical inquiries into the formation of our 
concepts such as sexuality, crime and punishment, and madness. In this context, I argue 
that Foucault’s claim that “Power produces reality” should be understood in the medium 
of Wittgenstein’s remark that ‘Grammar tells what kind of object anything is”.  
In the third step, I take this connection between Wittgenstein’s criteria and 
Foucault’s power one step further and argue that Cavell’s discussion of the moral 
implications of intelligibility allows us to understand Foucault’s concerns with our forms 
of intelligibility better. In Cavell, knowing ourselves and making ourselves intelligible to 
others as well as knowing others and demanding intelligibility from them are not purely 
epistemological matters. On the contrary, our relations of knowing always have moral 
dimensions because the forms of intelligibility and self-intelligibility are forms through 
which we become available and accessible to each other. Cavell points out that these 
forms of availability and accessibility may provide the ground on which speakers engage 
in a conversation of justice, or they become sources of moral or political injury. In any 
case, our practices of knowing should be understood and judged in terms of the risks and 
costs of knowing ourselves and others. Foucault’s genealogical engagements with our 
forms of intelligibility also point to the risks and costs of our knowledge of ourselves. I 
discuss these issues in relation to Foucault’s genealogical analyses of the formation of 
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subjectivities as forms of intelligibility. The available spaces of subjectivity in a given 
period are forms in which we make sense of each other’s speech and actions. In his 
genealogies, Foucault focuses on those forms of intelligibility that establish spaces of 
subjectivity as the sites of domination. That is to say, these forms of subjectivity render 
the subjects accessible and available to the forces of discipline, normalization, 
segregation, and exclusion. In each of these practices of power, the authority of 
grammatical criteria (to distinguish the mad from the sane, the normal from the abnormal, 
the criminal from the innocent) plays a huge role in defining these sites of subjectivities 
as requiring the intervention of an institutionalized rational authority. The critical point of 
Foucault’s genealogies is to show that in the history of modern West the institutionalized 
rational authority of discourses of human sciences claims more and more authority over 
our forms of self-intelligibility, narrowing down the possibilities of ordinary language 
users’ participations and interventions in the authority of grammar. 
In the last step, I establish connections between Foucault’s genealogy and 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of the connections among our language games in terms of 
the concept of ‘family resemblance’. Genealogy literally means an inquiry into the 
junctions and disjunctions of familial histories, and, therefore it already points to the 
family as the medium in which these junctions and disjunctions come into play. 
Wittgenstein coins his concept of family resemblance to underline the irreducible 
multiplicity of language games. The resemblances between our language games should 
not be taken as a sign for a common essence shared by all these similar language games. 
Rather, their resemblances, (and their differences as well), should be made intelligible on 
the basis of the history of familial relations these language games have established among 
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each other. This also points to a formulation of critical thought as genealogy. What 
Wittgenstein wants us to recognize and acknowledge in the concept of family 
resemblance is the contingent historical elements in the ways the families of language 
games form connections among each other. The point of such a recognition and 
acknowledgement is to be able to see that the connections and configurations of our 
language games can be made intelligible without a reference to a common essence shared 
by all language games. In the same fashion, Foucauldian genealogy takes the emergence 
and disappearance of discourses as historical singularities which can be made intelligible 
with respect to the unique specific conditions of their emergence and/or disappearance. 
At this point, Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy as therapy coincides with the 
critical aims of Foucault’s genealogies. I refer to David Owen’s conception of 
Wittgenstein’s therapy as an undoing of our ‘aspectival captivity’ (as opposed to 
ideological captivity) to argue that Foucauldian genealogical critique should be 
understood as offering a Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy. Like Wittgenstein, 
Foucault aims at uncovering the contingent elements in the formation of discourses to 
show that as historical entities they are accessible and available for our political 
interventions.  
In the last chapter, I evaluate and criticize the claims that Wittgenstein and 
Foucault are conservative thinkers. At the center of such accusations of conservatism is 
the problem of normativity. Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s unique philosophical ways to 
understand our language and discourses cause suspicions that their portrayals of our 
practices leave no room for a reasoned criticism of our practices. As our rational terms of 
criticism are shaped by the same contingent forces that shape the very objects of their 
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criticism, these rational critical terms cannot establish the necessary critical or reflexive 
distance between themselves and the objects of our criticisms. Therefore, in Wittgenstein 
and Foucault’s portrayal of language and discourse, the effective range of our critical 
forms is banished. On this understanding of their works, their political positions are akin 
to conservatism which also insists on the vanity of rational critique and transgressing of 
our practices. I take Ernest Gellner’s and Jurgen Habermas’ respective criticisms of 
Wittgenstein and Foucault as paradigmatic examples of such criticisms and present a 
comparative evaluation of their arguments.  
To respond to Gellner’s and Habermas’ criticisms, I refer to Alice Crary’s concept 
of ‘inviolability interpretations’. In ‘inviolability interpretations’, Wittgenstein’s remarks 
about the relations between the uses of concepts and their meanings are taken to be a 
theory of the meaning of a word as determined exclusively by its uses. Since it is use that 
determines the meaning, (and the use itself is conditioned by linguistic conventions), a 
criticism of any meaning claim is possible only from within the perspective of the social 
conventions. Yet, these conventions themselves are immune to criticisms. Crary criticizes 
‘inviolability interpretations’ for assuming a perspective outside our linguistic context 
and commit to the oxymoronic idea of ‘intelligible nonsense’. For Crary, if a criticism is 
voiced and it is recognized as a criticism by the relevant parties, then, we have to assume 
that the critic occupies a place in the symbolic space. Jose Medina’s criticism of Alice 
Crary at this point focuses on the unsustainability of an inside – outside distinction with 
regard to our linguistic practices. Medina suggests that both ‘inviolability interpretations’ 
and Crary commit to a picture of linguistic space divided into a homogenous inside and 
an indescribable outside. As opposed to this picture, Medina points to rich and 
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heteregenous geography of linguistic space the intricacies of which demystify the claims 
of the inside/outside distinction with respect to the problem of normativity.  
Having criticized Gellner and Habermas via Crary and Medina, in the last section, 
I develop an account of critical normativity utilizing Cavell’s understanding of the place 
of the normative in Wittgenstein with respect to rule following capability of language 
users. For Cavell, our capability to articulate statements of facts is utterly dependent on 
our ability to exercise our judgment. In other words, in stating a fact (X is the case) or 
stating an identity (X is Y), our statements necessarily include our judgments. Cavell, of 
course, does not claim that there are no differences between our factual and normative 
statements. His point is that a sharp and absolute distinction between factual and 
normative statements obstructs us from seeing the dependency and co-existence of our 
factual and normative statements. On this account, then, Foucault’s factual statements 
about prison, asylums, and sexualized subjects contain in them criterial judgments to 
recognize, say, the criminal as the oppressed party in modern language games of 
punishment. Cavell’s other contribution to the resolution of the normativity problem is 
his conception of rule following. For Cavell, language use is based on our ability to 
project concepts in different contexts. Grammatical rules and criteria govern and regulate 
our conceptual projections. However, no grammatical rule fully determines a concept’s 
range of application and therefore the moment of projection is an indeterminate moment 
where the language user’s attunement with her linguistic community is at stake. Thus, 
Cavell thinks that whenever we project a concept in a different context, we face with the 
responsibility to make a leap assuming the responsibilities of making a leap either too 
short or too long. Foucault shares this vision of our language and discourses where the 
 17
language user is not only given possibilities of existential freedom in her speech, but she 
is also forced to be free by the very structure of our speech.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Formalism as a Common Methodology 
 
The concept of the ordinary in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and 
that of the present in Foucault’s genealogical studies are enormously important in 
understanding the political implications of their thoughts. In this chapter, I would like to 
trace the emergence and transformation of these concepts in their earlier works3 as a 
preparation to describe parallel political perspectives available in their later thoughts.   
Even if, the ordinary and the present occupy such critical spaces in their later works, their 
earlier texts are marked by a lack of critical investment on these concepts. Instead, the 
idea of totality in the Tractatus and the idea of historical outside in Foucault’s 
archaeological works frame the critical claims of these texts. However, the critical 
perspectives established on the basis of the idea of totality and of a historical outside 
exclude the ordinary and the present as legitimate philosophical tasks in their own rights.  
Therefore, I will first focus on the concepts of totality and historical outside to show their 
critical function in their early works, and then, argue that such a critical investment in 
                                                 
3
 Periodization of Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thought is a problematic issue. Until recently, 
Wittgenstein’s early period was associated with logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and 
correspondence theory of truth. This picture of the early Wittgenstein has been fruitfully challenged by 
various philosophers who reveal a more complex web of continuities and discontinuities between the 
Tractatus and the Investigations. (See The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (Routledge, 
2000), and “Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 49, no. 197 (October 1999)) The way the early Wittgenstein is portrayed 
throughout this dissertation is partly informed by these new interpretations of the Tractatus. However, fully 
articulating these new discussions about the early Wittgenstein remains outside the scope of this 
dissertation the main concern of which is to capture common points between Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s 
thoughts. Furthermore, the argument I develop in this dissertation about his early period is meant to be a 
very limited one focusing strictly on the contrast between the idea of totality in the Tractatus and the open-
ended character of our ordinary language games articulated in the Investigations. The transitional period of 
Wittgenstein between the publication of the Tractatus and that of the Investigations is also excluded based 
on the same reasoning.   
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these concepts suppresses the critical potentials of the concepts of ordinary and the 
present.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ends his first major philosophical text, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, with the following proposition: “What we cannot speak about we must 
pass over in silence.”4 In the very first pages of his first major book, Madness and 
Civilization, Michel Foucault writes: “The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue 
of reason about madness, has been established only on the basis of such a silence. I have 
not tried to write the history of that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence.”5 
How can we understand these two silences in comparing Wittgenstein and Foucault? It 
should be first noted that the Tractarian silence and the silence of madness in Foucault 
have different philosophical implications. The Tractatus is a very short text composed of 
only seven numbered propositions, whereas Foucault describes the reason induced silence 
of madness in almost 600 pages6. Being an openly self-destructive text, the Tractatus is 
short and precise, as if not to disturb the philosophical silence recommended at the end of 
the text, whereas Foucault is at pains to disturb the silence by showing how the silence of 
madness is pervasive to each and every moment of reason’s monologue on madness. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the silence in the Tractatus is a mystical 
achievement in a form of recognition of the limits of language and the world beyond 
which our linguistic articulations cannot reach, while, in Foucault, the silence is a 
discursive achievement of the psychiatric voice through which the unreason is reduced to 
                                                 
4
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Routledge, 1974), 7.  
5
 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Vintage Books, 
1988), XI. 
6
 For years, only an abridged version of this early text of Foucault under the title Madness and Civilization 
was available to English speakers. Finally, in 2006, a full English translation by Jonathan Murphy was 
published under the title History of Madness by Routledge. Due to the concerns with consistency, I use the 
old English translation in my references.    
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silence. Nonetheless, their separate emphases on, and even privileging of these two 
different silences give us grounds to connect and compare their earlier thoughts to each 
other because, despite the differences mentioned above, Wittgenstein and Foucault’s 
separate ways to explore the theme of silence cross each other on some common 
methodological and normative/critical plains they share in their earlier periods.  
The common methodology I refer to above can be defined as a formal delimitative 
engagement with language and discourse through which the limits of linguistic and 
discursive space are drawn on the basis of the conditions of possibility of that space. 
Once the logical limits of language (Wittgenstein) and the conceptual/historical limits of 
discourse (Foucault) are drawn, the linguistic/discursive space appears as a limited 
totality on the basis of the a priority of logic (Wittgenstein) and a ‘historical a priori’ 
(Foucault). This appearance of linguistic/discursive space as a totality, then, is an effect 
of formal methodology which does not ask what exists in that space but rather how that 
space itself is possible.  
The notion of totality is also indicative of how the methodology and 
normative/critical concerns of Wittgenstein and Foucault are internally linked because by 
conceptualizing linguistic/discursive space as a limited totality, they open up a critical 
space on the borders of their texts (but not in their discourse) for that which remains 
outside of that totality. This critical space displays itself not as a positivity but the 
negative impression of that which is outside the limits of language and discourse. While 
the formal analysis produces the ‘knowledge’ of what can exist inside language and 
discourse, an ontologically different kind of ‘knowledge’, the ‘knowledge’ of that which 
cannot exist inside language and discourse, takes shape offstage. Precisely because the 
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formal analysis produces the knowledge of the outside by exhausting the possibilities of 
linguistic/discursive space as a totality, in the early writings of Wittgenstein and Foucault 
the critical space that arises out of the textual emergence of the outside has to be mute. 
Thus, we have in both thinkers the silence that remains outside of that totality, testifying 
to a possibility beyond all the possibilities of the inside, incommunicably demanding a 
transgressive response. As we will see, both Wittgenstein and Foucault seek such 
transgressive possibilities in the medium of art, and especially in the medium of plastic 
arts which privileges showing as a form of expression as opposed to saying and stating.  
Alice Crary gives a compact picture of the standard readings of the Tractatus in 
the following passage: 
The narrative about the development of Wittgenstein’s thought told within standard 
interpretations, sketched broadly enough to abstract from local disagreements, proceeds as 
follows. It begins with Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, giving an account of the connection between 
language and the world. The main tenet of the account is that the form of language and the form of 
the world reflect each other. The world is made up of simple objects which can combine into facts, 
and language is made up of names which can combine into propositions. These two types of 
combination mirror each other, and the fact that they do so is what ensures that propositions have 
meaning. The meaning of a name, on this allegedly Tractarian theory, is determined by an act 
which ties it to a particular simple object. Simple objects have logical forms which are their 
possibilities of combination with other objects, and names have logical forms – or possibilities of 
combination with other names – derivatively. What a name means determines what can be said 
with it in the sense that the logical form of a name reflects the logical form of the object it 
denotes.7 
 
The problem with the standard readings of the Tractatus is not that they are inaccurate or 
that they misinterpret this or that specific proposition of the Tractatus. The problem is 
with what I call, for the lack of a better term, the explanatory spirit of these readings 
which cannot accommodate the ethical/aesthetic dimensions of the Tractatus. These 
interpretations take themselves to be exhaustive of the content of the Tractatus when they 
derive a more or less consistent account of how language works on the basis of the 
                                                 
7
 Alice Crary, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought,” in The New Wittgenstein, ed. 
Alice Crary and Rupert Read (Routledge, 2000), 2. 
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logical atomist picture theory of meaning. However, the Tractatus is an inexhaustible text 
in the same sense that the content of an artwork is inexhaustible. We cannot redeem its 
claims on us by articulating its content on a cognitive level for what it demands is not 
cognition but recognition.  
The very first sentence of the text of the Tractatus expresses this demand for 
recognition.  
Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts 
that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts. – So it is not a textbook. – Its purpose would 
be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it.8  
 
If the precondition to understand the Tractatus is to have had the same thoughts, then, 
‘understanding’ in this context means to recognize these thoughts in the forms 
Wittgenstein expresses them in the Tractatus. If so, ‘understanding’ in this context 
implies that the reader acquires the sense of the text through cognition. ‘Understanding’ a 
text, in this sense, yields something positive, a new form of an old thought, hence an 
intellectual surplus. Here ‘pleasure’ is the keyword to understand the riddle of 
‘understanding’ in this opening passage of the preface of the Tractatus. In the strictest 
sense of the term of philosophy, a philosophical text does not declare its ultimate purpose 
to be to give pleasure to the reader. That, ordinarily, is the purpose of an artwork. In this 
sense, then, the textual pleasure Wittgenstein promises in this passage is an aesthetic 
pleasure. The aesthetic pleasure Wittgenstein refers to suggests that to understand the 
Tractatus is to recognize something even without, strictly speaking, cognizing it, as, for 
instance, we mean in a sentence like “I understand your sorrow”.  
                                                 
8
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Routledge, 1974), iii. 
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Surprisingly, it was Frege who first recognized this aesthetic dimension of the 
Tractatus expressed in the passage above.9 In a letter to Wittgenstein, he made the 
following comment: 
The pleasure of reading your book can therefore no longer be aroused by the content which is 
already known, but only by the peculiar form given to it by the author. The book thereby becomes 
an artistic rather than a scientific achievement; what is said in it takes second place to the way in 
which it is said.10  
 
What Frege argues here should not be understood in terms of the style of Wittgenstein’s 
writing because there is a considerable difference between what an artistic style is and 
what the form of an artwork is.What style implies is the possibility of the detachment of 
the form and the content in the sense that the stylistic form is one of the possibilities of 
the form of expression among many other available ones. In this sense, style is a more or 
less arbitrary and subjective choice of a form which is not connected to the content of the 
expression as intimately as the form is. When it is put this way, style is almost opposite of 
the aesthetic form, for aesthetic expression reflects a necessary relationship between the 
form and the content. The form and the content of an artwork are constitutive of each 
other. In other words, the form and the content of the aesthetic expression are non-
detachable to such a degree that the form of a specific artwork is the only single possible 
way to express that specific content. It is for this reason that the genuine artwork is 
unique, particular, and singular. In short, the content of the artwork can be neither 
rephrased nor translated through re-formation of its content. In this sense, then, it is not 
the case that ‘what is said in [the Tractatus] takes second place to the way in which it is 
said’, but, as Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing indicates, the 
content, i.e. what is shown, in the Tractatus is inherent in the form of it.  
                                                 
9
 It is surprising because it took the philosophical community half a century to recognize what Frege, who 
was one of the few to read the Tractatus before its publication, recognized at first glance.  
10
 Quoted in Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Penguin Books, 1990), 174. 
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For Wittgenstein, the aesthetic value lies not in the way things get said, but in the 
demonstrative capability of the aesthetic form to show that which cannot be said at all. 
When we look at a work of art, what we see is:  
…life as a work of art created by God, and, as such, it is certainly worth contemplating, as is every 
life and everything whatever. But only an artist can so represent an individual thing as to make it 
appear to us like a work of art…A work of art forces us – as one might say – to see it in the right 
perspective but, in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other.11 12  
 
The aesthetic form frames a piece of reality and makes it distinct and visible by 
disconnecting it from its surrounding. The artwork is not a continuous element of the 
fabric of the surrounding reality, hence it interrupts the infinitely seamless fabric of 
reality. Precisely because thought and reality share the same form, when the artwork 
interrupts the overall structure of reality it also interrupts thought too. It is in this sense, 
then, that the artwork overpowers our ordinary perception and ‘forces us to see the world 
in the right perspective’. The aesthetic form makes the artwork appear as an autonomous 
totality through aesthetic demarcation of its edges. The hard work of totalizing aesthetic 
labor is delimitative creation of the aesthetic form because what we call form is the limits 
of the artwork that enables the content of the artwork to show itself. In the same fashion, 
what the reader, who has had the same thoughts as the author of the Tractatus is supposed 
to recognize is not this or that particular thought but the limits of the totality of her/his 
thoughts just where language vanishes. The parallel between Wittgenstein’s formalism 
and aesthetic formalism lie in the common search for a form that is able to present a 
                                                 
11
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 4. 
12
 This remark and the next one from Culture and Value were recorded in 1930. I am aware of the fact that 
dated as 1930 these remarks belong to Wittgenstein’s transitional period and cannot be used without 
specification to interpret the Tractatus. However, as will be seen below, he ties these views with the 
problem of presenting the world as sub specie aeterni which is the defining problematic of the Tractatus. 
Thus, I believe that these remarks are qualified to be used in interpreting the Tractatus.  
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world in the artist’s case and the world in Wittgenstein’s case as a totality. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein says: 
But it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world sub specie aeterni other than 
through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way – so I believe – it is as though it flies above 
the world and leaves it as it is – observing it from above, in flight.13   
 
The thought ‘in flight’ is the Tractatus, which  has an recognitive claim to force the 
reader to ‘see the world aright’, that is sub specie aeterni. The limits of that final 
perception exclude the viewer/reader from that totality and render the Tractarian 
experience a purely subjective, albeit a pleasuring, one. If understanding the Tractatus is 
the realization of its claims, then, understanding it is the recognition of one’s being as a 
non-extensional subject, or, as Wittgenstein puts it, a ‘Godhead’, which has nothing to do 
with the world.  
Wittgenstein’s remark about the reader’s having had the same thoughts as the 
precondition to understand the Tractatus also gives us some clues about the connections 
between his formalist methodology and his normative concerns. It is not the case that 
Wittgenstein ‘discovers’ the issues of aesthetic, ethics, subjectivity, etc. as a result of his 
formal analyses of language. Rather, his formalism is a specific device Wittgenstein 
develops to display what the subject as a limit to the world already experiences outside 
the totality of language and reality. The aim of the Tractatus, as Wittgenstein puts it, is 
‘to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: 
for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the 
limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).’14  
Wittgenstein feels compelled to qualify what he means by drawing a limit to thought 
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 Ibid., 5. 
14
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Routledge, 1974), 3. 
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because such an aim is problematic by definition. To draw a limit to thought requires one 
to think thought as a totality but such a totalizing perspective is only available outside of 
that totality, in a realm where, by definition, thinking is not possible. In other words, the 
problematic, or rather the paradox, of the Tractatus is to draw a limit to thought by 
thinking. Formulated in this way, such an aim may seem to be paralyzing, but one of the 
main achievements of the Tractatus is to display this paralyzing condition in its 
paradoxical, self-destructive structure. This paralysis could have been absolute were we, 
as speakers, stuck within the limits of language and hence no one, including the writer of 
the Tractatus, could have imagined the limits of language. Yet, we, not as empirical, 
contingent persons, but as speaking subjects, or rather contingent instances of the 
metaphysical subject, are located on the limits of language and the world. This is why 
Wittgenstein stipulates the aim of the book as drawing a limit to the expression of 
thought, rather than to thought itself.15 As the subject constitutes a limit to thought and to 
the world, she already experiences that limit as her/his existential home. In this sense, 
from an existential perspective the problem of the limits of language and the world is not 
a problem at all. It is for this reason that the value of the Tractatus is that ‘it shows how 
little is achieved when these problems are solved’.16 These problems arise when the 
genuine experience of the subject which is the disinterested experience of the world as a 
totality is reduced to linguistic expressions which by definition cannot express anything 
other than contingent, and hence valueless, facts of the world. In this sense, then, these 
                                                 
15
 This should be seen yet another paradoxical statements of language. In the foreword Wittgenstein makes 
a distinction between thought and its expression. As his remarks on solipsism and mysticism show, we 
seem to be able to think more than we express our thoughts. And in a sense, we can ‘feel the world as a 
limited whole’ or have thoughts about solipsism. The limits on our thinking, then, seem to be operational 
only when we express our thoughts. This is also the case in the incommunicability of the meaning of life. In 
any case, there is much more going on in our mindful lives than only rational, articulated thoughts.  
16
 Ibid., 4. 
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problems are pseudo problems that cannot be solved but rather must be dissolved. In this 
sense, Wittgenstein’s formalism is not a way to ‘discover’ a priori conditions of the 
possibility of language and the world for the sake of producing knowledge of those 
conditions. It is a methodological device to show the futility and the normative threat of 
such a ‘will to knowledge’ from the non-articulable perspective of the subject. In other 
words, to display the totality of language and the world is significant as much as showing 
it will lead to feeling the outside of that totality. The ‘knowledge’, or more appropriately 
the formal construction, of totality is important because the limits of that totality can 
function as the condition of the possibility of a reconstruction of an outside.  
This is the point where the normative/critical significance of Wittgenstein’s and 
Foucault’s early formalist methodologies meet. Foucault’s choice to write ‘the 
archaeology of that silence’ rather than ‘the history of that language’ is based on the same 
concerns that lead Wittgenstein to present the world and language as a totality not for the 
sake of the significance of the inside of that totality but for the sake of the 
ethical/aesthetical significance of what remains outside of it. Methodologically, and this 
is what situates Foucault’s work closer to philosophy than history, for while 
historiography establishes its knowledge and truth claims on the basis of the actual 
configurations and compositions of historical ‘facts’, archaeological inquiry makes 
formal claims about the conditions of the possibility of its objects. In other words, 
historiography establishes a relational order among discursive facts while archaeology 
aims at revealing the logic of what can be said in a discourse. In this sense, 
historiography is oblivious to any sense of limit for its field is filled with facts that 
obstruct any clear view of a horizon. As opposed to historiography, archaeological 
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knowledge and truth are formal reconstructions the purpose of which is to make the 
unrecognized horizon visible and thereby reveal the historical limits of discourses. As 
archaeological inquiry reveals what is possible to say in a discourse, it also produces a 
unique knowledge of what cannot exist within the limits of that discourse. That which 
does not exist as a positive fact is condemned to nonexistence within the confines of 
historiography because positive facts constitute the whole discursive universe of 
historiography. Under the conditions of the lack of any sense of limits, the universe of 
historiography also lacks the possibility of its totality and hence any sense of limitedness 
and of outside. And by contrast, Foucault’s archaeological inquiries have a very sharp 
focus on the limits of the discourses of human sciences so that we are able to see that 
what presented to us as universal and objective necessities is, in fact, historically 
contingent limits placed upon our lives.   
In the context of modernity, the voice of madness, which poses an ontological 
question if not a paradox as deep as silence, cannot be heard in the factual universe of 
historiography precisely because it can be captured only on the limits of psychiatric 
discourse where the voice of madness is muted and pushed to the other side of the 
discursive limits of reason. Archaeological ‘knowledge’ of madness, then, is a unique 
‘knowledge’ of this limit experience the ambiguous ontological status of which defies the 
rigid dialectic of reason and unreason. In this sense, Foucault’s methodological choice of 
privileging a formal inquiry into the limits of psychiatric discourse is a significant 
normative choice because only a formal archaeological scrutiny of the discourse can give 
us an access to the excess which is constantly produced at the limits of the discourse. In 
other words, only archaeological methodology can enable us to hear the silence of 
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madness which is made inaccessible by the discursive tools of historiography designed to 
capture what is already well articulated, meaningful, and rational. 
For the early Wittgenstein, language makes sense by representing the facts. Every 
meaningful proposition is a picture of a fact. Yet, every picture is also a fact independent 
of what it represents. Indeed, this is the condition of the possibility of representation, for 
a picture can represent a fact only from outside of that fact. A picture and a fact share 
logical form. Logical form determines what is possible in the logical space. The existence 
of a fact is just one possibility of the combinations of objects. A proposition can depict 
any possibility in the logical space. When the combination of the objects in a fact 
corresponds to combination of names in a proposition we call that proposition a true 
proposition. Yet, since propositions can depict anything possible in the logical space 
independent of what is really the case, the sense of the proposition and its truth value are 
independent of each other. In other words, a proposition can be false but meaningful. The 
truth of any proposition is determined by whether what it depicts is actually the case in 
the world. What is the case is the contingent configuration of the totality of facts which 
can be in any configuration logic allows. The truth of any proposition is utterly dependent 
on whether the configuration of the totality of facts is the same as depicted by the 
proposition.nIn this sense, then, there is no a priori or necessary truth which is true 
regardless of the configuration of facts in the world. Since reality and language share the 
same logical form the set of what can be said (all the possible meaningful combinations 
of the names) is at the same time the set of propositions that describe what can exist (all 
the possible combination of objects). By definition, this set of all possible propositions 
include the set of all true propositions that describe what actually exists. Hence, from 
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within this set, it is possible to represent the whole reality exhaustively, that is as a 
totality.17 However, from within this set of all possible meaningful propositions, it is not 
possible to represent the logical form, that is the totality of the world and language, for it 
requires us to ‘station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say 
outside the world’.18  
In this picture, if the aim of philosophy is to set limits to the expression of thought 
by representation, then that limit cannot itself be represented. Representation is the 
condition of possibility of saying anything and hence whenever the philosopher says 
anything, whatever she says will remain within the limits of representation and infinitely 
defer the point where language and its outside limit meet each other.  What cannot be said 
cannot be said but can only show itself. To present the point where the limits of language 
show itself philosophy ‘must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards 
through what can be thought’.19 “It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly 
what can be said”.20 To do so, philosophy must bypass the content of language and arrive 
at the form of language which simultaneously makes representation possible and limits it. 
There are propositions that serve this end, or more correctly pseudo-propositions which 
behave like genuine propositions even if they are only inevitable by-products of the 
representational process: tautologies and contradictions. A tautology ‘admit[s] all 
possible situations’ and a contradiction ‘[admits] none’.21 Therefore: 
Contradiction is that common factor of propositions which no proposition has in common with 
another. Tautology is the common factor of all propositions that have nothing in common with one 
another. 
Contradiction, one might say, vanishes outside all propositions: tautology vanishes inside them. 
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 Ibid., 4.115 
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 Ibid., 4.462 
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Contradiction is the outer limits of propositions: tautology is the unsubstantial point at their 
centre.22  
 
Precisely because their inability to carry any content, or to put it more appropriately, their 
inability to represent anything unlike propositions which ‘show what they say: tautologies 
and contradictions show that they say nothing’.23 Completely stripped from any 
possibility of content, a tautology is pure possibility and a contradiction is pure 
impossibility. In other words, tautologies and contradictions are pure form. For 
Wittgenstein, the fact that they show their inability to say anything in their inability to say 
anything shows something more than that also: that there is a logical form to the world 
and to language, and that where there is form, there are also limits. Hence, the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus thinks that tautologies and contradictions are special logical 
windows through which it is possible to catch a glimpse of the world as a totality. 
 Wittgenstein’s interest in logic, as a body of tautological ‘propositions’, is about 
the demonstrative capabilities of logic to show language as a totality on the formal level. 
Once the limits of that totality is drawn, a space emerges outside of the borders of that 
totality and, for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, that outside space is the condition of 
possibility of the critique of reason. In his archaeological period, Foucault also thinks that 
critique of any discourse requires an outside perspective, which, according to the 
Foucault the archaeologist, is available in the form of a historical distance, absolutized on 
the basis of the historical discreteness of epistemes.  
The epistemological field traversed by the human sciences was not laid down in advance: no 
philosophy, no political or moral option, no empirical science of any kind, no observation of 
human body, no analysis of sensation, imagination, or the passions, had ever encountered, in the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century, anything like man; for man did not exist (any more than life, or 
language, or labour); and the human sciences did not appear when, as a result of some pressing 
rationalism, some unresolved scientific problem, some practical concern, it was decided to include 
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man (willy-nilly, and with a greater or lesser degree of success) among the objects of science – 
among which it has perhaps not been proved even yet that it is absolutely possible to class him; 
they appeared when man constituted himself in Western culture as both that which must be 
conceived of and that which is to be known.24  
 
Or,  
Historians want to write the histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but they do not realize 
that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a 
hundred and fifty years is not valid for a previous period. And that, if biology was unknown, there 
was a very simple reason for it: that life itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, 
which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history.25  
 
Among the other texts that belong to Foucault’s archaeological period, The Order of 
Things is distinguished by the fact that in it Foucault develops a full account of historical 
discreteness, while in his other archaeological works like Madness and Civilization and 
The Birth of the Clinic we have only scattered clues and fragments about it. What we 
discover in his account of historical discreteness is that there cannot be any account of it, 
properly speaking, as these epistemic ruptures are events to be analyzed and not patterns 
in a causal nexus. 
What event, what law do they obey, these mutations that suddenly decide that things are no longer 
perceived, describes [sic], expressed, characterized, classified, and known in the same way, and 
that it is no longer wealth, living beings, and discourse that are presented to knowledge in the 
interstices of words or through their transparency, but beings radically different from them? For an 
archaeology of knowledge, this profound breach in the expanse of continuities, though it must be 
analysed [sic], and minutely so, cannot be ‘explained’ or even summed up in a single word. It is a 
radical event that is distributed across the entire visible surface of knowledge, and whose signs, 
shocks, and effects it is possible to follow step by step. Only thought re-apprehending itself as the 
root of its own history could provide a foundation, entirely free of doubt, for what the solitary truth 
of this event was in itself.26   
  
Within its own historical boundaries, each episteme constitutes a totality the form of 
which determines what can be said in that specific epistemic configuration.  
Foucault develops his archaeological project against the project of history of ideas 
which takes these ‘ideas’ at their face value as truths or falsehoods that are expressed in 
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discussions, disagreements, and polemics. In other words, the project of history of ideas 
seeks the truth of these ideas in their content, their capability to produce true knowledge 
of their epistemic object, or in their errors about that epistemic object. From this 
perspective, biology follows from natural history, or the analysis of wealth gives rise to 
political economy as the ongoing dialogue among the ideas forces knowledge claims to 
assume more effective forms of rationality to capture the truth of their objects of 
knowledge. The disagreements in a field of knowledge, then, are not only clashes among 
the agonistic contents of different ideas that are exclusive approaches to the truth of their 
subject matter, but also developmental engines of rationality that gets infinitesimally 
closer and closer to truth by infinitely perfecting its form. This is what Foucault rejects. 
From the perspective of the history of ideas, labor, for example, is a central 
concept common in both Adam Smith’s political economy and his precursors such as 
Condillac, Quesnay, and Cantillon. What makes Adam Smith Adam Smith is that he 
develops the concept of labor through correcting misunderstandings of this concept by his 
precursors and gives a more rational form to it to capture the essence of human 
productive activity in a more truthful way. The historian of ideas, then, reads the 
modifications in the content of the concept of the labor as the signs of the continuity of a 
singular explanatory rational narration in which human beings not only make their own 
economic activity an object of knowledge but also recognize their own rational essence as 
it unfolds and expresses itself in the rationality of productive economic activity. For 
Foucault, however, what Smith does is not to cleanse the content of the concept of labor 
from errors and irrationalities. Rather, according to Foucault, Smith ‘does displace it: he 
maintains its function as a means of analyzing exchangeable wealth; but that analysis is 
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no longer simply a way of expressing exchange in terms of need (and trade in terms of 
primitive barter); it reveals an irreducible, absolute unit of measurement.’27 In this sense, 
then, even if the concept of labor in Smith seems to be telling a story continuous with the 
story told by means of the concept of labor in the texts of his precursors, these two 
concepts of labor are not the same. Within Foucauldian archaeology, then, the concept of 
labor starts a new life of its own in Smith’s works.  
Labour, life, and language appear as so many ‘transcendentals’ which make possible the objective 
knowledge of living beings, of the laws of production, and of the forms of language. In their being, 
they are outside knowledge, but by that very fact they are conditions of knowledge…they totalize 
phenomena and express the a priori coherence of empirical multiplicities; but they provide them 
with a foundation in the form of a being whose enigmatic reality constitutes, prior to all 
knowledge, the order and the connection of what it has to know…28  
  
The concepts of labor in Smith and in the earlier analysts of wealth are even 
incommensurable concepts because the former is pure form devoid of any content while 
the latter is defined by its content. Even if the analysis of wealth uses the concept of labor 
as a unit of measurement of the value of commodities, the concept of labor in the earlier 
works is not a threshold to the outside of their discourse. One measures the value of the 
wealth with labor but wealth is still defined in terms of need as an object of desire and not 
pure material expression of labor. Labor is a phenomenon shaped by the need and desire. 
In Smith, however, labor designates the epistemic space where analysis vanishes. It 
makes the knowledge claims of political economy possible, but it cannot be an object of 
knowledge.    
As I have exemplified in terms of the concept of labor, the project of the history 
of ideas cannot conceive the difference between the truth of ideas and the truth about 
these ideas. For Foucault however, the truth of ideas, which is what counts as true under 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., 223 
28
 Ibid., 244 
 35
an epistemic regime, does not give us access to the truth about these ideas, for that can be 
conceived only on the level of their historical conditions of possibility. In other words, 
even if one can reveal the truth of ideas through their content, the truth about these ideas 
does not lie in their content but must be sought on the level of their form, of the episteme 
they operate in, which makes the totality of those ideas, including the conflicting ones, 
possible. This epistemic form is the condition of the possibility of knowledge claims, 
theories, and rationalities. It is, in Foucault’s words, the ‘historical a priori’ of 
knowledge. Historical a priori is that which accompanies thought as unthought. It is what 
we do not think when we think. It is, in Foucault’s words, the ‘positive unconsciousness’ 
of thought. The truth about thought, then, lies in its unthought. However, this unthought 
should not be confused with the deep meaning that hermeneutics seeks or the synchronic 
orders that structuralism analyses. It is, in the same way as Wittgenstein defines logic, the 
‘scaffolding’ of ideas. The reason why it is impossible to articulate it from within is not 
that it is buried as a deep sedimentary layer of thought or that it is an invisible regulating 
center covering itself as a blind spot. Rather, its inarticulacy lies in its pervasiveness of 
every conceivable point in the epistemic space which makes it impossible to capture it as 
a totality from within a space completely saturated by its presence.     
Once put in this way, the ‘critical’ value of knowledge claims, theories, and 
thought in general is neutralized. While from within a certain episteme the topology 
constituted by these ideas looks very alive with conflicts, contrasts, and shifting and 
drifting differentiations, from an archaeological point of view the topology of the 
episteme appears a very smooth and homogenous surface invisibly regulated by a 
‘historical a priori’. A genuine hierarchical or critical differentiation cannot occur among 
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the ideas of the same episteme because these ideas cannot express anything more than the 
form of episteme allows them to express. By definition, a single epistemic form constricts 
all the ideas it makes possible, and hence from within that episteme no idea and no 
knowledge claim can reveal the constricting epistemic form while it itself is constricted 
by the same form. This is, of course, what Wittgenstein means by ‘propositions cannot 
express anything higher’. All are of equal value by virtue of being formed by the same 
representational economy. If any proposition has any critical claim, this requires that 
proposition to reveal the limits of other propositions which in return requires that 
proposition to step out of the representational form. However, being constituted by the 
representational form, having a critical claim requires that proposition to cease to be a 
proposition, which is impossible as a proposition is the only possible form in which to 
say anything.  
This common formal operation of Wittgenstein and Foucault interrupts the 
developmental narration of Enlightenment for that narration defines value as the 
progressive differentiation of knowledge claims, theories, and ideas. In their earlier 
periods, what Wittgenstein and Foucault claim, on the basis of epistemic and logical 
grounds, is that such a differentiation, as a precondition of the criticality of thought, is not 
possible because knowledge claims, ideas, and theories, in short, all the forms that 
rationality defines, are caught in their own form. And the pressing demand of critique is 
to reveal this form that keeps the thought hostage in its self-identity. What is caught in its 
form, however, is not only the rationalist discourse but the whole modern social texture. 
“Our civilization is characterized by the word ‘progress’. Progress is its form rather than 
making progress being one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with 
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building even more complicated structure.”29 As the form of language and discourse 
restricts what can be said and imposes the reproduction of the sameness of thought 
without allowing any meaningful differentiation, i.e. value, within the limits of language 
and discourse, modern society is caught in its own form of progressiveness which does 
not allow any differentiation, as the word ‘progress’ implies, but imposes the construction 
of the same structure. Formalism, then, is not a choice but a normative demand of 
critique.  
 
Some Preliminary Remarks: Modernity, Critique, and Silence 
 
How is it that the notion of silence in Wittgenstein and Foucault can assume a 
normative/critical role? Neither Wittgenstein nor Foucault try to vocalize that silence or 
talk in the name of it for the sake of doing justice to that which is missing. Not only the 
notion of silence, then, but also an actual silence in the form of mute textual gaps seems 
to be the animating critical spirit of their meticulously designed formal analyses. 
Wittgenstein wants his readers to listen to the voice of the Tractatus only as a prelude to 
be able to hear and appreciate the silence of the unwritten Tractatus which is the 
indefinable substance of the written Tractatus. In his archaeological works, Foucault’s 
voice always stops short at articulating an audible dialectic between the thought and the 
unthought in modern discourses, creating a textual space for countless textual 
possibilities that provoke untold narrations to come outside of his texts. The Wittgenstein 
of the Tractatus sees certain potentials of ethical/aesthetical emancipation in silence, and 
in the same fashion, Foucault criticizes the ‘talking cure’ of psychoanalysis for remaining 
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‘a stranger to the sovereign enterprise of unreason’.30 Indeed, the critical function of that 
which cannot find its voice in language and discourse is important to such a degree that if 
one’s horizon of reading fails to go beyond the positive content of their early works,  one 
can easily interpret them as a certain kind of positivism, as did the Vienna Circle in its 
reading of Wittgenstein and Habermas in his reading of Foucault.31  
At this point, I would like to take a detour to come back to the criticality of their 
texts. Because Wittgenstein and Foucault’s preoccupation with silence pushes the critical 
value of their works to the outside of their texts, the normative value of their writings is 
sustained only on the textual borders. In other words, the critical edge of their earlier texts 
is established where the word edges into the silence. Hence, one is required to step into 
their texts from outside.  
When one questions the critical place of silence in their earlier texts, she will 
immediately realize that it is actually a double question. This is because, if silence is 
critique of thought as it reveals the limits of discursivity and thought, under modern 
conditions, this critique has to be in the form of re-posing the very question of the 
criticality of thought itself.  As Cavell nicely puts, ‘…philosophy is the criticism a culture 
produces of itself, and proceeds essentially by criticizing past efforts at this criticism…’32 
In this sense, then, the question how silence is critical includes the question silence poses: 
“How is thought critical?” Our first approximation to the critical function of silence, then, 
has to be through the question of the self reflexive criticality of modern thought. Even if 
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the Cavell passage puts this in a historically unspecified manner, self-critique of a culture 
through the self-critique of its thought seems to refer to the historical event we call 
modernity. Criticality, in this sense, is the grand denominator of the different branches of 
modern thought – meaning that as a cultural phenomenon and under its own 
determinations, modern thought cannot help but criticize. Starting from Kant, modern 
thought constitutes itself as the object of its own critical scrutiny. In Foucault’s words, 
‘[i]nterpretation and formalization have become the two great form of analysis of our 
time – in fact, we know no others.’33 Either through interpretation of the texts of 
yesterday or formalization of the patterns and concepts of the thought of today, critical 
thought defines itself by folding back on itself to find its own rightful voice, the 
legitimacy of its claims, and its own limits. This is also the movement by which modern 
thought searches for the grounds of its authority in its own structure and hence claims its 
autonomy within which reason follows nothing but its own imperatives.  
That the self-critique of thought starts having legitimate claims on the socio-
historical context in which it stands should not be understood as a self-contained event or 
a merely an intellectual/academic operation in which the imperatives of reason are 
gradually translated into the guiding principles of various social transformation programs 
either by the authority of a universal ‘ought’ or the pressing telos of a historical teleology. 
Instead, this event should be understood in its existential relations with another modern 
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invention that filled the political space in the ‘long 19th century’ of Europe from 1789 to 
1917: revolution34. As John S. Ransom puts, 
Criticism was now able to draw on the emotional attachments to an increasingly secularized 
millennialism. Critique became associated with the desire for another world… Revolution gave 
critique the gift of life, of positive existence. Instead of acting as one of life’s shadows – always 
following it around but lacking its own substance – critique could stand in the world and speak to 
it of its future.35 
 
This ‘secularized millennialism’ is marked by a displacement. Revolution displaced the 
idea of religious salvation with the idea of secular liberation. How things ought to be was 
no longer derived from a contrast between the mundane and insignificant disorderliness 
of the world and divine order but of a meaningful disorder the decipherment of which 
would reveal a mundane rational order unfolding and realizing itself beneath mundane 
disorderliness. Salvation was the promise of a divine, transcendental power which 
justifies, regulates, and gives an order to the political action. It was, in short, the 
redemption of the truth of that divine power. The modern secular political concept of 
liberation replaced the concept of religious salvation together with the terms of the divine 
logic behind it. Yet, even if the terms of that divine logic lost their political authority, the 
form of the same logic remained almost intact. Although, as a secular concept, the new 
order promised by the concept of liberation cannot be seen as the redemption of a divine 
truth, the promised order of liberation was presented in the same redemptive terms. 
Hence, liberation is the redemption of the truth of 'humanity' and of a rational order 
which is inherent in the core of human existence. In other words, liberation is the final 
rational harmony and the end of the tensions between the rational human essence and the 
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actual, historical configuration of human existence. Religious salvation neither left a 
vacuum behind it nor disappeared completely. The secular idea of liberation gradually 
covered the space of socio-political imagination where, previously, salvation had resided. 
Salvation, which was to be an apocalyptical public event, receded to the domestic space 
of bourgeois households in the form of private worship., offering individual comfort, as 
well as moral significance in the midst of the revolutionary unrest which was moving on 
the grounds of the promises of liberation.36 
Ransom observes that even if revolution initially gave critique a home in the 
world, it also reduced the value of critique to critique’s instrumentality in the process of 
social transformation, making the existence of critique conditional upon the fate of 
revolution. Once the era of revolution was over, critique lost its substance and became 
homeless again. According to Ransom, Foucault’s work is a response to this crisis of 
critique. Foucault wants to elevate the value of critique from the level of instrumentality 
to the level of a virtue by rendering the critical ends of thought internal to thought itself. 
In other words, for Foucault the critical task is not to provide a social and political 
program for those who resist and oppose the existing political order. Rather, the critical 
task suitable for philosophy is to show the historicity of our forms of thinking and thereby 
question the necessities imposed on our lives by these forms of thinking. He thinks that 
offering a programmatic politics to resistance and opposition amounts to imposing new 
necessities on our lives. In Ransom’s reading, by avoiding such a programmatic politics, 
Foucault reinstates the dignity of thought. Yet Ransom thinks that Foucault is able to 
restore the dignity of critical thought only through an intellectual regression to pre-
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revolutionary times. While it is true that like all other 20th century thinkers, Foucault’s 
work is a response to the crisis of critique, his thought cannot be understood in terms of a 
regressive romanticism, as Ransom sees it. Rather, Foucault aims at establishing a 
‘critical ontology of the present’ on the very basis of the uniqueness and singularity of the 
present. In this sense, decoupling critical thought from revolutionary political programs is 
not a form of intellectual regression, but on the contrary a precondition to avoid the risks 
of such an intellectual regression.  
Ransom’s diagnosis that Foucault’s work is a response to the post-revolutionary 
crisis of critique is an accurate diagnosis. Yet, the content of this crisis is not as simple as 
Ransom envisions.  In his reading, revolution left everything as it was. It appeared on the 
European socio-political scene like lightning, giving critique a short-lived substance, and 
disappeared suddenly, leaving critique lifeless. It is, of course, an empirico-historical 
question if revolution disappeared dialectically, i.e. completing itself through 
paradigmatic and institutional realization of its political program, or simply disappeared, 
leaving no trace behind it. It is, however, definitely a philosophical question whether 
revolution’s gift of life to critique evaporated at the end of the revolutionary era. If 
revolution ceased to be revolutionary in its post-revolutionary life, perhaps we can say 
that critique ceased to be critical in its post-revolutionary life, too. In other words, if we 
grant a certain plausibility to the idea of parallel fates of revolution and critique, then we 
can also trace the parallel fates in their afterlife. From the tribal organization of African 
national independence struggles to the Islamist/socialist hybrid organization of the 
Iranian revolution, as the claims and forms of revolution became less and less 
revolutionary, the imperatives of reason generated out of reason’s own self-critique 
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became less and less critical. As revolutions stopped promising transgressing of limits but 
reaffirmed those limits by demanding a more consolidated place within the given borders 
of nation-states, the imperatives of reason became more and more affirmative of the 
limits of social texture.  
It is this thought that informs Foucault’s thinking, for the context of the crisis of 
critique is the changing configuration of modernity in general. Modernity started as such 
a powerful earthquake that ‘everything that is solid melted into air’. It transformed the 
static, rock-solid, and fragmented communal formations of first the European continent 
and then the whole earth into a dynamic liquid social mass. It changed the very fabric 
human life is made of. Traditional forms of authority legitimized on the religious grounds 
and traditional forms of power materialized as tangible means of immediate violence 
were too solid and hence too local to claim monopoly over the control and management 
of the working of this liquid mass.  In short, this colossal transformation not only 
dissolved the loci of traditional authority and dislodged the primacy of tangible and 
immediate means of power but also rendered the social texture a politically workable 
plastic material.  Yet, out of this landscape, which the earthquake of modernity rendered a 
space of liberatory promises, there emerged ‘the iron cage of bureaucracy’ which stands 
for a new, impersonal, and pervasively institutionalized form of authority organized on 
the grounds and dynamics of the rapid and excessive ‘rationalization’ of social texture. It 
is under these conditions, then, the fate of revolution and the fate of critique became 
entangled.  
The crisis of critique to which Foucault’s work is a response is not a crisis of 
defeat but a crisis of unredeemed triumph and this perspective allows us to see the 
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Tractatus and the archaeological texts of Foucault under the same light. It is exactly the 
same triumphant thought, a reckless rationalism that Wittgenstein criticizes and resists in 
the Tractatus. Now, we can begin to develop a sense of the critical value of the common 
notion of silence in Wittgenstein and Foucault. In their earlier works, both Wittgenstein 
and Foucault think that the discursive/linguistic space is devoid of critical possibilities. 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus claims that a proposition can express how things are in the 
world but it cannot express any ethical and aesthetic values. Similarly, in his 
archaeological texts, Foucault claims that the thoughts of Marx and Freud, but especially 
that of Marx, are established on the basis of the same episteme that renders human 
sciences possible. Therefore, as the discourses of Marxism and Freudian thought are 
blind to their own ‘historical a priori’, their claims to criticality cannot surpass the 
horizons of the 19th century humanistic discourses. Both Wittgenstein and Foucault think 
that the normative/critical emptiness of linguistic/discursive space is due to its closed, 
that is limited, character. Anything sayable, even before it gets said, is already an actual 
element of discourse for, in the earlier periods of Foucault and Wittgenstein, 
linguistic/discursive space is not defined by totality of actual statements but by the 
totality of all possible statements that the rules of logic (Wittgenstein) or the episteme 
(Foucault) allow. In short, any possible statement is taken to be already an actual 
statement on the level of formal analysis. The difference between what gets said and what 
can be said does not have any analytical significance on the formal level. In this sense, 
then, their analyses exclude the possibility of articulating any normative/critical concern 
from within the discursive space. Consequently, the normative/critical element resides 
only in what is unsayable. 
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By itself, this critical strategy is neither original nor immediately effective. In fact, 
starting from Kant, modern western philosophy is marked by its obsessive fascination 
with that which is conceptually inaccessible and non-articulable. Furthermore, both 
Wittgenstein and Foucault think that that which cannot be expressed in the discursive 
space manifests itself in the form of aesthetic expressions which are the only possible 
form of its manifestation. For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, ‘ethics and aesthetics are 
one and the same’.37 One of the possible understanding of this claim is that our justice 
claims like our aesthetic expressions are to be shown in artworks instead of being 
articulated in rational discourses. Similarly, Foucault thinks that it is literature and 
painting that shows us ways to relate to the world of the unreason without violating or 
dominating the mad. 
At this point, it is necessary to ask the critical value of aesthetic acts to open up 
various spaces in our lives for that which is not articulable because implying or 
manifesting the non-articulable does not necessarily have a direct critical effect on the 
rational order of things and life. What makes their work original and strategically 
valuable is their subversive, from-within attack on what I tentatively call ‘linguistic 
liberation’ the criticism of which starts in their earlier period and gives rise to the critique 
of the modern socio-political imagination the limits of which are drawn by the idea of 
‘political liberation’.38 At this point let me call that which cannot reside within the limits 
of discursive/linguistic space the excess, even if, in the framework of this project, the 
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excess is more than what is unsayable. Linguistic liberation and its parallel paradigm, 
political liberation, are either non-cognizant of the excess or they actively pursue 
theoretico-political programs to reduce it to the status of the knowledge object of various 
discourses, making it an indistinguishable element of the rationalized fabric of the social 
space. 
I would like to discuss the idea of linguistic liberation in relation to the excess to 
argue that the philosophical question whether linguistic/discursive space is a transparent 
and stable medium has direct political bearings in the context of the development of 
modern western thought. With respect to linguistic liberation and the excess, we can 
recognize a division in the development of modern western thought.39 On the one hand, 
there is self-congratulatory rationalism as the voice of ‘triumphant thought’ which not 
only embraces Enlightenment ideals as the unquestionable basis of human emancipation 
from the despotism of irrational forces, but also perpetuates and reproduces the 
developmental narrative of the Enlightenment in which constant categorizations and 
divisions between the rational and the irrational take place on the basis of the imperatives 
of reason. In return, these divisions and categorizations are redeemed as power relations 
in the increasingly rationalized social texture either in the form of assimilation into the 
rational order or in the form of exclusion from the horizons of that order. On the other 
hand, there is a variety of dissenting voices that look for ruptures and blind spots in the 
seamlessly narrated story of the Enlightenment. These ruptures and blind spots tell the 
stories of new forms of dominations and oppressions in the midst of the liberatory 
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narration of the Enlightenment. As I pointed out earlier, criticality of thought is the 
common denominator of the variety of forms of thinking in the framework of modern 
thought. In other words, modern thought is defined by its criticality on the both sides of 
the division above. This division, then, is not a division between critical and uncritical 
thought. Rather it is the form and the mode of the criticality that render this division 
meaningful.  
In the first case, the criticality of thought is understood as the self-critique of 
thought that enables thinking to conform better to the imperatives of reason. Self-critique, 
in this sense, is more or less a mode of the self-correction of reason under the conditions 
of the post-revolutionary era. Self-critique is for the perfection of reason based on the 
imperatives of reason but the critical effects of this perfection process is replaced by the 
effects of increased effectivity of the rational domination relations that are constitutive of 
the fabric of modern social order. In the second case, criticality is a mode of historical 
scrutiny and patient questioning of those very imperatives of reason themselves for the 
story of the historical process of their formation is also the (hi)story of the modern 
domination relations. In other words, while the former tries to make the Enlightenment 
narration more seamless, self-contained, and comprehensive, the latter recovers the 
oppressed (hi)stories under the seemingly solid seamlessness of the narration of the 
Enlightenment. It does not look for further articulations of the socio-historical elements, 
but unearths the social costs of already existing articulations of social elements into the 
dominant narrations through a monolithic, meaning producing signification system.  
At this point one might have a concern that this story of modernity is too one 
sided for it exclusively focuses on the Hegelian/Marxist historicism and ignores the 
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analytical/positivistic tradition which also claims to be the rightful inheritor of modern 
thought. This is exactly the concern that linguistic liberation, as an experimental concept, 
addresses. It is meant to reveal the power effects and hence the moral/political 
dimensions of the philosophical fantasy of a stable meaning and a transparent language. 
No matter how much one is convinced, as positivists are, that she ‘does 
philosophy’ for the sake of ‘objective truth’ away from all moral and political questions, 
thinking about language and discourse, especially under modern conditions, is necessarily 
involved with the moral/political questions of life and authority. When rationalist thought 
makes language and discursive orders its object of study, the telos of its activity (and 
paradoxically, its suppressed assumption) is a rationally stable and universal order of 
meaning which shows the conditions under which the submission of the speakers to these 
rational discursive orders are not only affirming the autonomy and freedom of the 
speakers but also constitutive of that very autonomy and freedom. In other words, 
rationalist thought identifies speech and discourse as the sites of emancipation and 
liberation for it is only in speech and discourse that human beings can align themselves 
and their social surroundings to the rational order and realize their freedom. Speech frees 
the speaker, for language as the very embodiment of the rational order reflects the truth 
about our human identity. Speaking and having a voice are the conditions of possibility of 
human freedom. Modern political scene is shaped by the multifaceted interactions among 
truth, liberation, and discourse. Truth resides in the discourse and liberation redeems the 
truth of the object of the modern politics. National liberation is the promise of an order in 
which the nation submits itself to the authority of the common will of the nation which is 
the realization of the truth of the nation. Sexual liberation is the promise of a sexual order 
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in which one conforms to the imperatives derived from the truth of her/his sexuality freed  
from the burdens of the social, moral institutions which form obstacles to the liberating 
rule of the truth of sexuality. Gay liberation is the social, institutional recognition of the 
truth of the specificity and difference of gay desire. Women's liberation is the redemption 
of the truth of feminine difference. In this sense, then, despite their irreconcilable 
differences, historicist and positivist forms of modern western thought converge in their 
affirmations of stable linguistic/discursive order in which universal forms of rationality 
appear to be inseparably connected to human freedom and agency. It is in this context 
that the issue of the transparency and stability of language becomes the philosophical 
battlefield between defenders and critics of the Enlightenment ideals. The defenders of 
Enlightenment ideals develop various projects of linguistic liberation in which the 
rational rules and regulations of speech and discourse, and truth as their operational 
redemption, are projected as the normative basis of the resistance and struggle against the 
domination relations. From within the perspective of these projects, there is a perfect 
isomorphism between the binary opposition of rationality versus irrationality and that of 
legitimacy versus illegitimacy.  Thus, the object of their criticism is defined by its 
irrationality and hence illegitimacy. Those other social relations that have passed the test 
of rational legitimacy remain unchecked outside the horizon of the critical vision. 
Without rejecting the legitimacy versus illegitimacy distinction, the critics of 
Enlightenment ideals ask what it means to develop critical visions based on a universal 
rationality under the conditions of the rationalization of the social texture where the 
domination relations are not only legitimized but also constructed based on the same 
rationality. The rationalist critical vision blindly affirms the majority of modern 
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domination relations in which the injustices of pre-modern domination relations do not 
disappear but take subtler and probably more injurious forms. If the stability of meaning 
and transparency of speech and discourse as they are conceived in the projects of 
linguistic liberation are conditions of assertibility of the liberatory narration of 
Enlightenment, then, it is not surprising that those critics who seek new ways to re-
establish the criticality of thought on grounds other than triumphant rationalism also 
focus on speech and language to reveal essential instabilities of meaning and 
historical/mythical obscurities of speech and discourse as symptoms of hidden oppression 
and domination relations. 
The fantasy of stable meaning residing in a transparent language is not without 
material basis. Rationalization of social texture inserts itself through not only 
bureaucratic institutional establishment of rational social organization but also 
stabilization of meaning by reducing the universe of possible meanings into a constricted 
set of meanings regulated by a rational discursive order. In other words, rationalism self-
valorizes itself by declaring itself the exhaustive meaning of the world and life. It is in 
this sense, then, that any instability and friction in the construction of meaning is 
indicative of resistance against the penetration of rationalization. It is the excess on the 
expanding borders of rationalization that radiates waves of resistance in different 
frequencies interrupting the clarity and stability of meaning and creating static in the clear 
channels of rational discourses.  
In their earlier periods, Wittgenstein and Foucault buy into the rationalist fantasy 
of stable meaning and transparency of linguistic/discursive space. Hence, these frictions 
and instabilities cannot reside in the center of meaning. For the Wittgenstein of the 
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Tractatus all the propositions are of equal value, that is, of no value. For Foucault the 
archaeologist psychoanalytical discourse is just another instance of expanding 
rationalization. Since the excess cannot reside in the world of language and discourse, it 
appears in their early works as silence residing in exile in the form of a metaphysical 
entity, of ‘the metaphysical subject’ in Wittgenstein and ‘the sovereign enterprise of 
unreason’ in Foucault.  
 
Formalism and Critique 
 
If critique is the folding of thought on itself to scrutinize its limits, to dictate to 
itself the limits of its own authority, and thereby declare its autonomy, this means that 
critique requires thought to self differentiate itself without causing a schizophrenic split 
in its unity. In other words, in its critical stage thought faces the difficult task of being 
both the looker and the looked-at. Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s formalism is a response, 
albeit a fatalist one as we will see, to this demand of critique to ‘liberate’ thought from its 
captivity in its own tyrannical form which sustains this state of captivity by generating a 
developmental narration on the basis of pseudo critical claims. Formalist critique, by 
virtue of its demonstrative ability to present the linguistic/epistemic space as a totality, 
fulfills its critical function by revealing the homogenizing form that makes any critical 
differentiation impossible. In this sense, then, formalist critique does not criticize through 
introducing alternative and better values to an established normative system. Instead, it 
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upsets that system by neutralizing its value claims ‘by working outwards through what 
can be thought’ in that normative system.40 
As Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ‘solves’ all the problems of philosophy by formally 
exhausting what is sayable in language, he warns us in the preface that very little is 
achieved with the disappearance of all philosophical problems. The author of the 
Tractatus is not being modest in his warning. Rather, Wittgenstein here manifests the 
critical spirit of the Tractatus. When taken as an epistemic project, in Foucault’s sense , 
that positively teaches the reader how language works, the Tractatus is only a collection 
of self-destructive propositions. . The critical spirit of the Tractatus is in what it leaves 
open after definitively bounding up the realm of language and representation. In the same 
fashion, when one takes Foucault’s texts, and especially his archaeological texts, in terms 
of an epistemic project which produces self-valorized knowledge claims, the 
archaeological project has very little to offer too. The notion of historical discreteness 
renders archaeological knowledge claims very stylishly yet they remain without any 
claim on our present. For example, despite their deep intimacy with Foucault’s texts, 
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow open the introduction to their book with the 
following passage: 
This is a book about how to study human beings and what one learns from such study. Our thesis 
is that the most influential modern attempts to achieve to this understanding – phenomenology, 
structuralism, and hermeneutics – have not lived up to their self-proclaimed expectations. Michel 
Foucault offers, in our opinion, elements of a coherent and powerful alternative means of 
understanding. His works, we feel, represent the most important contemporary effort both to 
develop a method for the study of human beings and to diagnose the current situation of our 
society.41 
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As a matter of fact, Foucault never studied human beings. He extensively read, studied, 
and wrote about a very broad spectrum of texts such as ‘scientific’ studies about human 
beings, observational reports from hospitals, prisons, and asylums, institutional 
constitutions, regulations, and regimens, autobiographies, philosophical works, artistic 
works, works on military strategies, in short, almost any kind and genre one can think of. 
Yet, one cannot find one single knowledge claim about ‘human beings’ in his texts. On a 
very general level, excluding his latest writings on the Ancient Greek texts, he studied the 
studies of human beings as a curious modern invention which put the being of human 
beings in various discourses, objectified it as an element to know in the world, and 
subjected it to various rationalities.  
 Dreyfus and Rabinow’s understanding of Foucault’s texts is not a matter of 
misreading but of perspective. For them, Foucault takes over where phenomenology, 
structuralism, and hermeneutics failed to fulfill their common premises to provide a final 
articulation of human life, a definitive narration of our history, the ultimate truth and 
meaning of our meaning-producing practices. Seen from this perspective, the 
interpretative possibility that Foucault is not concerned with the better ways to fulfill 
these promises but with questioning these very promises themselves is invisible. In this 
sense, then, in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s reading, Foucault’s relation to these three 
traditions of modern thought appears not as a critical questioning of these ways of 
thinking but as complementary to their promises.  
Foucault felt, as did many other intellectuals in France at the time, that the understanding of 
human beings had reached a crucial juncture. It seemed that at last the study of human beings, 
having taken several promising steps which in the end failed to live up to their own promise, had 
finally found a program that could be carried out. The structuralist projects of Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, 
and Chomsky seemed to have opened up a domain of formal analysis which could be profitably 
pursued by anyone who could free himself from traditional preconceptions. The Order of Things, 
subtitled An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (and originally entitled The Archaeology of 
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Structuralism) is precisely an attempt to further these structuralist disciplines by determining “the 
possibilities and rights, the conditions and limitations, of a justified formalization”42   
 
Foucault, of course, did not write in vacuum and his work can be seen as a response to 
the failures of the dominant philosophical projects of his time. However, an ‘archaeology 
of structuralism’ in terms of an ‘archaeology of the human sciences’ does not mean the 
endorsement of the promises of the human sciences and structuralism no matter how 
much the archaeological formalizations resemble the structuralist formalizations.  
At this point, we can see the parallel fates of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and 
Foucault’s archaeological project. The standard readings of the Tractatus assert that 
Wittgenstein takes over when Frege’s and Russell’s projects to formalize language 
through logical symbolism fail by providing answers to the questions that remain 
unanswered in their projects. In this sense, the Tractatus is an attempt to realize the 
promises Frege and Russell previously made. Yet, the Tractatus is an attack, albeit a 
suicidal one, on the fundamental tenets of those projects. If, in the case of the Tractatus, 
showing the limits of language through its logical order does not necessarily mean to 
endorse the rational order of propositions, but on the contrary a critique of that rational 
order, then, in the same fashion, Foucault’s archaeological project is not ‘an attempt to 
further’ structuralism or any other truth seeking rational discourse but a search for an 
outside through formally defining ‘the possibilities and rights, the conditions and 
limitations, of a justified formalization’. An example that belongs to Foucault’s later 
period will clarify the point. In a radio interview, when asked if homosexuality is a 
natural or a cultural phenomenon, Foucault’s answer was simply that he does not know. 
The point is that explaining homosexuality as a natural phenomenon or a cultural 
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phenomenon through knowledge claims is irrelevant to Foucault’s archaeological, and 
also to his genealogical, project for neither of the options as ‘explanatory’ epistemic 
constructs gives us automatic oppression or resistance possibilities. What interests 
Foucault is rather the claim that these explanatory accounts make on us under the 
conditions of rationalization. To do justice to Dreyfus and Rabinow, in his archaeological 
period Foucault does not have a clear account of what kind of regulatory, constructive, 
ethical, or political claims these epistemic constructs have on us. Only in his later period 
can he present us an account of how these epistemic constructs are also strategic 
constructs and how one should read these epistemic constructs through their power 
effects in terms of their strategic use in power relations. Yet, again, the absence of such 
an account does not mean that Foucault is interested in furthering the epistemic projects 
of the explanatory accounts such as structuralism.      
 As we have seen, this outside cannot be an integral part of the Tractatus but as 
formalist analysis reveals the limits of language the outside makes itself felt as that which 
lies on the other side of the border. Since this negative existence of the outside is a 
necessary result of formalist methodology, it is not surprising to observe that Foucault’s 
formalism also gives rise to the negative existence of the outside. I would like to refer to 
an anomaly in the general architecture of The Order of Things to exemplify the negative 
appearance of the outside. This text is regarded as the least critical/political text Foucault 
wrote during his archaeological period. In Madness and Civilization, and The Birth of the 
Clinic Foucault analyses discourses the knowledge claims of which are immediately 
entangled with an institutional structure in charge of managing, categorizing, and 
regulating the lives of those under its roof. In a sense the authority of knowledge is so 
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solidified in the very walls of these institutions that the effects of rationalization is more 
immediately visible in the texts preceding The Order of Things. The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, though more abstract and formal than all of his other texts, is the first in 
which Foucault attempts to develop an account of ‘non-discursive’ practices and 
discourses as actualities rather than epistemic spaces of possibilities. Furthermore, the 
analyzed discourses have no immediate institutional affiliations in The Order of Things 
and we do not have any account of how ‘non-discursive’ forces interact with the 
discursivity. Due to the absence of such accounts, the question why a specific body of 
knowledge claims in a discourse emerges even if it is just a moment of the actualization 
of some and not all of possible knowledge claims. In short, The Order of Things does 
give the impression that it is an epistemic project which seeks the truth of its knowledge 
object without any critical concern. Yet, at the end of the eighth chapter where Foucault 
analyzes labor, life, and language as formal concepts that signal the emergence of the 
modern episteme, this outside forces itself into the text. Whereas in the cases of labor and 
life Foucault does not feel compelled to include the other of political economy and of 
biology (and we do not know at this point in the text if they exist or not), when the issue 
at stake is language, Foucault does not think that he can finish the chapter without the 
other of philology.  
Finally, the last of the compensations for the demotion of language, the most important and also 
the most unexpected, is the appearance of literature, of literature as such – for there has of course 
existed in the Western world, since Dante, since Homer, a form of language that we now call 
‘literature’. But the word is of recent date, as is also, in our culture the isolation of a particular 
language whose peculiar mode of being is ‘literary’.43 
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However, the event of the birth of modern literature, ‘the most important and the most 
unexpected’ event in the configuration of modern linguistic space, does not find any 
textual place other than a paragraph at the very end of the central chapter of The Order of 
Things. This is because the site Foucault the archaeologist excavates does not include any 
items that will tell the story of that event.  
[A]t a time when language was burying itself within its own density as an object and allowing 
itself to be traversed, through and through, by knowledge, it was also reconstituting itself 
elsewhere, in an independent form…Literature is the contestation of philology (of which it is 
nevertheless the twin figure)…44    
 
This ‘elsewhere’ shaped by ‘an independent form’ is in fact that outside for the sake of 
which Foucault the archaeologist excavates an enormous amount of textual material. Yet, 
precisely because it is the outside of the site of excavation, it is also the point where the 
archaeological analysis vanishes. Our critical question here is this: if the archaeological 
apparatus is designed to reveal the form of knowledge claims and not to recognize that 
alien ‘independent form’, i.e. the aesthetic form, and to work inside the episteme and not 
in its outside, how can the archaeological apparatus tell that the formal totality it reveals 
is not all enclosing and that the limits it draws does not mark the vanishing point of 
everything that matters but a sign of a significant ‘elsewhere’? The answer is simply that 
it cannot. This question is the same question we asked earlier about the demonstrative 
capability of tautologies and contradiction to show the world and language as a limited 
totality. As with the mysticism of Wittgenstein, the critical/normative content of 
Foucault’s archaeological works, even if it makes itself felt in the text, resides outside of 
his texts. (And this is, as we will see, what makes their earlier critical strategies fatalistic.) 
This does not mean that his texts are devoid of normative content. Rather, as in the case 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., 300 
 58
of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, Foucault’s formal reconstruction of the realm of the 
episteme as a homogenous totality devoid of any critical potentiality is so strong that he 
also neutralizes the possibility of vocalizing any normative claim out of his 
archaeological analyses.  
The normative/critical claims of the Tractatus are caught in their own gravity and 
hence the contrast between the existence of their signs and their textual non-existence 
point to the non-articulable life of the subject in the form of a black hole. In the same 
fashion, while reading the archaeological texts, the reader might have the impression that 
following the voice of the archaeologist and reenacting his journey into the deeper layers 
of the episteme will lead the reader to that outside space as if it is the endpoint of the 
journey of the archaeologist. Yet, the voice of the archaeologist already comes from 
outside in the sense that the archaeological project can be written only if the archaeologist 
has a sense of totality and limitedness of the episteme. This is of course a reformulation 
of Wittgenstein’s warning to his readers in the preface to the Tractatus that one can 
understand the Tractatus only if she has already had the thoughts expressed in it. The 
outside in this sense is not the endpoint of the Tractarian journey but the very beginning 
of it. What the Tractatus does is not to elevate the reader from her ignorance by teaching 
her something about the world. What it does is to make the reader recognize where she 
already is by changing her/his perception of the world so that s/he can ‘see the world 
aright’. As Wittgenstein’s preface to the Tractatus establishes the outside as the 
beginning of the Tractarian journey, Foucault’s preface to The Order of Things shows 
how the possibility of the archaeological project arises in recognition of an impossibility 
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which is the sign of totality and its outside simultaneously. Let me quote the entire first 
paragraph of the preface which, I think, is essential to the point I am trying to make. 
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered as I read the 
passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought – our thought, the thought that bears the stamp 
of our age and our geography – breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which 
we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to 
disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This 
passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in which it is written that ‘animals are divided 
into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) 
fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) 
drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like flies.’ In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing, the thing 
we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic 
charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of 
thinking that.45    
 
Foucault starts the next paragraph with a question: “But what is it impossible to think, 
and what kind of impossibility are we faced with here?” The rest of the text, then, is an 
answer to this question. Foucault’s experience with the Borges passage is not a small 
biographical detail but indicative of a methodological necessity that the archaeological 
project can start only with the recognition of the impossibility to think the outside. Yet, 
paradoxically, such a recognition is possible only with an encounter with the outside. 
This encounter is in the form of ‘one great leap’ of meaning. Like the Tractatus, 
archaeological thought is also thought ‘in flight’. The leap Foucault mentions above is 
not a result of a gradual accumulation of thought but a violent disruption of thought in the 
presence of an alien form which is ‘demonstrated’ ‘by means of the fable’. What is 
demonstrated in the fable is ‘the stark impossibility of thinking’ what is demonstrated in 
the fable and precisely because it is impossible to think what is demonstrated, what is 
demonstrated overpowers thought. This is exactly what Wittgenstein means when he says 
that ‘a work of art forces our perception to see in the right perspective. Left to itself, 
thought is capable of reproducing itself in its sameness infinitely without ‘bumping into’ 
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any limits. Thought stops its mindless self-reproduction and starts thinking about itself 
only when something outside itself overpowers its capability to extend itself infinitely. 
This is the moment of thought becoming self-reflexive by thinking ‘[b]ut what is it 
impossible to think, and what kind of impossibility are we faced with here?’46  
 Perhaps the parallel between the Tractarian distinction of saying/showing and the 
archaeological significance of the demonstrative capabilities of the artwork is most 
visible in Foucault’s ‘reading’ of Las Meninas by Velázquez. If Borges’ text forces 
modern thought to face the impossibility to go beyond itself, Las Meninas by Velázquez 
attracts thought as an entrance to an archaeological site that has preserved the possibilities 
and impossibilities and hence the limits of the Classical episteme. As an entrance to the 
Classical episteme, Las Meninas is also an exit from the Classical episteme to the modern 
episteme. Since it is a junction between modernity and the Classical age, it presents not 
only what is impossible to say in the Classical episteme, but also what emerges as a 
possibility out of the space to which the vanishing moment of the Classical episteme 
points. The impossibility that shows itself is the impossibility to represent the act of 
representation in the absence of ‘man’ as the subject behind the act of representation.47 In 
the very center of the painting, a mirror, reflects the outside of that representational space. 
Man as the sovereign subject, which is to say the king, appears there. For Foucault, the 
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painting is able to present and give a positive visual body to what is utterly different 
because the economy of the visual and the order of language work on different levels 
according to different regulations.  
But the relation of language to painting is an infinite relation. It is not that words are imperfect, or 
that when confronted by visible, they prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the 
other’s terms: it is in vain that we say what we see: what we see never resides in what we say. And 
it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are 
saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but that 
defined by the sequential elements of syntax.48  
 
The saying/showing distinction is not a simple epistemic device deployed when words 
fail. In this distinction, Foucault the archaeologist recognizes both the locatedness, and 
hence limitedness, of the self-identical and the space of exile where the other resides. For 
Wittgenstein too, ‘what can be shown, cannot be said’ because what shows itself does not 
reside within the space of linguistic representation. The fact that propositions cannot say 
what is shown does not point to a failure of the signification system that can be fixed by 
finding ways to say it adequately and properly; on the contrary, what shows itself cannot 
be said precisely because the propositional system works perfectly and adequately. In this 
sense, propositions that try to say what is shown are not false, incorrect, wrong, or 
inadequate because these categories imply the possibility for propositions about what is 
shown can be true, right, correct, and adequate. For Wittgenstein, they are simply 
nonsense, because ‘it is in vain that we say what we see’. Language can try to say what is 
shown, of course, but the demand that gives rise to the impulse to say what is shown can 
never be satisfied by what language says about it, and hence, the relation between 
language and what is shown becomes infinite in the form of the dissatisfaction of that 
demand.  
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The Outside 
 
At the first sight Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s views about the subject seem to be 
completely incommensurable. For Wittgenstein, the metaphysical subject that resides on 
the borders of the world and of language is what makes representation possible. It is the 
source of aesthetic and ethical value. It is the excess Wittgenstein tries to save from the 
abuses of rationalization. The intellectual climate in which Foucault the archaeologist 
wrote was dominated by anti-humanist structuralism the main purpose of which was to 
finalize the project of Western philosophy by getting rid of the idea of a sovereign 
meaning-giver and foundational subject and filling its space with ahistoric structures 
beneath history, society, language, and the ego. Even if Foucault always rejected the 
suggestion that he was a structuralist, it is obvious that his anti-humanist archaeological 
project is deeply connected to the project of structuralism in terms of its formalism and 
anti-humanism. In short, for Foucault, the subject is not the point of resistance against the 
rationalization process but rather a central element in the project of rationalization. As a 
result, while Wittgenstein sees the expressions of subjectivity in the artwork where the 
ethical/aesthetical claims of the subject shows themselves, Foucault sees a destructive 
dispersion of subjectivity in the artwork. Yet, beneath the appearance of this 
incommensurability, one can see a common objection to the idea of the subject as a 
sovereign thinking ‘I’. This, of course, does not mean that the differences between their 
views on the issue of the subject are not genuine. What I mean is that despite the 
differences in their views on the subject, their common search for an outside underlines 
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their common objection to the idea of the subject as it is conceptualized in rationalist 
discourses.  
 In rationalist discourses, the subject appears to be the possessor of thoughts, a 
positive yet extensionless entity that is the doer behind operations such as believing, 
deciding, thinking etc. Indeed, ordinary language is full of statements such as “S thinks 
that…”, “I believe that…”, “S has thoughts about”, all of which seem to point to such an 
entity. When Wittgenstein analyzes the form of such complex statements he says: “It is 
clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’, and ‘A says p’ are of the 
form ‘“p” says p’: and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but 
rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.”49 If 
representation is the only possible way to say anything meaningful, then ‘A says p’ 
means that either an object A is in a representational relation with the fact p (which is an 
impossibility), or A is not an object but a composite. To ascribe the rational actions of 
believing, thinking, saying etc., then, requires one to assume a composite subject. Hence, 
the fact that the logical form of the sentences that seem to imply a subject holding 
thoughts and beliefs is different from their apparent form ‘shows too that there is no such 
thing as the soul – the subject, etc. – as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the 
present day’ because ‘indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul’.50  
As the pure outside of language and of the world, the experience of the subject in 
the Tractatus cannot be put into words. “There is no such thing as the subject that thinks 
or entertains ideas.”51 The thinking ‘I’ that seems to be a shared topic between 
‘superficial psychology of the present day’ and philosophical speculation is both an 
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expression of epistemologically misguided attempts to say what cannot be said and also a 
moment of the colonization of the realm of aesthetic/ethical value by rationalization. Seen 
from this perspective, then, the Tractarian subject displaces the thinking ‘I’ as the subject 
constituting the deepest layer of rationality, and reconstructs itself as the pure non-
articulable experience of hovering over the world and language.  
In his article on Blanchot, Foucault also seeks the moments of the displacement of 
the thinking ‘I’ in the artwork through which the outside of language shows itself in the 
dispersion of subjectivity. He starts with a familiar paradox: “I lie”. The truth of this 
statement is immediately self-contradictory for it simultaneously negates the truth it 
asserts. For Foucault, this paradox was able to threaten the foundations of the Greek truth. 
What threatens the modern discourse, however, is not this Greek paradox but the 
statement “I speak” in which the speech becomes its own performative object. Contrary 
to the Greek paradox, this statement is self-affirmative in the sense that the moment of 
the utterance of this statement is also the realization of its truth. Yet, for Foucault, one 
can discern an upsetting problematic in the self transparent identity of this statement. 
“I speak” refers to a supporting discourse that provides it with an object. The discourse, however, 
is missing; the sovereignty of “I speak” can only reside in the absence of any other language; the 
discourse about which I speak does not pre-exist the nakedness articulated the moment I say, “I 
speak”; it disappears the instant I fall silent. Any possibility of language dries up in the transitivity 
of its execution.52 
 
The sentence “I speak” says nothing more than itself. Even if its object, ‘speaking’, is a 
discursive object, the performative, momentary character of “I speak” excludes the 
discursive order. It is, on the one hand, self-contained, but, on the other hand, under the 
absence of discursive order, there is nothing that can limit the ‘sovereignty’ of “I speak”. 
Hence “I speak” fades away in the void opened by the performative character of the 
                                                 
52
 Michel Foucault & Maurice Blanchot, Foucault/Blanchot (Zone Books, 1987), 11. 
 65
statement. Therefore, it is the ‘spreading forth of language in its raw state, an unfolding 
of pure exteriority’.53 For Foucault, “I speak” is the mode of language operational in 
modern literature. Even if modern literature seems to ‘interiorize’ language by making 
language its own object, literature is actually ‘a passage to the “outside”: language 
escapes the mode of being of discourse – in other words the dynasty of representation – 
and literary speech develops from itself.’54 
When language escapes from its discursive form, not only its representational 
functions but also the illusion of a subject behind the representations disappear. And this 
is the reason why literature has claims on modern philosophical activity the central 
problematic of which has been to establish a sovereign subjectivity.  
The reason it is now so necessary to think through fiction – while in the past it was a matter of 
thinking the truth – is that “I speak” runs counter to “I think”. “I think” led to the indubitable 
certainty of the “I” and its existence; “I speak,” on the other hand, distances, disperses, effaces that 
existence and lets only its empty emplacement appear. Thought about thought, an entire tradition 
wider than philosophy, has taught us that thought leads us to the deepest interiority. Speech about 
speech leads us, by way of literature as well as perhaps by other paths, to the outside in which the 
speaking subject disappears.55 
 
This search for an outside experience as ‘the thought from outside’ is what ties 
Wittgenstein’s account of language in the Tractatus and Foucault’s radical anti-
humanism in his archaeological period. One cannot, of course, argue that the differences 
between their accounts are just nominal, yet one cannot fail either to see the kinship 
between their search for an outside. Foucault himself recognizes the fact that modern 
literature’s search for a pure externality is related to mysticism on the one hand and 
formalization of language on the other. This double kinship is not surprising given that 
the condition of possibility of replacing the thinking “I” through introducing a radical 
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outside, where the genuine experience resides, as the ability to see the language and the 
world as limited totalities. And, at least in the history of Western thought, this ability 
takes the form of either formalization or mysticism, or, and this may be also the point of 
Wittgenstein’s genius, a combination of the two.  
Foucault alludes to attempts to formalize language as thought which is in the 
process of excluding the subject from thought. The being of language, which is an ‘abyss 
hitherto invisible’, becomes visible with the disappearance of the subject. The access to 
‘this strange relation’ is gained through a form of thought developed ‘on the margin of 
Western culture’ where mysticism and formalism reside. In this line of thought, there is a 
very strong resemblance to the Tractatus. First of all, Foucault consciously chooses the 
language of visibility rather than the language of articulation. The being of language, i.e. 
the totality of language, becomes visible only when one gains access to the outside of the 
discourse of representation. Once outside, this totality cannot be articulated because the 
very possibility of articulation lies within the limits of representational discourse. Hence, 
modern literature performatively renders the being of language visible. In a similar 
fashion with the Tractatus which is a reading of not what statements tell but what their 
formal totality shows, for Foucault, the fact that modern literature is a speech about 
speech and the fact that its truth is in the moment of its performance, i.e. it does not tell 
anything other than its telling, are also the grounds on which modern literature produces 
‘thought from outside’.  
Both Wittgenstein and Foucault think that this outside is not an extension of 
language and existence in a different form. The outside does not fit the representational 
economy of language and the categories of the metaphysics of presence, because ‘it is the 
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silence beyond all language and nothingness beyond all being.’56 As we have seen, the 
reason Wittgenstein wants us to be silent about this outside experience is precisely the 
radical ‘ontological’ otherness of it. As we will see, there is an ambiguity as to whether to 
remain silent is an ethical responsibility or an epistemic imperative. At this point, 
however, it should suffice to note that for Wittgenstein silence is not a mute emptiness. 
Rather, it is the speech that is empty in its self-identity. Silence is an effect of 
overpowering the self-identity of speech by what shows itself as the incommensurable 
other of the speech. This is, of course, not to deny the forceful domination of life by 
representational language. The demands of our other life, which we have to live silently, 
cannot even be expressed, let alone satisfied, within the representational economy of 
language. Thus, this radical otherness of our other life can be felt and shown through 
‘thought in flight’ and not through the settled and located language the this-worldliness of 
which also makes us speaking subjects. This bare fact that life and the world, which are 
one, exists by itself, in itself, and for itself as a totality on the level of which the local 
interests of living beings lose their significance shows itself in the medium of the 
artwork. It is the artwork through which we can ‘feel’ connected inarticulately to this 
totality from within the representational economy of language and the world of beings in 
which we are caught.  
For Foucault, too, the demands of this outside experience can be expressed only in 
literature57 because in the medium of reflexive thought ‘the demand was being 
                                                 
56
 Ibid., 16 
57
 Here, however, one difference should be noted. For Wittgenstein, the aesthetic demonstrative capability 
of artwork is more or less a passive ability to reflect the world as a totality. He does not seem to think that 
artwork in general and literary text in specific is not constructive of the outside experience. For Foucault, 
however, the aesthetic labor of the literary artist is not a reflective but a constructive labor. The literary 
artist constructs the outside experience not to transmit an already existing outside experience which is also 
 68
formulated, most imperiously, to interiorize the world, to erase alienation, to move 
beyond the false moment of the Entaüsserung, to humanize nature, to naturalize man, and 
to recover on earth the treasures that had been spent in heaven’.58 Notice that Foucault 
does not talk about a rejection of the demand of outside experience but an inappropriate 
formulation of the demand. In this sense then, philosophy, reflexive thought, is an 
inappropriate response to this experience. The outside experience does not demand to be 
appropriated by rational means; it does not demand us to find an appropriate place for its 
singularity, particularity, and uniqueness in our constructions of the universal, the 
absolute, the general because, by definition, there is no appropriate place in our rational 
categories to express the claim of the outside. Thus, echoing the Tractarian imperative of 
silence with an additional caution and hopefulness, Foucault says: 
It is extremely difficult to find a language faithful to this [outside] thought. Any purely reflexive 
discourse runs the risk of leading the experience of the outside back to the dimension of 
interiority; reflection tends irresistibly to repatriate it to the side of consciousness and to develop it 
into a description of living that depicts the “outside” as the experience of the body, space, the 
limits of the will, and the ineffaceable presence of the other.59  
 
In this sense, even if philosophy is a recognition of this demand of the outside in an 
inappropriate form, its inappropriateness is not a corrigible, self-contained mistake. If I 
am to be allowed to speculate the little bit that seems to be required by this passage, we 
can see that under the conditions of rationalization the philosophical attempt to respond to 
the demand of the outside turns into a destructive force. The rationalization process 
endows reflexive thought with more power than it can handle. That is to say, the context 
of rationalization puts reflexive thought in a situation in which the power of rationality 
overpowers the very same critical authority of reason to such a degree that the presumed 
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autonomy of reason turns into a blindness toward the destructive effects of its own force. 
The injuries on the social body thus remain unrecognized and unchecked. Whenever 
philosophy attempts to recognize the outside experience, the recognition attempt turns 
into a violent submission of that outside to the order of rationalization. If it is plausible to 
assume that the Foucault passage above is an echo of the Tractarian imperative to remain 
silent, then we can also recognize the echo of the Wittgensteinian worry behind that 
imperative. The imperative to remain silent, as it echoes in Foucault’s warning of the 
risks of ‘purely reflexive discourse’, is an attempt to resist the violent submission of the 
outside ‘back to the dimension of interiority’. This submission has to be violent because, 
by definition, the outside is ‘ontologically’ unfit to the dimensions of inside. Thus, one 
must disfigure the outside to the degree of unrecognizability to make it fit to the 
categories of the inside.  
 
The Problem with Formalism 
 
Even if I have not introduced Philosophical Investigations into the conceptual 
framework of this chapter, I would like to quote from it because, in the following 
passage, Wittgenstein seems to diagnose the problem with formalist critique that I would 
like to address.  
To say "This combination of words makes no sense" excludes it from the sphere of language and 
thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various 
kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to 
prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be part of a game and the players 
be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one man ends 
and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am 
drawing it for.60 
 
                                                 
60
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 499. 
 70
As we have seen, in the Tractatus the reason Wittgenstein cannot say why he draws a 
limit to language is precisely because of the absolute muteness of the other side of 
language. So the reason of drawing a limit to language, i.e. the content of the Tractarian 
critique, cannot be put in words. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus wants his readers ‘to 
jump over the boundary’ to a mystic experience. Yet, what the young Wittgenstein did 
not realize and the mature Wittgenstein points to is that the purpose of fencing could be 
‘to prevent someone from getting in or out’.  Wittgenstein’s point here is not that the 
critic should provide a prescription as to what to do with the limits of language and 
discourse. Rather, the task of the critic is to show that what, on the grounds of 
epistemology, logic, discourse, or a power structure, seems to be an unsurpassable limit is 
in fact a specific and contextual construction which can function in irreducibly different 
ways and for different purposes. This, of course, does not mean that the limits, which 
shape our ‘form of life’ by simultaneously enabling and disabling us to live our lives in 
this or that way,  are not ‘really real’. Indeed, these limits are real enough that one 
immediately experiences their solidity when she bumps into them in the form of 
exclusions, prosecutions, lynching, labeling, criminalization, medicalization, etc. But 
these limits are not given once and for all; their establishment is an open-ended and 
incessant process of construction. Since drawing a limit is a social practice that 
immediately affects the forms our life takes, the task of the critic does not end when these 
limits are revealed by the formal inquiry. In other words a formal inquiry into what can 
be said (form) in a bounded linguistic domain, does not tell us what gets said (content). 
Since the effects, social costs, exclusive and inclusive functions of limits do not lie in the 
sheer fact that there is a limit but in the way that limit is drawn and functions in our 
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practices, the task of the critic is to reveal these limits on the level of their actual 
functioning in our practices.  
As is obvious, this is a criticism of the Tractatus, in which the 
transcendental/mystical display of the limits of language is based on the presumption of 
the unanswerable character of the question ‘why?’.  In the same fashion as Wittgenstein, 
Foucault, in his later period, also thinks that revealing the epistemic limits of discourses 
by itself does not automatically produce critical effects. 
… there are no reforms in themselves.61 Reforms do not come about in empty space, 
independently of those who make them…And then, above all, I don’t [sic] think that criticism can 
be set against transformation, “ideal” criticism against “real” transformation. A critique does not 
consist in saying that things aren’t [sic] good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type 
of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted 
practices are based…There is always a little thought occurring even in the most stupid institutions; 
there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and 
trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that 
what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make harder those 
acts which are now too easy.62  
 
Archaeological analysis shows how the epistemic value of a statement is limited by the 
form of the discourse in which the statement occurs. Even if Foucault the archaeologist is 
aware of the fact that there is a close connection between institutional authority and 
epistemic authority, the methodological commitment to formalism prevents 
archaeological analysis from penetrating the deep layers of this connection because this 
connection can be captured only when we have a vision of the significance of what 
actually gets said in a discourse. The task of the critic, however, is not limited to 
revealing how hidden, invisible, and suppressed epistemic elements ground the truth and 
validity of discursive speech because, as our practices are based on these ‘unexamined 
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ways of thinking’, the epistemic value of any discursive statement is dissociable from its 
strategic value, and this value expresses itself not in the ahistoric discursive universe of 
what is possible to say (form) but in the actual genealogical record of what gets said 
(content). In this sense, while, on the archaeological level, an actual discursive statement, 
as a contingent realization of a discursive possibility among other equally possible 
statements, is insignificant, on the genealogical level the actuality of a statement is 
significant because the actualization or non-actualization of a statement has effects on the 
configuration of ‘accepted practices’.  
Here, then, Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s criticisms of their earlier ways of 
criticism converge. What they realize is that revealing the limits of discursive/linguistic 
space on the grounds of logic or episteme is not only an inefficient critical strategy but 
also a self-destructive one.63 Let me detail how formalism leads to fatalism and escapism 
in their earlier periods. 
 Foucault’s Madness and Civilization is a strange first book. Even if it is generally 
classified as an exemplary archaeological work, one can easily recognize the genealogical 
worm already irritating the limits of the archaeological discourse. This early and 
premature genealogical approach makes itself visible in two themes. First, Foucault tries 
to write a unified history of a modern institution together with the emergence of a new 
discursive truth regime, a new rationality, and a new positive domain of knowledge. As a 
result we are able to see the first glimpse of the concept of power/knowledge which 
signifies the power effects of this uniquely modern co-formation of a set of 
institutionalized practices and knowledge production. Second, while he writes ‘an 
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archaeology of silence’, he also gives us some clues about ‘how’ resisting voices could be 
possible in the middle of the hegemonic effects of a certain discursive regime.64  
Precisely because the genealogical element shows itself as a non-integral part of 
this archaeological text, we can see the shortcomings of the archaeological critique in the 
moments of non-integration of the genealogical element within a formalist framework. 
After claiming that psychoanalysis is not a liberating rupture in the body of the 
monologue between reason and unreason and that ‘it remains a stranger to the sovereign 
enterprise of unreason’, in the last paragraph before the conclusion chapter, Foucault 
points to another ‘discursive’ space in which madness shows itself. 
Since the end of eighteenth century, the life of unreason no longer manifests itself except in the 
lightning flash of works such as those of Hölderlin, of Nerval, of Nietzsche, or of Artaud – forever 
irreducible to those alienations that can be cured, resisting by their own strength that gigantic 
moral imprisonment which we are in the habit of calling, doubtless by antiphrasis65, the liberation 
of insane by Pinel and Tuke.66 (Madness and Civilization, p. 278) 
 
If this was the final concluding paragraph of Foucault’s work on madness, one could 
easily deduce from it that unreason resists against the silencing and suffocating discourse 
of reason in the medium of art which is made possible by the capabilities of aesthetic 
‘discourse’ to externalize and distance itself from the discursive order of reason. In other 
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words, due to the opposing autonomies of truth and beauty, aesthetic beauty would here 
seem to give unreason its voice back. However, something is missing in this reading: the 
archaeological critique itself. If the battle is between truth and beauty, reason and 
unreason, the psychiatrist and the artist, then, how should one situate the archaeologist in 
this battle which seems to leave no room for a third party. Moreover, if madness takes 
care of itself in its encounter with rational discourse by resisting it through its emergence 
in the work of art, then, the critic either becomes a bad poet or starts a new career as a 
psychiatrist.  This is because the limits that the archaeologist draws already appear as the 
battle line between reason and unreason. The archaeologist exhausts what is possible to 
say within the psychiatric discourse and shows that the form of that discourse does not 
allow the experience of madness to vocalize itself. Yet, the archaeologist has to stop there 
too, for her/his own voice cannot penetrate the thick silence surrounding the psychiatric 
discourse. In this sense, when the archaeologist projects the inside of the discourse as a 
uniform space without any margins for unreason or critique, and the outside as non-
articulable silence, the archaeological voice suddenly becomes redundant. Despite its 
obvious sympathy for the experience of madness, the archaeological voice is not the 
resisting aesthetic ‘voice’ of madness. Yet it does not tell the truth of madness either. As 
in the Wittgenstein passage above, the archaeologist draws a limit yet neither she nor the 
reader knows what to do with that limit because the transgressive demand can only come 
from outside, i.e. the realm of silence and aesthetic display. This is of course a threat to 
the whole of the archaeological project.   
 Madness and Civilization, however, does not end with the passage quoted above. 
Instead, as if Foucault sensed the threat to his critique of these ‘works…resisting by their 
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own strength’, (emphasis is mine) the book takes a strange turn and ends with a separate 
conclusion which is structured more like a long footnote to the passage above than 
concluding remarks on the whole body of the text. In the conclusion, Foucault specifies 
how the connections of madness to the work of art in the classical period were differently 
established than the connections between them in the modern period. In the classical 
period,  
…there existed  a region where madness challenged the work of art, reduced it ironically, made of 
its iconographic landscape a pathological world of hallucinations; that language which was 
delirium was not a work of art. And conversely, delirium was robbed of its meager truth as 
madness if it was called a work of art. But by admitting this very fact, there was no reduction of 
one by the other, but rather (remembering Montaigne) a discovery of the central incertitude where 
the work of art is born, at the moment when it stops being born and is truly a work of art.67  
 
The work of art and madness were in a limiting, but also reciprocally sustaining, 
relationship by virtue of which the truth of the artwork becomes visible. In return, this 
limiting relationship enabled madness to offer the Western world ‘the possibility of 
transcending its reason in violence, and of recovering tragic experience beyond the 
promises of dialectic’. In the Renaissance period, Erasmus made folly praise herself as 
the foolish truth of reason. In the classical period, Sade and Goya were able to derive a 
threatening violence from the non-being of madness which was also the transgressive 
horizon of reason. In a sense, then, there was a compatibility between reason and 
unreason in the periods in which reason had not proliferated itself across the exclusive 
lines of well-defined and isolated discourses of those ‘human sciences’, such as  
psychiatry, within which the ‘non-being’ of unreason was constructed as a scientific 
phenomenon and a positive domain of knowledge. In short, when reason closed the 
asylum’s doors on the madman, it also closed its discursive doors to the voices 
manifested in the work of art and only then it could declare itself the only voice to tell the 
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truth of madness. It is in this context, then, the modern form of the relationship between 
the work of art and madness emerged. In the modern period, this relationship takes a fatal 
form for the artist’s ‘madness is precisely the absence of the work of art.’ (emphasis is in 
the original) Madness does not sustain the work of art anymore. This is not because 
madness limits the work of art with sharper boundaries than the boundaries drawn 
between them in the classical period; on the contrary, madness does not limit the work of 
art at all. It is under the conditions of this limitlessness, and of consequent formlessness 
and shapelessness, that the work of art dissolves as a result of its crossing of its own 
boundaries, which are not visibly drawn but inherent in the formal expressive capabilities 
of aesthetic creation. On the one hand, the work of art, as a positive object in its formal 
unity, is a survivor of a battle between madness and the artistic creation. However, this 
battle is not fought by the artist against madness on the side of reason; on the contrary, 
the intolerability of the effects of pure rationality and truth as well as reason’s failure to 
render the world meaningful produce artistic creation and madness as exclusive options: 
the artist has to create or s/he will go mad. The work of art, then, is a moment of 
tolerability in its aesthetic form as against the intolerability of the content. On the other 
hand, ‘by the madness which interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a moment of 
silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where the 
world is forced to question itself’.68   
If presence, meaning, unity, and order are made possible by formal limitations, 
then, (precisely because artistic creation does not know its limits anymore) the work of 
art becomes a gate to that very limitlessness and formlessness. Through this artistic gate, 
the threat of formlessness and limitlessness constantly introduces silence that upsets 
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speech, void that upsets presence, breach that upsets unity. It is precisely because the 
orderly unity of the world cannot answer the question posed by the artwork that the world 
starts questioning itself. In this sense, then, neither the form of the work of art as its 
condition of possibility nor its appearance in the world as an object, but precisely how art 
cannot appear as a positivity in this world determines the significance of the work of art 
in the modern social texture. This significance is nothing other than the insignificance of 
the work of art through which we have a glimpse of the cost borne by the significant to 
become significant. While rationality, truth, and meaning embrace what is here, the work 
of art is a reminder of the injustices induced through presence, truth, and meaning. 
Beauty, then, in modern times, is an unsatisfiable justice claim which, due to its 
unsatisfiability,  constantly forces the world to justify itself against the claims of what is 
lost.  
Ruse and new triumph of madness: the world that thought to measure and justify madness through 
psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its struggles and agonies it measures itself 
by the excess of works like those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud. And nothing in itself, 
especially not what it can know of madness, assures the world that it is justified by such works of 
madness.69 (MC, p. 289)  
   
For the purposes of my argument, the most critical point of Foucault’s conclusion is that 
the conclusion leads us back to the beginning of the book where Foucault declares that 
his aim in this book is to write ‘the archaeology of a silence’. In the introduction to the 
book, Foucault says that this silence is a result of a broken dialogue between reason and 
unreason, but at the same time it is both the ground and the effect of reason’s ‘monologue 
about madness’. In the conclusion, we see that, in the medium of art, this silence becomes 
a claim on the world and a question awaiting its impossible answer. In any case, the work 
of art transforms this silence into something that demands a response. Foucault’s 
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archaeological inquiry into this silence, then, is a response to this demand because this 
silence itself is not silent at all. What the archaeological inquiry shows is that what 
appears to be an absolute silence of unreason and madness is, in fact, the deafness of 
reason. Hence, as opposed to the mute silence in the introduction, in the conclusion we 
encounter a talkative silence audible to the right ears. The criticality of Foucault’s text, 
then, lies in this transformation and specification of silence through archaeological 
inquiry.  
Seen from this perspective, in the last chapter of Madness and Civilization, 
Foucault tries to situate the voice of archaeology which belongs neither to madness nor to 
reason. The site from which the archeologist speaks is the void opened by modernity 
between madness and reason. However, Foucault cannot vindicate the threat of the 
artwork, the rightful medium of madness, in his own archaeological project. The 
talkativeness of the silence of the ‘sovereign enterprise of unreason’ bypasses the 
archaeological project and establishes its line of resistance in the medium of the artwork. 
Madness as a limit experience already upsets experience within the limits and makes its 
own claims on the world. From a formal perspective, the inside of the psychiatric 
discourse is uniform and this uniformity not only excludes any possibility of an internal 
transformation but also reflects back the claims of madness on the world. Hence, the void 
the archaeologist tries to situate her/himself in becomes a normative non-place because 
this place has no claims on either psychiatric discourse or the experience of madness. 
This ambiguity as to the status of the voice of the critic is due to the radical distinction 
between reason and unreason which, in the framework of Madness and Civilization, 
corresponds to the distinction between the pure and immediate experience of madness, 
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and reason’s project of mediation of this experience. The suicidal moment of the 
archaeologist is that she, on one hand, claims that the radical otherness of the ontology of 
madness is an effect of the epistemological project of reason, and on the other tries to 
ground her/his critique on the infinite potentials of the resistances that reside in the same 
otherness. In other words, the archaeologist’s search for an outside is based on the 
rationalist fantasy that the ‘outside’, where the other resides, is really outside and that the 
inside is, by definition, stable and uniform. Hence, the inside of the discourse, where truth 
resides, appears to the archaeologist devoid of any critical possibilities and the 
archaeological critical strategy turns into escapism to the outside where aesthetic beauty 
resides.  
The fatalism of archaeological critique is a direct result of the characterization of 
discourses as autonomous, self-sufficient, self-evident, self-referential, and self-enclosed 
entities. The formalist approach to discourse does not allow any critical voice to emerge 
from within it. As we have seen, for Foucault the condition of possibility of any critical 
voice is the existence of an outside which is free from the constricting formal 
determinations of the inside of the discourse. Such an outside appears either as an 
aesthetic effect, which is ontologically distancing, or as historical discreteness, which lets 
historical time neutralize the constricting effects of the form of discourses and allow the 
historically distanced archaeologist to see discourses from outside as totalities. If critique 
is meaningful because it is a response to a claim, then the fatalism of the archaeological 
critique is a sign that it is a response to a missing claim. Historical discreteness makes it 
impossible for the past to have any claims on the present. The claims of the outside 
cannot penetrate the inside or be represented. Hence archaeological critique becomes a 
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negative affirmation of the rationalist fantasy that rationalization of the social texture is 
the complete satisfaction of the demands of sociality and the full redemption of an 
irrational past. 
The same fatalism is also present in the Tractarian critique. Wittgenstein says, 
“Logic must look after itself…In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic”.70 
Logic, as the transcendental form of language and the world, is independent of the 
contingent facts of the world and speech. Its authority over language is absolute and 
unchallengeable. On one hand, it enables the speaker to imagine, think, and speak. On the 
other, the restrictions and boundaries that logic puts on the speaker’s speech, thinking, 
and imagination are absolute and unsurpassable. Even if the contingent grammatical form 
of speech gives a superficial view of richly heterogeneous and plural topography with a 
lot of room for multiple linguistic maneuvers, deep down the banal binary logical form of 
language ‘restricts reality to two alternatives: yes or no’.71 The grammatical form hides 
the logical form and thereby creates the illusion that language is more than its 
representational structure and the contingent facts in the world can stand for 
ethical/aesthetical value. If one strictly follows this line of reasoning, then, she will 
conclude that the critical task of philosophy is to penetrate the grammatical form to reveal 
the logical form of language and thereby purify thought of the confusions and 
misunderstandings created by the everyday dress of our linguistic body. From this 
perspective, it seems that purifying language and clarifying thought are constitutive of the 
ethos of critique in the sense that their critical value is self-evident. Logic, in this context, 
makes a claim on us on behalf of sense to get rid of nonsense from language.  
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However, the critical claim Wittgenstein wants us to feel at the end of the 
Tractatus is not the claim of sense on nonsense, of speech on silence, of science on 
ethics; rather the claim he wants to make visible is the claim of silence on language. 
Purification of language and clarification of thought cannot have self-evident value 
because purified language and clarified thought are determined precisely by their sterility 
to produce even false value claims. The world is as it is and there is no value in it; 
language represents the facts in the world as they are and hence no value can be 
represented in language. Hence the outside of language, silence, gains critical 
significance as the ethos of critique. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, wants to mark off that 
unique part of human existence to which speech, knowledge, and truth cannot penetrate. 
He wants to create a sobering effect on a victorious and ardent rationalism which claims 
that its discursive limits are also the limits of experience and. In the same fashion, the 
psychiatric discourse claims to confine the experience of madness in the truth of 
madness. Both Wittgenstein and Foucault, in their first works, think that after all which is 
sayable in the limits of the rational discourse has been said, there remains an excess in the 
form of a silence. At this point, their critical voices show similar ambiguities with regard 
to this excess. On the one hand, this excess threatens the rational discourse by its 
resistance to be articulated in the discursive space. On the other hand, this excess is under 
the threat of being infinitely marginalized. Its ontological otherness endows the excess 
with powers of infinite resistance to the rationalization process. In a sense, the excess 
must take care of itself. However, it is under the constant threat to be marginalized 
infinitely in accordance with the rationalization process. As it resists by its own 
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ontological powers, it makes no claim on the critic. However, as it is the target of 
aggressive rationalization, it generates justice claims.  
As a result of the ambiguous place of the excess in the Tractatus, the Tractarian 
critique takes a fatal turn and cancels itself out. If logic takes care of itself and if our 
speech is already restrained by the logical structure of language, then the other side of 
language, silence, must also take care of itself. By definition, then, silence does not have 
any claims on us. Perhaps the last proposition of the Tractatus is the crystallized form of 
the Tractarian critique and hence of its fatalism. “What we cannot speak about we must 
pass over in silence.”72 That which we cannot speak about is already unspeakable by 
virtue of its transcendental nature and of the logical structure of our language – meaning 
that it will infinitely resist speech and discursivity. The ability of silence to resist 
language is the same ability that Foucault attributes to madness which ‘resists by its own 
strength’ in the medium of art. Silence and madness resist language and discursivity 
because silence and madness are moments of formlessness that cannot fit in the formally 
restricted inside of language and discourse. Even if the excess in the form of silence is 
protected from speech (We cannot speak about it!) the ‘must’ (muß) that follows 
expresses an imperative – meaning that the excess demands a response, perhaps from us. 
The last proposition, then, is an expression of a demand to produce a response to 
the excess. There are three possible ways to read the last proposition of the Tractatus all 
of which show that the expression of that demand fails. Or, in the later Wittgenstein’s 
words, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus fails to convey for what reason he draws a limit 
to language.  
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The standard readings of the Tractatus tend to read the last proposition as an 
expression of an epistemic/logical imperative to keep language pure. In this reading, our 
inability to speak entails that we must be silent. Formulated in this way, this proposition 
has no moral content. It is similar to any expression of technical necessity, such as “I 
cannot drive, therefore I must not drive.” Yet, the very spirit of the Tractatus dictates that 
the imperative to be silent is a moral imperative because silence is where language 
vanishes and the ethical/aesthetic life of the subject begins.  
However, when we try to read the last proposition as a direct expression of moral 
entailment, we immediately lose the moral authority of the ‘must’. As a moral 
proposition, the last proposition does not convey anything moral. The moment we cannot 
speak, we are already silent and therefore the ‘must’ is reduced to an expression of 
identity rather than an imperative. In other words, the moment we cannot speak is not 
differentiated from our silence. So, there is not a responsive differentiation between the 
‘cannot’ and the ‘must’. This problematic, of course, is expressed best in the insight that 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’. If we grant a minimum plausibility to this moral insight, then we 
can see that an incapacity does not give rise to a moral imperative. A moral imperative 
either inhibits or demands a response toward a situation, and therefore the moral 
imperative includes the presumption that we are capable of producing that response. If 
the logical structure of language is behind our inability to speak about the excess, then, 
this means that the logical structure of language cannot give rise to a moral imperative.  
Even if the ‘cannot’ cannot give rise to a moral imperative, it can itself express a 
moral imperative as in the statement “We cannot speak in the name of others.” In this 
sense, then, we can read the last proposition as a double imperative. ‘We cannot speak’ is 
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not the premise of ‘we must be silent’, but it is an imperative itself. If this is the case, 
then, the last proposition is a repetition of the same imperative. Thus, despite its 
authoritative voice that sounds strong enough to interrupt the colonization of the excess 
by language and discourse, the last proposition is where the critic stutters. She is stuck in 
her own speech. She cannot speak yet she cannot remain silent either. So s/he is 
compelled to repeat herself forever.  
In each of these three possibilities of reading the last proposition, we can see that 
the transgressive demand of the spirit of the Tractatus, which is supposed to ‘liberate’ the 
reader from the ‘prison of language’, cannot become an integral element of the text of the 
Tractatus. One might argue, at this point, that self-destructiveness is an integral element 
of the Tractatus and that it is no anomaly that the last proposition is also self-destructive. 
However, as Cora Diamond argues, the preface and the last proposition of the Tractatus 
should not be seen as integral elements of the self-destructive architecture of the 
Tractarian formalism.73 Rather, according to Diamond, they envelop the self-destructive 
Tractarian event so that the reader can see the futility of the philosophical project. In 
other words, according to Diamond’s argument, while the logical analyses of the 
Tractatus are self-destructive and leave nothing beyond them, the preface and the last 
proposition are ethical positives that are designed the survive the self-destructiveness of 
the Tractatus. It is not within the scope of this dissertation to develop a full counter 
argument against Diamond. Yet it should suffice to say that as I have been arguing 
through this chapter, there are vital connections between the formalism of the Tractatus 
and its ethical/aesthetical dimensions. Consequently, reducing the formal logical analyses 
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of the Tractatus to a didactic showcase to teach the reader a lesson about the futility of 
the philosophical project also means reduction of the criticality of the Tractatus into a 
didactic moral exercise.  
However, I agree with Diamond that the preface and the last proposition are not 
integral elements of the ongoing logical analyses of the Tractatus. I prefer to understand 
their non-integral appearance as an expression of the fatalism of formalist critique, rather 
than the core of the Tractarian critique. Seen from this perspective, the last proposition is 
similar to Foucault’s conclusion to Madness and Civilization. Both Wittgenstein and 
Foucault, in their earlier periods, think that drawing the limits to language and discourse 
by itself will be sufficient to reveal the transgressive demands of the other side of reason 
and language. However Foucault is compelled to write the conclusion to formulate that 
demand and Wittgenstein, after completing all the necessary logical analyses in six 
propositions, is compelled to write a seventh proposition. It is not surprising that 
Foucault’s conclusion and the seventh proposition of the Tractatus are both outsiders to 
the texts they are supposed to complete, given that both Wittgenstein and Foucault situate 
the transgressive demand outside of the borders of language and discourse. Thus, the 
transgressive demand, the reason they draw a limit to language and discourse, has to 
come from outside. Yet, precisely because this demand comes from outside, when it 
reaches us, who are locked up inside language and discourse, ‘we’ do not hear it as a 
transgressive demand but the seductive call of Sirens that we want to resist.  The power 
of critique lies in the fact that we are able to comprehend its claims and demands as 
‘ours’, while the threat of seduction, by contrast, is that the demands and the claims of the 
seducer appear to ‘us’ as outsiders. Even if madness and silence seduce ‘us’, the seducer, 
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the excess, appears to us as a femme fatale whose demands of transformation are 
demands for destruction in disguise. In ‘our’ encounter with femme fatale, we 
immediately recognize the injustices done to her and the pain she has been suffering. Yet, 
her image presents ‘us’ two exclusive options: either we have to resist her attraction and 
turn our backs to her demands and live with ‘our’ ‘non-recognition’ of her claims, or we 
respond to her justice claims at the expense of ‘our’ own destruction. However, in either 
case the justice claims of femme fatale remains unsatisfied because the very form in 
which these justice claims are formulated makes the redemption of those justice claims 
impossible. In the same fashion, Wittgenstein and Foucault formulate the justice claims 
of the excess in such a way that the only way to redeem the claims of madness and 
silence is to become mad or silent, or, to put it more appropriately, a mute mad.  
 
From Formalism to Description: The Ordinary and the Present 
 
In the later works of Wittgenstein and Foucault, a descriptive philosophical 
account of language and discourse, in contradistinction to explanatory modes, becomes a 
privileged mode of thinking. Since their earlier works share some philosophical affinities 
with explanatory modes of thinking, their methodological preferences in favor of a 
descriptive philosophical account should be understood as a tacit self-criticism of their 
earlier commitments to explanatory mode of thinking. As we will see, the critical shift 
from explanation to description is not only a significant methodological change but also a 
very crucial step toward a re-articulation of their philosophical ethos. 
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 Wittgenstein famously says in the Investigations: “And we may not advance any 
kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must 
do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.”74 And, Foucault 
defines his project as pure description:  
Before approaching, with any degree of certainty, a science, or novels, or political speeches, or the 
oeuvre of an author, or even a single book, the material with which one is dealing is, in its raw, 
neutral state, a population of events in the space of discourse in general. One is led therefore to the 
project of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search for the unities that 
form within it.75 
 
In accordance with their preference for description, Wittgenstein and Foucault do not 
address the question ‘why?’76, and instead pay attention to minute details of the elements 
of language and discourse to address the question ‘how?’ The reason why they reject 
explanatory models is not a sign for their commitment to unintelligibility of our practices. 
On the contrary, they both think that looking for causal and final explanations for human 
practices amounts to mystification of our practices. For example, as I argue in chapter 2, 
the idea of a sovereign and disembodied subject is in the center of such mystified 
projections, for, in such mystified accounts, subjectivity is not only the site of the human 
agency, but also the terminal point of analysis as the ultimate cause behind our speech 
and actions.  
Against such a philosophical urge, Wittgenstein and Foucault suggest a deliberate 
suppression of the question ‘why?’ to render the phenomenon in question intelligible: “It 
often happens that we only become aware of the important facts, if we suppress the 
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question ‘why?’, and then in the course of our investigations these facts lead us to an 
answer.”77 Here, Wittgenstein suggests that the question ‘why?’ shapes our perspective in 
such a way that we become blind to certain facts. Foucault shares similar concerns with 
Wittgenstein. “For some people, asking questions about the ‘how’ of power would limit 
them to describing its effects without ever relating those effects either to causes or to a 
basic nature.”78 However, he thinks that such a criticism itself is based on a peculiar 
picture of power as a substance. When the question ‘why?’ frames our inquiries, ‘an 
extremely complex configuration of realities is allowed to escape.’79 Prioritizing the 
question ‘why?’ over the question ‘how’ leads one to search for final causes and origins 
that are supposed to provide a full explanation and total transparency. At the same time, 
such a search blocks one’s ability to understand and appreciate the phenomenon in 
question in its own terms. In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein likens those who always 
ask ‘why?’ to tourists who get stuck in their tour guide brochures and prevented from 
seeing the building itself.80 The focus of Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s methodological 
concerns with explanatory models is a certain kind of philosophical blindness. They both 
think that the horizon of explanatory models exclude some philosophical objects 
rendering them invisible and hence unintelligible.  
I argue that the immediate excluded element in explanatory philosophical 
accounts is the ordinary in Wittgenstein and the present in Foucault. In this context, they 
both suggest a descriptive philosophical account to overcome our philosophical blindness 
toward our ordinary and our present. Furthermore, as the ordinary and the present are the 
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blind spots in their own earlier works, their later descriptive accounts are self-therapeutic 
attempts to critically articulate what they both qualify as inarticulable in their earlier 
works.        
The ordinary and the present appear in the early works of Wittgenstein and 
Foucault as the limits of philosophical inquiry. In the Tractatus, ordinary language 
appears to be too complicated to be accessible immediately. Furthermore, as opposed to 
logic, which ‘takes care of itself’, everyday language relies on ‘tacit conventions’ about 
which logical analysis cannot say anything.  
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without 
having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is – just as people speak without 
knowing how the individual sounds are produced.  
Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. 
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. 
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is 
impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is 
not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes. 
The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously 
complicated.81 
 
As the notion itself implies, these tacit conventions are contingent agreements among the 
users of language. Partly because of their contingent character and partly because of their 
enormous complications, ordinary uses of language have an ambiguous place in the 
Tractatus.  On the one hand, they show the logical structure of language which is 
independent from the contingent agreements among the users of everyday language. “In 
fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order.”82 On the other hand, ‘language disguises thought’, because these tacit 
conventions cover what is essential in language like a dress covers the body. In any case, 
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in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not think that the ‘tacit conventions’ of the ordinary 
can be legitimate objects of philosophical questioning.  
Similarly, Foucault the archeologist thinks that our present is inaccessible to us. 
The episteme, the reservoir of unthought, is visible only from a historical distance. 
Therefore, 
…it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we 
speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say – and to itself, the object of our discourse – 
its mode of appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, 
historicity, and disappearance…It emerges in fragments, regions, and levels more fully, no doubt, 
and with greater sharpness, the greater the time that separates us from it…the greater 
chronological distance would be necessary to analyze it.83  
 
‘Our own archive’ within which we experience our present is too close to us to articulate 
our present critically. Thought has to be blind with respect to its present where its 
conditions of possibility lay hidden. This is not surprising, for Foucault the archaeologist 
is committed to discreteness of system of thoughts. Foucault’s commitment to 
discreteness in his earlier writings allows him to reveal what is radically and purely 
different in successive systems of thought and this is the achievement of his earlier 
philosophical labor. However, at the same time, his commitment to discreteness also 
severs the present from its history, rendering it unintelligible.  Similar to Wittgenstein’s 
avoidance of the ordinary, Foucault also brackets the issue of the present because of the 
methodological difficulties it poses to the archaeological mode of thinking.    
To sum up, in Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s earlier works, the ordinary and the 
present are inaccessible for thought. They are, so to speak, too thick for critical thought to 
reveal whatever lies beneath it. In other words, the present and the ordinary, though 
accessible for all other purposes to all of those who share them, are not accessible for 
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critical analysis. We are too involved in it to direct our gaze at it at a distance. The 
absence of this required critical distance makes any totalization impossible and hence the 
present and the ordinary appear to be infinitely complicated. If we keep in mind that the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and Foucault the archaeologist define their tasks as 
revealing the limits of thought and language, then the resistance of the everyday and the 
ordinary to such delimitative critical labor disqualifies them for critical thought. That 
which cannot be totalized cannot be the object of critical thought, because that which 
cannot be totalized cannot have clear limits either. In both thinkers, then, a rift separates 
thought from the ordinary and the present and leaping the rift takes a philosophical 
rotation toward the infinitely complicated present and the ordinary in a way described by 
Wittgenstein in the Investigations: “…the axis of reference of our examination must be 
rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.”84  
In their later works, the ordinary and the present are not only new objects for 
philosophical inquiry but also a ground for a new philosophical ethos. Wittgenstein does 
not discover in the Investigations a hitherto unknown continent called the ordinary, like 
Freud who, as some people think, discovers the continent of the unconscious. Rather, he 
reinvents the ordinary as a new task, a new responsibility for thought, just as Freud 
invents new language games within which our dreaming life becomes a new 
philosophical task and makes a claim on our thought. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s 
constant appeal to the ordinary in his later works is an expression of a philosophical 
ethos. Philosophy is burdened with the task of making our relations to the ordinary 
intelligible. This task amounts to creating a large room for the contingent, the particular, 
and the singular in the discourse of philosophy which has been considered to be a site of 
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reflection mainly on what is necessary and universal. Wittgenstein, the philosopher of the 
ordinary, and Foucault, the historian of the present, share this modern philosophical ethos 
which, Foucault thinks, we inherit from Kant’s thought. In his essay on Kant’s answer to 
the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault claims that Kant left for us two 
philosophical tasks: ‘an analytics of truth’ and ‘a critical ontology of the present’.85 While 
the former task directs our attention to what is beyond our actuality, beyond our ‘now’ 
and ‘here’, the latter one requires a philosophical involvement with the present. Foucault 
thinks that the latter task is more binding for us than the former one. While the ‘analytics 
of truth’ is a dimension modern philosophy shares with the other historical forms of 
philosophizing, the present as a philosophical task is what distinguishes modern 
philosophy in the history of thought.  
The ordinary and the present are the sites to which the philosopher ought to turn 
her attention and discover there the philosophical significance and relevance of all those 
minor and banal truths that shape our ordinary linguistic practices. Both Wittgenstein and 
Foucault think that philosophical discourse must develop sensitivity and conceptual 
responsiveness to such minor and banal truths. Because the taken-for-granted character of 
these truths is the basis of our unexamined and uncritical attitudes toward what we tend to 
take to be normal, natural, and necessary. The philosopher finds such banal truths 
dispersed in the realm of our ordinary practices and the norms of the present. The fact 
that we are able to expect and hope for something, and that we are able to read silently, or 
that we can speak to ourselves silently are such banal truths that Wittgenstein focuses on. 
The fact that we lock up those people we call criminal or mad, and that we use a concept 
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like sexuality are banal truths of ourselves about which Foucault reminds us. In 
Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s works such minor and banal truths gain a new 
philosophical significance and burden the philosopher to become responsive to them.   
 The place of the ordinary in Wittgenstein and that of the present in Foucault have 
a direct connection to their explicit methodological preference for descriptive accounts. 
What is to be described is not something hidden, but, on the contrary, the object of their 
descriptive accounts is what is obvious. The aim of their descriptions is not to reveal what 
lies behind the surface appearances, but to problematize what is already in plain view. I 
emphasize the idea of problematization becase, although the ordinary and the present are 
immediately (or, as Cavell would say, intimately) accessible for us as the background of 
our practices, they are not immediately available to us with respect to our critical 
concerns. The ordinary and the present, in this sense, pose a philosophical paradox. On 
the one hand, the knowledge of the ordinary and of the present is an indispensable 
element of our practices. To allude to Cavell, the knowledge of the ordinary and of the 
present is ‘what in a given period we cannot fail to know, or ways we cannot fail to know 
in’.86 They are the home of our practices, and if we are not sufficiently familiar with 
them, we simply get paralyzed. The fact that we are acting beings and the fact that we are 
knowing beings are inseparable from each other. On the other hand, precisely because 
they are too familiar to us, we are oblivious to the intricacies, subtleties, and 
sophistications our ordinary and present lay before us. The ordinary and the present cover 
our scope of visibility so densely that our relation to our ordinary and present is marked 
by what Wittgenstein calls ‘aspect blindness.’ “The aspects of things that are most 
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important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.”87 Wittgenstein’s 
and Foucault’s descriptive philosophical attitudes get their significance in the context of 
the tension between our simultaneous embeddedness within and estrangement from the 
ordinary and the present. Their descriptions defamiliarize the ordinary and the present so 
that our presence in them and their presence in our lives become recognizable.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 129. 
 95
Chapter 2 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein says that “grammar tells what kind of object 
anything is. (Theology as grammar).”88 This statement points to grammar as a source of 
authority which shapes the ways things become available and accessible to language 
users as objects. For example, there are meaningful ways to use the concept of tomato in 
our language games, and these ways are enmeshed with the established ways we use the 
object of tomato in our practices. Tomatoes are publicly available and accessible to be 
bought, cut up, and eaten, or thrown at people as a political protest in demonstrations, or 
as an expression of festivity exemplified in the Spanish tomato festival. In each of these 
instances of the use of the object in our meaningful practices, we see that the grammar of 
the concept of tomato tells us what kind of an object a tomato is by indicating what 
possible spaces the tomato can occupy in our lives. These possible spaces are the forms in 
which the tomato is known, recognized, and used by language users. In this sense, the 
grammar of the concept of tomato governs both our uses of the concept and what we do 
with and to tomatoes. Wittgenstein’s account of language allows us to articulate these 
spaces of objectivity in historical terms, because, in Wittgenstein, the authority of 
grammar is nothing but a historically formed community of language users’ collective 
attachment and commitment to shared forms of life. On the same principle, a 
genealogical inquiry into the formation of various concepts is the way in which the 
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authority of grammar can be challenged, criticized, and transformed on the basis of 
disappointments, dissatisfactions, and discontents a given form of life systematically, i.e. 
grammatically, produces. 
How is it possible that grammar disappoints language users? A Foucauldian 
answer lies in the ways grammar tells what kind of subjects we are. As I will elaborate 
more fully, Arnold I. Davidson, in his book, The Emergence of Sexuality, addresses 
Cavell’s philosophical elaboration of the concept of object in Wittgenstein, and argues 
that what Wittgenstein means by the concept of object sheds light on what Foucault 
means by the concept of sexuality, because, Davidson claims, “sexuality is a 
Wittgensteinian object”.89 What Davidson claims about sexuality is valid of most of the 
‘objects’ in Foucault’s works, including madness, crime, and punishment, and 
Wittgenstein’s perspective on the relations between objects and grammar is also useful in 
elucidating the relations between power and subjectivities in Foucault.  
Needless to say, a tomato and sexuality are quite different ‘objects’. While the 
grammar of the concept of tomato tells what kind of objects tomatoes are, the grammar of 
the concept of sexuality tells mostly what kind of subjects we are. The difference between 
these two objects tells us that whether the authority of grammar has a political character 
is a matter of historical contingency. Without excluding the possibility that objects can be 
invested with political aims and visions, we can claim that the authority of grammar tends 
to contain deeper political dimensions when it tells, not what kind of object a thing is, but 
what kind of subjects we are. Whether to add pieces of tomato to a certain dish could be a 
dispute confined within gastronomy, or simply a matter of taste. However, we can 
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imagine a society in which eating tomatoes is prohibited according to a certain religious 
belief. In this case, whether tomatoes are available and accessible as a kind of food can 
easily turn into a political struggle between the defenders of the religious order and those 
who refuse to conform to its rules and regulations.  
The grammars of subjectivity, similar to that of objectivity, render language users 
available and accessible in the public realm to each other. The accessibility and 
availability of objects mean that they are intelligible parts of our world constituting the 
scene and the stage of our language games. The subject’s availability and accessibility, on 
the other hand, is mostly a matter of her ability and capability to respond to the calls, 
invitations, requests, and sometimes compulsory orders by other language users to 
participate in and become a part of our language games. While there is a general 
consensus about what tomatoes are and what to do with them, concepts like sexuality 
invite and provoke disputes and disagreements as well as struggles. This is because, as 
opposed to the accessibility and availability of things as objects, the forms of availability 
and accessibility of language users as subjects can be forms of dissatisfaction and 
discontent felt and experienced by the very same subjects. In other words, forms of 
availability and accessibility of language users can also be asymmetrical power relations 
in which some subjects are dominated, silenced, and excluded. In this sense, being in a 
relation of power is to be in a state of a certain form of availability and accessibility to 
others. The grammar that renders us available and accessible as subjects also contains the 
grammar of power relations.   
 How does grammar tell us what kind of subjects we are? What is the force behind 
the authority of grammar in telling what kind of subjects we are? Can we question, 
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criticize, and resist what grammar tells us? These are the questions I ask in this chapter 
and I will develop responses to these questions in the intersection of Wittgenstein and 
Foucault’s thoughts. 
I develop my argument in four steps. In the first step, I will closely examine four 
different, but at the same time overlapping social constructionist philosophical positions 
informed by Wittgenstein and Foucault. One of the most visible common themes in 
discussions of politics by Wittgenstein and Foucault scholars is the constructive character 
of our political actions and therefore these discussions about social constructionism will 
open a path towards discussing the intricacies of the politics in Wittgenstein and 
Foucault. Needless to say, the place occupied by Wittgenstein and Foucault in the 
philosophical discussions about social constructionism is enormous and I do not claim to 
develop a full blown account of it. Instead, I focus on these social constructionist 
positions to demarcate the critical role the concepts of grammar and grammatical criteria 
play in these discussions.  
In the second step, I will establish the political significance of the concept of 
criteria in Cavell’s discussion of philosophical skepticism. I argue that we have a better 
and clearer understanding of Foucault’s claims such as the ubiquity of power and mutual 
relations between power and knowledge, if we understand the concept of power in the 
context of Cavell’s delineation of the authority of grammar and grammatical criteria in 
our lives.  
In the third step, I focus on the politics of intelligibility as it unfolds in Foucault’s 
understanding of the formation of subjectivities and in Cavell’s discussions of language 
acquisition and the idea of private language. Forms of intelligibility have a double 
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significance for language users. They render language users accessible and available to 
each other both as moral/political subjects and as objects of domination. On the one hand, 
forms of intelligibility contain the possibilities of recognizing and acknowledging the 
moral standing of our fellow language users. On the other hand, it is also through forms 
of intelligibility that the moral standing of language users is diminished as they are 
reduced to objects of domination. The dialectic between these two ends informs the 
politics of intelligibility which reveals the costs and risks of our becoming accessible and 
available to mechanisms of domination through forms of intelligibility.  
In the fourth and final step, I argue that Wittgenstein’s concept of family 
resemblance suggests a genealogical mode of philosophical inquiry into historical forms 
of intelligibility. The critical/political significance of such an endeavor is in its ability to 
uncover arbitrary and contingent elements that constraint our actions in the name of 
various metaphysical notions of necessity. I refer to David Owen’s concept of aspectival 
captivity to show how pseudo necessities limit our self-understanding and actions and 
argue that the critical effects of Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thought should be 
understood in terms of a philosophical therapy to invent new language games and 
perspectives to transgress the limits imposed on our lives by these pseudo necessities. As 
this last part of the argument points to some problems of normativity, it is also a 
transitional section to the next chapter where I discuss the problem of normativity in 
Wittgenstein and Foucault. 
 
Grammar, Discourse, and the Question of Reality 
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The fundamental relationship between Foucault’s concept of power and the 
authority of grammar is that power in Foucault, like grammar in Wittgenstein does not 
point to a form of capability that reaches its objects from without. Rather, both concepts 
point to the formation of what we count as and take to be the real as the field where the 
limits between the same and the different are constantly drawn and re-drawn. In this 
sense, Foucault’s claim that power produces reality and Wittgenstein’s claim that 
grammar tells what kind of object anything is point to the same existential level as the 
locus of our moral and political responsibilities. In short, the politics of Wittgenstein’s 
and Foucault’s thought comprehends power and authority to be formative and immanent 
for, as opposed to repressive and anterior to, those under its rule. In this section, I would 
like to elucidate the formative feature of power and the authority of grammar by 
discussing them through some thinkers who thematize the construction of the real by 
language and discourse.  
Peter Winch’s seminal work The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy, is one of the earliest attempts to elucidate the implications of Wittgenstein’s 
account of language for social ontology.90 In Winch’s understanding, the proper subject 
of philosophy is philosophical confusion caused by incorrect or inappropriate uses of 
concepts. Yet, not all misuses of concepts invite philosophical analysis. Philosophical 
analysis is responsive to those misuses where the intelligibility of reality is at stake. For 
Winch, the question of the intelligibility of reality is a question about the relationship 
between thought and reality, which boils down to the relation between language and 
reality. In the context of social sciences and social philosophy, Winch argues that how 
one understands the relationship between language and reality has a direct impact on how 
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one formulates what philosophy can say about society and what kind of knowledge 
claims social sciences can produce. In one understanding, the most fundamental problems 
of social philosophy is due to the ‘eccentricities’ of philosophical language to describe 
society and politics and therefore the philosopher’s task is to reveal the inappropriateness 
of philosophical language to describe society. From this perspective, political philosophy 
clears the ground for a social science which, just like any other empirical science, 
produces accurate descriptions of its object, the social body. According to Winch, such an 
understanding of the relation between language and reality assumes that they are two 
separate entities. Reality exists independently from language and language is a neutral 
means to describe it. This distinction also draws a line between scientific and 
philosophical tasks of rendering the world intelligible. The philosophical task is to 
remove linguistic confusions while the scientific task is to produce empirical knowledge 
about the world. For Winch, such a clear-cut distinction is not available for language 
users. Because “in discussing language philosophically we are in fact discussing what 
counts as belonging to the world [emphasis in the original]. Our idea of what belongs to 
the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The concepts we have 
settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world.”91 The concepts through 
which we think and speak about the world are not passive and neutral instruments to 
make reality intelligible. On the contrary, they actively shape what we take to be reality. 
For Winch, the intelligibility of reality is not a matter of representing it in the 
medium of language, for reality shows itself nowhere but in the medium of language. Our 
concepts do not get their meaning through a mysterious connection to an extra-linguistic 
reality. The meaningfulness of our concepts, (and hence the intelligibility of the world) is 
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a function of our ability to follow rules in our uses of concepts. “…the question: What is 
it for a word to have a meaning? leads on to the question: What is it for someone to 
follow a rule?”92 To understand the meaning of a concept is equivalent to using it 
meaningfully. In this sense, there is a close connection between the intelligibility of 
reality and our ability to follow grammatical rules. It is in the context of the intelligibility 
of our grammatical rules that the question of the intelligibility of reality can emerge. The 
relevance of Winch’s concerns with the rules of grammar in relation to the intelligibility 
of reality is that he opens a path to a philosophical inquiry into the rules of our grammar 
in which the intelligibility of reality must include our investments and commitments to 
the world. In other words, Winch’s arguments imply that reality reflects not only how the 
world is, but also our interests, desires, commitments, dissatisfactions, and discontents. 
This is because the rules of grammar do not come into being in a vacuum. On the 
contrary, the historical formation of grammatical rules and conventions point to the fact 
that our desires, interests, and motivations are integral elements in their formations.  
David Bloor takes the relations between grammatical rules and reality one step 
further. In his book, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, he focuses on the relations 
between what we take to be real and grammatical rules, and builds his arguments on 
Wittgenstein’s remark that a rule is an institution.93 He gives examples of institutions 
such as money, marriage, and private property and explores the implications of 
Wittgenstein’s remark in these examples. A coin, he says, comes into existence as a direct 
result of an agreement in a certain community to use certain metal disks for exchange and 
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circulation of goods.94 In the same fashion, what we call private property exists because a 
community of language users agrees on the way the concept is used and acts according to 
the grammar of the concept. Bloor directs our attention to the self-referential and self-
creative character of these institutions.  
Property has been defined in terms of agreement, but the agreement (i.e. the content of the 
agreement) can itself only be defined by reference to the notion of property. The content and the 
object of the agreement are defined in terms of one another, and so we are going round in circles. 
There is no way to rationalize or justify the pattern of behaviour without circularity. This logical 
circle derives from the fact that the whole discourse, the whole language game of calling 
something ‘property’, is a self-referring practice. In virtue of it being a self-referring practice it is 
also a self-creating practice.95 
 
What Bloor argues is that a concept is not a tag that we attach to pre-linguistically 
existing entities. Our use of a concept, our activities associated with that concept, and the 
existence of the object categorized under that concept are enmeshed in such a way that 
isolating them from each other for the sake of intelligibility leads to the utter 
unintelligibility of all. The agreement among language users that is the basis to use a 
concept more or less consistently and with a certain degree of stability is not a meta-
agreement that can verify our use of the concept by virtue of being independent from our 
actual uses of the concept. On the contrary, the agreement is formed and transformed in 
actual uses of the concept. This is the reason why the content of the agreement that makes 
possible meaningful uses of a concept can be defined only in reference to the use of that 
very concept.  
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The agreement is not the explanation of the meaning of a concept. Nor is it a 
potential rationality of the concept which gets activated in each moment of the use of the 
concept. The agreement to share words and the world is not prior or anterior to our actual 
practices of sharing of them. Bloor refers to Austin’s concept of ‘performative utterances’ 
to sum up what he means by the self-referential and self-creating character of institutions. 
“[The concept of performative utterances] gives us a simple way to sum up the foregoing 
analysis of social institutions. We can treat them like giant performative utterances, 
produced by the social collective.”96 Performative utterances bring into existence what 
they state and Bloor thinks that what he calls ‘social kind of things’ emerge in our world 
through such performative utterances. Social kinds of things exist on the basis of a net of 
grammatical rules that compel us to speak and act within certain limitations. However, 
when we question these limitative rules in terms of their formation we find that what 
gives them substance, what makes them actual forces in our lives, are the very practices 
that they limit.  
To reformulate Bloor’s remarks about circularity: the practices through which we 
share words and the world are self-sustaining. The normative dimension of our practices 
of sharing is embodied within those practices – meaning that there is no separate body of 
norms that govern our practices of sharing from without. To use his own example, our 
uses of coins as coins constitute the normative grounds on which we recognize and use 
them as coins. Any normative evaluation of what coins are must refer to our uses of them 
as coins, Outside the framework of our uses of coins, such a normative evaluation would 
not be possible simply because the object of the evaluation, coins, would be absent in 
such a context. Sharing words and the world is a matter of practical activity. It is in the 
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medium of our sharing that our world comes into existence together with its promises and 
discontents. The practices of sharing the world are self-sustaining. There is no necessary 
form to share the ‘words and the world’ yet there are historically privileged ways to share 
them. Some of these privileged forms to share the words and the world put some of us in 
underprivileged social positions and some of them exclude and silence the 
underprivileged. However, in Bloor’s argument, the grammatical surface of the social 
fabric is smooth and flat as if the shared world were indifferent to our interests. There is 
room for struggles and conflicts in the way he imagines the social collective but these 
struggles and conflicts are wrinkles on the smooth surface of a grammatically formed 
world. For example, one can be a dedicated Marxist and engage in oppositional political 
activities to erase the institution of private property from the social order. However, even 
in her opposition to private property, she has to initially conform to the rules of grammar 
of the concept of private property to define what she opposes. Only after such an initial 
conformity, can she start claiming that private property is a result of systemic historical 
inequalities as opposed to bourgeois understanding that it is a God given right of property 
owners. The Marxist and the bourgeois must share the grammar of the concept of 
property to encounter each other on the platform of politics. They have to inhabit the 
same world to oppose each other and the condition to inhabit the same world is the 
conformity to the same, or at least greatly overlapping, sets of grammatical rules. In other 
words, in Bloor, politics cannot touch the grammatical authority by which both the 
Marxist and the bourgeois feel constrained in equal proportions in the way they use the 
concept of property.  
 106
With respect to grammatical authority, Bloor rightly argues that ‘…rules and 
meanings considered in themselves do not possess any agency; all agency and action 
associated with them derives from their human users and creators.’97 Yet, the feeling that 
the authority of grammar is an external force is due to the fact that this authority always 
resides in our historically conditioned relations to the other language users. In this sense, 
whether a rule enables us to exercise our freedom or obstructs our freedom to act depends 
on the features of our relation to those others that compel us to speak and act in a certain 
way. Yet, in Bloor, the agency behind grammatical rules is not historically differentiated. 
Therefore, in his understanding of rules, the authority of grammar is a manifestation of 
the force of the social collective. The individual language user, in return, is a part of that 
social collective and thus she is also the source of the authority which compels her and 
the other language users as well. “We are only compelled by rules in so far as we, 
collectively, compel one another.”98 Bloor, in this sense, accepts the alienation of the 
individual language user from her community for she feels that what compels her in her 
speech and actions is something other than her own will. She uses words that do not 
belong to her to the extent that the world she lives in does not belong to her, and vice 
versa. Yet, for Bloor this is not a problematic issue because the individual language user 
is a participant in the authority of grammar due to her place as a member in the linguistic 
community. He does not make any critical distinctions between different degrees and  
forms the individual language user participates in the authority of grammar. Therefore the 
possibility to challenge and transform the oppressive grammatical constraints does not 
become a distinguishable theme in Bloor. 
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Bloor assumes an undifferentiated social collective to which everyone equally 
belongs and by which everyone is equally compelled, and therefore he imagines 
Wittgenstein’s idea of agreement among language users as a kind of social contract. 
Whether we belong to the social contract as equals is not for him a question Bloor 
addresses and therefore his understanding of linguistic agreement is confined within a 
liberal interpretation of social contracts as projections of the idea of a total society. The 
idea of a total society is a picture of our social conditions in which each individual 
member is fully integrated in public life by conforming to the norms of the social 
contract. However, Bloor’s understanding of the authority of grammar as a projection of 
the agency of a social collective goes against the spirit of Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
our language. In a sense, there is no Language for Wittgenstein, and there is no Power for 
Foucault. In the same fashion, we can say that for Wittgenstein and Foucault there is no 
Society. They develop a vision of society in which our practices constitute a dense 
network. There is no singular social collective, as Bloor suggests, hovering over this 
network, but only conjunctions and disjunctions of practices. It is this vision that allows 
them to think of our practices without any reference to a larger framework such as a 
social contract or class struggle. In Wittgenstein, there is no general working of language 
that manifests itself in the singular instances of linguistic practices. In Foucault, there is 
no power that expresses itself in various forms of repression. Instead, our practices are 
singular performances. Even if these performances are, to a certain extent, re-iterable as 
the condition of possibility of their sociality, each performance is still a unique event. In 
other words, the vision of a total society makes our practices intelligible at the expense of 
the intelligibility of the uniqueness of these practices. To underemphasize Wittgenstein’s 
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avoidance to ascribe agency to our linguistic forms is to miss the critical edge of his 
thought. This is exemplified in the early stages of Bloor’s argument where he opens up a 
path to another politics, and then quickly dismisses it. In his discussion of the notion of 
following a rule while playing a game, he says, “To make a wrong move is ultimately to 
make a move that leads the individual along a divergent path. To be wrong is to be a 
deviant…however, these are only complications in the story, not things challenging its 
basic principles.”99 Although Bloor’s arguments are very forceful and useful in revealing 
the grammatical nature of ‘normal’ institutions such as marriage, money, and private 
property, he takes deviations as accidents and exceptions, and does not take into account 
the discontents language users experience in the medium of the distinction between the 
normal and the deviant ways to speak and act.  
Ian Hacking develops an interpretation of Foucault that is in some respects similar 
to Bloor’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Hacking, however, is able to avoid using a 
generalizing concept like ‘social collective’ in showing how forms of rationality bring 
into existence new ‘social kind of things’. Also, Hacking does not take ‘deviations’ as a 
marginal linguistic error. He thinks that ‘deviations’ are produced within linguistic space 
as systematically as normalcy is. Hacking calls his approach ‘dynamic nominalism’ the 
basic argument of which is ‘that numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come 
into being hand in hand with our invention of the ways to name them.’100 Hacking 
invokes the ancient polemic between realism and nominalism to clarify his own position. 
The realist claims that by creating categories and classes we simply recognize features 
and properties of objects that exist regardless of our naming them. As opposed to the 
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realist, the nominalist thinks that the relationship between words and things is the other 
way around. The things that are defined under a concept have nothing in common other 
than being defined under the same concept. Hacking thinks that such vulgar realism and 
static nominalism are both misleading because the relationships between words and 
things are more complex. Drawing on Foucault’s arguments, he claims that a concept is 
not a passive sign of recognition of a natural distinction. Nor is it the case that the thing 
classified under a concept does not participate in the formation of the concept in any 
ways. Hacking’s dynamic nominalism (which, he says, can be also dubbed ‘dialectical 
realism’) boils down to the claim that objects come into being in the medium of 
interactions between what there is and our concepts. In other words, what there is cannot 
exist in our world as objects without our conception of it, and, at the same time, concepts 
are not completely detached from what there is.   
What Hacking calls dialectical realism is similar to what Bloor calls the self-
referential character of language games. In Bloor, meaning is possible on the basis of the 
interplay between a concept and the agreement that gives substance to that concept. As I 
mentioned earlier, the agreement among language users should not be understood as pre-
given, but as formed in the actual practices of language users, which Cavell calls mutual 
attunement of language users. In a similar fashion, Hacking argues that a concept and an 
object classified under it mutually create each other in a dialectical way such that the 
question which one has epistemic and ontological priority over the other is not 
intelligible. Hacking thinks that crude realism and static nominalism make the exact same 
mistake from opposing directions. Crude realism assumes an ontological realm existing 
independently from our linguistic conventions while static nominalism assumes a pure 
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linguistic realm to which no natural distinction can enter. The question is not to choose 
between two different purities: the purity of the thing and the purity of the concept. Such 
purities are not only equally unavailable to creatures who use language but also equally 
misleading. Neither is a concept the manifestation of immanent natural properties of an 
object, nor is an object a complete stranger to its concept. It is not the case that objects 
exist and, then, we attach meaning to them. Nor is it the case that our invented meaning 
claims arbitrarily find their objects. On the one hand, meaning is the form, that is, the 
condition of possibility, of a thing to emerge in our world as an object. On the other hand, 
a concept gets its liveliness, that is, its materiality in linguistic circulation and exchange, 
from the historically shaped space of possibilities an object occupies in our lives.  
In Hacking’s dynamic nominalism, the emergence of things as objects in our 
world is fundamentally different from the emergence of human beings as subjects in 
history. A concept opens up a space of possibility for a thing to be an object in our world. 
Even if this space of possibility puts contingent historical limits to what we do with that 
object, the object in question has a life of its own regardless of how we name it. Objects 
are definitely significant elements in our language games, but they are not participants in 
our language games in the way language users are. It is needless to say that the limits a 
concept activates in our interactions with the world and with each other also affect the life 
of beings in our world that are not language users. However, for language users those 
limits are internal to their actions and consequently who they are. In Cavell’s words, 
asking how far the distance between our actions and our concepts is like asking how far 
Paris is from France. There is, so to speak, a different kind of distance between concepts 
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and objects than the distance between the concepts of subjectivity and our practices 
constitute us as subjects.  
Hacking thinks that both Foucault’s early archeological works and his later 
genealogical texts point to the discursive space where the interactions between concepts 
and subjectivities occur. Foucault’s notorious pair, power/knowledge, basically refers to 
specific historical forms within which these discursive acts of creation occur. How is it, 
then, we can understand what concepts do in the formation of subjectivities? For Hacking 
the answer is in the concept of possibility.  
Who we are is not only what we did, do, and will do, but also what we might have done and may 
do. Making up people changes the space of possibilities for personhood…But our possibilities, 
although inexhaustible, are also bounded…What could it mean in general  to say that possible 
ways to be a person can from time to time  come into being or disappear? Such queries force us to 
be careful about the idea of possibility itself.101  
 
Human actions make sense because what we do has a name, a description in linguistic 
space. This does not merely mean that language users are capable of representing what 
they do to each other and to themselves. What we do must be describable in linguistic 
space, because otherwise it gets stuck in itself as an empty gesture. Descriptions 
constitute various media that make possible our engagement with the world and with each 
other. If what we do is to have content, this content can emerge only in the medium of 
various forms of relationships with other language users. Language users share more or 
less a common reservoir of descriptions of actions, and it is on the basis of this common 
reservoir that they can relate to each other through their actions. In this sense, the 
appearance or disappearance of the descriptions of actions is also the appearance and 
disappearance of the possibilities of actions in a given historical period. Descriptions, 
then, are what open up a space of possibilities for human actions. What is grammatical is 
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not only our uses of language, it is our way of being in the world. It is not that there is a 
specific form of life that we have and we play language games on the basis of it. Playing 
language games is itself a form of life. To put it differently, it is not that we are related to 
the world and grammar regulates this relationship. Grammar is our relationship to the 
world and to each other.  
The kinship between Wittgenstein’s understanding of grammar and Foucault’s 
analyses of forms of rationality is made explicit by Arnold I. Davidson in his book The 
Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts 
(Davidson 2001) Davidson defends Foucault’s view that the concept of sexuality is not a 
new name for an old field of human experience. Against those who would accuse 
Davidson of talking merely about words and concepts and not things and the world, 
Davidson uses Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgensteinian criteria. As I will elaborate more 
in the next section, for Cavell, knowing the grammatical criteria of the concept of an 
object is not only a pre-condition for language users to name and talk about that object 
but also the condition of possibility of that object to be part of the world of language 
users. If a community of language users lacks the criteria of an object, that object is not 
there to be named and talked about. Drawing on Cavell’s interpretation, Davidson argues 
that: 
sexuality is a Wittgensteinian object and that no one could know the grammatical criteria of this 
object before the emergence of the psychiatric style of reasoning, which is to say that before this 
time there was as yet no object for us to attach the name “sexuality” to.102  
 
What Davidson claims is not that there are overlapping points between what we 
call sexuality and what the Ancient Greeks called eros. The concept of sexuality, like 
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most of our other concepts, is a re-invention as much as it is an invention. We clearly feel 
that our concept of sexuality and the Ancient Greek concept of eros point in the same 
direction even if the fields they cover are not identical to each other. Davidson’s 
argument should be understood as pointing to different schematisms these two concepts 
have. For Cavell, the ability of concepts to make sense relies on their ability to be 
connected and related to other concepts. The schematism of a concept, in Cavell, is the 
range of the concept’s ability to be combined with other concepts. In this sense, the 
possibilities of the world are manifested in the schematism of concepts. The absence of 
the concept of sexuality in Ancient Greece does not mean that their acts of sex were 
totally alien activities to us. In retrospection, we are likely to subsume what is subsumed 
under the concept of eros under our own concept of sexuality. However, by doing so we 
would not enrich our understanding of these two concepts. On the contrary, we would 
reduce the depth of our comprehension of these concepts by rendering invisible so many 
distinctive aspects of them. The concept of sexuality has a range of use which is 
determined by its ability to be combined with other concepts and used in different 
contexts. The absence of it means that the possible connections and relations that we 
establish through the concept of sexuality are not there as discursive possibilities. For 
example the difference between the concepts of ‘sodomite’ and of ‘homosexual’ lies not 
in the kind of acts of sex these two ‘sexual species’ engage in, but the ways these 
concepts combine with some other possible concepts. While the sodomite was a legal 
category with some moral connotations, the concept of homosexual was invented as a 
psychiatric category to designate a form of personality. The absence of the concept of 
sodomite in our ordinary language now, and the absence of the concept of homosexual 
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then, show the absence or presence of possible conceptual combinations that we can 
make using these concepts. The concepts of moral condemnation and of criminal law 
were the most visible discursive areas the concept of sodomite tended to combine, while 
the concept of homosexual found its meaningful combinations in the concepts of the 
disorders of the soul.   
Not only sexuality but all other concepts of subjectivity in Foucault can be 
understood in terms of  Wittgenstenian objects, that is, in reference to the schematism of 
concepts. For example, Foucault claims in the second volume of The History of Sexuality 
that the fact that in Ancient Greece men had sex with each other and with women as well 
does not make them homosexuals or bisexuals for the simple reason that such ways of 
becoming sexualized subjects were not within the space of possibilities opened up by 
Ancient Greek reservoir of descriptions.103 While modern discourses of sexuality tend to 
classify and recognize acts of sex as manifestations of different kind of desires, the 
Ancient Greek describes acts of sex according to whether someone is the active party or 
the passive receiver. One might say at this point that homosexuality is a concept that 
applies to anyone who has sex or wants to have sex with someone of the same sex. 
However, this implies that the criteria for the application of the concept of homosexuality 
in different contexts somehow naturally exist in the contexts themselves, rendering the 
very notion of criteria irrelevant. By reading Foucault’s claim from a Wittgensteinian 
perspective we can say that homosexuality was not an ‘object’ to be named and talked 
about in Ancient Greece because the Ancient Greeks lacked the grammatical criteria to 
open up a space in their lives for homosexuality. It is only at the end of the 19th century 
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that psychiatric discourse produced homosexuality as an object of knowledge by 
inventing new language games and new grammatical criteria.  
Foucault’s epistemological structures are regimes of description that establish 
grammatical criteria to tell what is what and who is who. They render some ways of 
being in the world possible and available, while, at the same time, making some forms of 
experience simply unthinkable and unavailable.  Moreover, some subjectivities created 
by these regimes of descriptions are maintained through relations of domination. In other 
words, some subjectivities are created as objects of domination. For instance, the social 
space opened up by the concept of criminal is not just a space bounded by the criteria of 
obeying or disobeying the law. The criminal as a subject is a product of sophisticated 
disciplinary mechanisms within prison. The regime of description that creates possible 
ways to be a criminal establishes criminality as an eternal object of knowledge the truth 
of which mirrors itself in punishment as a necessary corollary of the crime. In Hacking’s 
terms, what Foucault’s genealogy of modern discourses on crime reveals is the process of 
‘making up’ the criminal as a subject which is enmeshed in the process of producing 
crime as an object of knowledge. These discourses create a new grammar of the concepts 
of crime and punishment. While this new grammar of crime and punishment is locally 
materialized as specific disciplinary mechanisms within the walls of prison, outside 
prison, what language users mean by crime and punishment is shaped by this new 
grammar as well. It is this new grammar that tells what crime is and what punishment is.  
In the very beginning of Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes a bloody 
language game between the criminal and his executioner that happened right before the 
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emergence of modern practices of punishment.104 In this language game, the sovereign’s 
power is injured in the act of crime and the sovereign reinstates his power by 
representative acts of violence on the body of the criminal. Soon after the episode 
Foucault describes, the practice of public torture almost completely disappeared and 
disciplinary language games played within the walls of prison started constituting the 
practices and meaning of the concept of punishment. In this new grammar of crime and 
punishment, crime is not violation of the rights of sovereign but of the whole society. In 
the language of the new discourse on crime, the criminal violates the terms of the social 
contract which is the substance of the individual’s membership in society. Consequently, 
the punishment now is to isolate the criminal from the social body. By violating the social 
contract, the criminal destroys the very basis of her rights and liberties. The punishments 
depriving her of these rights and liberties is the direct effect of her criminal acts.  
Foucault thinks that this logic behind the practices of punishment is not merely an 
ideological story that legitimizes the practices of punishment. This is the emergence of 
modern punitive reason that reshapes the power of the sovereign to punish. The 
sovereign’s object of punishment is the body of the criminal where the sovereign 
inscribes signs of punishment through bodily injury and destruction. Modern punitive 
reason, on the other hand, takes the soul of the criminal as the object of punishment. To 
do so, modern punitive reason does not destroy the body of the criminal but subjects it to 
various disciplinary mechanisms. The body that is disciplined is the bridge between 
punishment and the soul of the criminal. In the way the sovereign punishes the crime, 
there is a one to one correspondence between the acts of crime and the kind of pain and 
injury the body of the criminal endures. (Damiens’ hand, the criminal in the above 
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mentioned public torture scene, is cut, because it held the knife in his crime.) Modern 
punitive reason, on the other hand, invents calculative systems to translate various acts of 
crime into lengths of incarceration. In this sense, modern punitive reason does not seek 
justice in concrete similitude between crime and punishment, but in an abstract system of 
equivalences between crime and the length of incarceration.   
By comparing Damien’s execution with modern disciplinary practices, Foucault 
shows how two different regimes of description of crime give rise to different practices of 
punishment. Modern punitive reason not only changes the relation between the crime and 
the corresponding punishment, but redraws the limits of what to do to and with the 
criminal, and hence forms a new space of possibility for the criminal subject. Modern 
punitive reason claims to have found gentle, less violent, and more humane ways of 
punishment and Foucault does not necessarily disagree with this claim. His point is rather 
that these forms of punishment are motivated by a desire to punish more effectively. The 
promise of modern punitive reason is to punish on the basis of scientific knowledge of the 
crime and the criminal which is produced by a network of juridico-scientific discourses. 
For Foucault, what the juridico-discursive complex does is more inventing than 
discovering. What it invents are new descriptions and criteria to tell what crime is and the 
corresponding punishment should be. In this sense, the power of the juridico-scientific 
discourses lies in their ability to effectively shape the grammar of language games that 
we play using concepts of crime and punishment.  
 
Skepticism, Criteria, and Politics 
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As we have seen, the discussions about social ontology above revolves around the 
issues of grammatical rules and criteria that govern the uses of our concepts. In this 
section, I would like to show the political dimensions of the authority of grammar by 
following Cavell’s thoughts on grammatical criteria. As he establishes his arguments 
about grammatical criteria in the larger context of philosophical skepticism, I will start 
with explicating his reformulation of the skeptical problematic.    
Skepticism Reformulated: 
In his seminal work, The Claim of Reason, Cavell takes the question of 
skepticism, or rather in his own words the threat of skepticism, to be the central theme of 
modern philosophy, and accordingly he reads the Investigations as a collection of 
responses to various claims of skepticism. The Wittgensteinian object and its relations to 
the authority of grammar as well as the issues of accessibility and availability are the 
central axes in Cavell’s discussion of skepticism. The skeptic is dissatisfied with the ways 
objects and subjects are available and accessible in our ordinary practices and 
interactions. For the skeptic, the forms of availability and accessibility of objects and 
subjects in our ordinary practices cannot satisfy the standards of epistemic certainty and, 
therefore both things as objects and the other minds as subjects are, in reality, unavailable 
and inaccessible. At least in principle, a rigorous epistemic questioning cannot 
exclusively rule out the possibility that the object we reach out toward and the subject we 
interact with are mirages of our own making, because the linguistic forms that make our 
relationships to objects and subjects possible are not sound in terms of our epistemic 
standards for certainty.  
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One of the most critical arguments Cavell develops in The Claim of Reason is that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical inquiries into the grammar of ordinary language do not 
defeat the threat of skepticism. As we know and recognize the world in language and by 
grammatical criteria, our claims (of knowledge and reason and morality) are infinitely 
vulnerable to the doubts of the skeptic. Cavell thinks that the undefeatability of the 
skeptic’s claims reveals what he calls ‘the truth of skepticism’, or ‘the moral of 
skepticism’ “namely, that the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation 
to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing.”105 
Knowledge of the world, by itself, cannot sustain our relationship to the world. In this 
sense, Cavell understands the skeptical impulse as an anxious philosophical response to 
an over-intellectualization of our relations with the world and to each other. In short, 
when language users’ relations to the world are reduced to language users’ epistemic 
capabilities and consequently to structures of knowledge, the skeptical impulse invades 
the field of thought uncontrollably.  
Cavell thinks that the message of the skeptical impulse can be understood in two 
ways. The skeptical conclusion ‘We cannot know that the world exists’ can be a premise 
to two opposing arguments. One can deduce that “we cannot know the world exists, and 
hence that perhaps there isn’t one.”106 This argument is motivated by the historical 
disappearance of some sources of (mostly traditional and religious) authority that used to 
establish our mode of relationship to the world. For Cavell, their disappearance and the 
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empty space they left behind amounts to a feeling of the ‘loss of the presentness’.107 
Accordingly, when the epistemic authority fails to stand behind the claim that the world 
exists, this failure is taken to be the absence of the world itself by those who believe that 
the epistemic form (the form of the object of knowledge) is the only available and 
accessible form of existence for human beings. The loss of the presentness projects itself, 
in empiricist and rationalist strains of skeptical philosophy alike, as the crisis of the 
knowing subject the certainty of whose perception by the senses is in question. The world 
starts emerging as something outside, the human connections with which are possible on 
the grounds of whatever we perceive through the senses. Yet, the ‘shocking’ realization 
that Kant calls a scandal is that the world that is present to the senses is not the world we 
ordinarily have and share with each other. This is because “the presentness achieved by 
certainty of the senses cannot compensate for the presentness which had been elaborated 
through our old absorption in the world.”108     
Cavell thinks, however, that only when we interpret the message of the skeptical 
impulse the other way around can its critical content can be revealed. The conclusion of 
the skeptical argument that we cannot know that the world exists can be a premise of the 
equally rational conclusion that “[the world’s] presentness to us cannot be a function of 
knowing.”109 Reformulated in this manner, what the skeptic expresses is no longer an 
epistemic crisis in our knowledge claims, but a manifestation of the crisis in the ways we 
connect to the world and to other language users. In this sense, for Cavell, skepticism is a 
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call for philosophy to articulate ways other than knowing in which we relate to the world 
and to the other language users. Cavell takes Wittgenstein’s concept of form of life to be 
the central therapeutic concept that relates world and mind. “In Wittgenstein’s view the 
gap between mind and the world is closed, or the distortion between them straightened, in 
the appreciation and acceptance of particular human forms of life, human 
‘convention’.”110 In the same spirit with Wittgenstein’s statement that “what has to be 
accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life”111, Cavell says that “the world is 
to be accepted; as the presentness of other minds is not to be known, but 
acknowledged.”112 One does not accept the existence of the world as such, just for the 
sake of accepting it. Only by accepting a form of life, can one accept the existence of the 
world. The world must be given, before it becomes a candidate for our inquiries into its 
existence or non-existence. This means that only in a certain form of life can the skeptic 
voice communicable claims about the existence of the world. Thus Cavell urges us to 
look at the form of life that gives the skeptic a world the existence of which can be 
refuted based on what we can know about it. 
What can be the mode of acceptance of the world that is not offensive to our 
epistemic capabilities? For Cavell, the mind is stuck in a world the presentness of which 
in the experience of language users is apparent and cannot be rejected. Yet, the 
presentness of the world cannot be supported and sustained within the frames of our 
structures of knowledge. In this context, Cavell refers to Kant’s concept of the thing-in-
itself to exemplify a philosophical mode of acceptance. In his understanding of Kant, the 
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thing-in-itself is not an ontological enigma, but a description of the conditions of saying 
something about the world.  
The reason we cannot say what the thing is in itself is not that there is something we do not in fact 
know, but that we have deprived ourselves of the conditions for saying anything in particular. 
There is nothing we cannot say. That doesn’t mean that we can say everything; there is no 
everything to be said. There is nothing we cannot know. That does not mean we can know 
everything; there is no everything, no totality of facts or things, to be known.113 
 
Accepting that the world exists means acceptance of a form of life. In this sense, when 
we accept that the world exists we accept a particular world which is given to us as 
having a history established in a form of life. The skeptic desires to say something 
without saying anything particular that would reveal the space- and time-bound context 
from which she speaks. Cavell’s point in referring to Kant is that the limitations that the 
skeptic takes to be the failure of our knowledge are what make our speech, and hence, 
knowledge possible. In the same fashion, Cavell thinks that there is a positive message in 
Kant’s insight about the limits of knowledge. The limitations of our epistemic capacity 
points to the fact that “there are human capacities and responsibilities and desires which 
reveal the world but which are not exhausted in the capacity of knowing things.”114 
Cavell describes an encounter between a ‘thing’ and a philosopher who tries to 
transcend the appearance of it to capture its existence, She wonders about the thing’s 
solitary existence when she is not there to experience it. She wants to have knowledge of 
it outside its mode of presentness to her, as if the mode of presentness of the thing (its 
place in time and space, its shape and color, its name, its size, in short everything that we 
can say about it) is external to it. She says: “That – that thing there – is what it is. It is, in 
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itself, none of the things we say it is. It escapes language in the end.”115  For Cavell, what 
the philosopher problematizes is not exactly the existence of the thing, but rather its 
accessibility: “…It is there, all right, but inaccessible.”116 The philosopher cannot reach 
the thing present right before her eyes, not because the distance between the thing and her 
experience of the thing is impassable, but because whenever she makes an attempt to 
reach the thing, the distance between her and the thing collapses, making it impossible for 
the philosopher to distinguish the thing from her experience of it. The philosopher thinks 
that there is a lack in her experience of the thing, because the thing ‘escapes language in 
the end.’ However, what lacks in her experience is not the (full) presentness of the thing, 
but her acceptance of the conditions of its presentness. The presentness of the thing 
requires not only the sheer physical existence of it but also the interests, desires, and 
responsibilities of the philosopher. When she withholds her investment in the thing, she 
cannot maintain its existence in her experience. As we will see below, the lack of 
acceptance is a manifestation of her distrust to the grammar of her language.    
Skepticism and Criteria: 
At the heart of Cavell’s discussion of skepticism lies the issue of grammatical 
criteria that govern applications of our concepts in different contexts. The skeptic 
questions the validity and correctness of the statements of facts we express in language. 
She does not question the validity and correctness of any specific claims we make about 
the world, but the possibility of making any claims about the world as such. She asks on 
what grounds we could be certain in believing that any stated fact actually exists in the 
world. In the mind of the skeptic, there is an unbridgeable gap between the world and the 
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statements we make about the world. Some Wittgenstein scholars, such as Norman 
Malcolm and Roger Albritton, argue that Wittgenstein’s discussion of criteria satisfy the 
skeptic’s demands for certainty. If someone who appears to be in pain meets our 
grammatical criteria for cases in which we legitimately apply our concept of pain, then, 
she is in pain beyond any doubt. In other words, we cannot legitimately play the language 
game of doubting the existence of something such as the tomato sitting on the table 
before my eyes or the pain of someone who is wincing, when the relevant context meets 
the grammatical criteria for the relevant concept. It is perfectly possible that the tomato 
on the table could be an illusion, and the person who is wincing could be an actor 
rehearsing for a role. But mistaking the mirage of a tomato for a real one and a rehearsal 
of pain behavior for the real pain are possible only if there are contexts in which we 
correctly assert that there is a tomato on the table or someone is in pain. In short, if it is 
possible to apply the wrong concept in a given context, then, it must be possible to apply 
the right one. The skeptic might reply that her point is not about the application of the 
wrong concept in a given context, but the applicability of any concept at all. Yet, 
questioning the applicability of each and every possible concept is questioning the 
possibility of any possible speech including the skeptic’s own voice. In this sense, the 
skeptic’s arguments against the applicability of all of our concepts are self-defeating, 
because they undermine the possibility of playing any language game, including that of 
doubting. If doubting the certainty of our knowledge claims is possible, then certainty 
must exist as a possibility.  
Cavell’s Wittgenstein develops voices of acknowledgement as a philosophical 
response to both the skeptic and the anti-skeptic. He starts with Wittgenstein’s statement 
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that “if language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements.”117 For Cavell, this 
statement means that “only a creature that can judge of value can state a fact.”118 The 
possibility of making a statement of fact depends on our capability of judging, which is, 
in Cavell, language users’ ability to use criteria in appropriately projecting words to 
different contexts. In using language, we judge whether the context is within the range of 
projection that the concept we use can sustain. This, in return, means that the language 
user’s ability to state a fact requires her to be a member of a normative community. 
Because the individual language user acquires language by acquiring the grammatical 
criteria of such a normative community, the grammatical criteria of the normative 
community precede, both logically and chronologically, the individual language user’s 
speech acts. However, for Cavell, the normative community is not a static whole, but a 
historically rooted network of attunements among various language users. Language 
users, Cavell claims, leap from one context to another by projecting words into different 
contexts, and whether a language user’s leap is too far or too short is a matter of 
attunement with the relevant members of the normative community. The force behind the 
grammatical criteria is the collective attunement among the members of a linguistic 
community. In this sense, the question of meaningfulness or meaninglessness of a speech 
act is a question about whether the normative community recognizes and acknowledges 
its own voice in the speech of the individual language user and whether the individual 
language user is able to express herself in the voice of her normative community. This is 
why the individual language user’s meaning claims are claims to be a member of a 
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certain community. In principle, all speech acts are only meaning claims pending 
confirmation or rejection by the relevant language user(s) the speech act is directed to. 
Needless to say, this vision of language and its relation to the world does not 
satisfy the skeptic. On the contrary, it seems to confirm the skeptic’s worry that our 
words do not reach out to the world, and instead, they get stuck circulating in our 
communicative exchanges. In the skeptic’s mind, what we take to be statements that 
describe how things are in the world express nothing but historically contingent 
judgments about the world upon which our normative community happens to agree. In 
this sense, when the skeptic refuses to share our convictions about the identity or the 
existence of a thing, what she actually refuses is the binding force of our criteria that 
make our judgment about the identity and the existence of it possible. Notice that the 
skeptic does not question if we apply the appropriate criteria in our judgment. Her worry 
is that any set of criteria is appropriate as long as it is shared and agreed upon by all 
relevant language users. It is possible to repudiate the authority of these criteria, because 
the binding force of grammatical criteria stem from the contingent (i.e. space and time 
bound) fact that at a certain moment in history and a certain place in the world, members 
of a normative community share them.119 What the skeptic is dissatisfied with is the 
worldly and contingent character of the binding force of grammatical criteria which 
offers intelligibility only for and to a particular normative community, but not 
intelligibility of the world independently from what the members of the normative 
community say about it. As we will see, according to Cavell, by repudiating ‘our’ criteria, 
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the skeptic avoids language users’ collective responsibility to make the world intelligible 
as well as the language user’s responsibility to make herself known and acknowledge 
other language users’ linguistic acts. The skeptic desires intelligibility without having to 
participate in the responsibilities and costs of intelligibility.  
Criteria and the Making of a World: 
In Cavell’s portrayal of skepticism, grammatical criteria emerge as the central 
target of skeptical arguments. He claims that our grammatical criteria do not have 
immunity on rational grounds against the claims of the skeptic. However, for Cavell, the 
vulnerability of our grammatical criteria is not a defect of our language. On the contrary, 
what makes our language vulnerable to the claims of the skeptic is precisely what makes 
it tightly systematic and incredibly flexible at the same time. To elucidate the 
vulnerability of grammatical criteria in Wittgenstein, Cavell provides random instances of 
the ordinary uses of the notion of criterion in various contexts such as a diving 
competition, the policy of admission in a university, a history book, etc. Relying on these 
instances, he defines what the concept of criterion means:   
. . . criteria are specifications a given person or group sets up on the basis of which (by means of, 
in terms of which) to judge (assess, settle) whether something has a particular status or value. 
Different formulations bring it closer to other regions of Wittgenstein’s surface rhetoric: Certain 
specifications are what a person or group mean by (what they call, count as) a thing’s having a 
certain status; the specifications define the status; the status consists in satisfying those 
specifications.120  
 
Wittgenstein’s use of the concept of criterion is both similar and dissimilar to the uses of 
the concept in these examples. Cavell asks us to pay attention to the differences between 
the ordinary uses of the concept of criterion and Wittgenstein’s grammatical criteria to 
elucidate what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s discussion.  
 Cavell identifies three such differences: 
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1- Most of the time, our ordinary uses of the concept of criterion differ from the concept 
of standard. Standards determine to what extent the relevant criteria are satisfied. In 
Wittgenstein’s grammatical criteria, there is no “separate stage at which one might, 
explicitly or implicitly, appeal to the application of standards. To have criteria, in this 
sense, for something’s being so is to know whether, in an individual case, the criteria do 
or do not apply.”121 In the example of diving competition, judges are obliged to apply 
some standards to determine how well the diver enters into the water. They express their 
judgments in the grades they give to each diver. Their grades are expected to differ over 
how well each diver satisfies the standards of an excellent dive. However, judges cannot 
differ from each other “over whether excellence of entry into the water is a criterion of 
the excellence of a dive.”122 
2- In the ordinary uses of the concept of criteria, the object in question is a known object 
from the very beginning. In these cases, the point of applying criteria is to evaluate the 
object and assign status and ranking to it. In Cavell’s example of the university admission 
policy, the criteria provide grounds to evaluate qualities of students on a consistent basis, 
but they do not give rise to the question what is subsumed under the concept of student. 
Wittgenstein’s grammatical criteria do not provide such evaluative parameters, but they 
specify conditions under which something is legitimately subsumed under a concept. In 
this sense, “in using ordinary or official criteria we start out with a known kind of object 
whereas in using Wittgensteinian criteria we end up knowing a kind of object.”123  
3- In the ordinary ways we use the concept of criteria, the authority that establishes and 
applies the relevant criteria is an easily recognizable specialized agency in the form of an 
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institution, a group of people, or a knowledgeable person. This also means that the source 
of authority that is responsible for establishing and application of criteria is also the 
source of authority that is able to change relevant criteria and their application when, for 
various reasons, such a change is required or desired. In Wittgenstein’s discussions of 
grammatical criteria, the authority is always the ordinary language user who is authorized 
by the mere fact that she is a competent speaker. The individual language user neither 
determines nor applies the criteria by herself, and therefore her authority resides in her 
linguistic relations to a normative community which sets the grammatical criteria and 
responds to their applications either affirming or rebuffing. As opposed to ordinary 
criteria, Wittgenstein’s criteria are deeply rooted in the history and organization of the 
normative community, and therefore changes in them are not a matter of a decision made 
by a visible and recognizable agency, but basically a matter of historical events and shifts 
in the organization of the relations within the normative community.   
For the purposes of this chapter, the last two features of Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical criteria have critical importance. While the second one points to the 
constructive/constitutive character of criteria in our lives, the third one problematizes 
unavoidable political dimensions of living in a grammatically constructed world.  
Cavell’s discussion of the differences between ordinary uses of the concept of 
criteria and Wittgenstein’s criteria in terms of the former’s function of identification and 
the latter’s place in constructing our ordinary world is extended in his comparison 
between the senses of the object in Austin and Wittgenstein. In Austin’s discussions, the 
object in question is a ‘specific object’, whereas Wittgenstein mainly points to ‘generic 
objects’ in his discussions on grammatical criteria. Accordingly, Cavell identifies the 
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Austinian criteria as non-grammatical criteria which are mainly marks and features of an 
object that tells the identity of it. Whereas Wittgenstein’s criteria are grammatical criteria 
which, as opposed to the Austinian criteria, “do not relate a name to an object, but various 
concepts to the concept of that object.”124 In this sense, Wittgenstein’s criteria are 
coordinates of a concept within the conceptual space. Austin’s criteria are more about 
what occupies an already given and known conceptual space at a certain moment, 
whereas Wittgenstein’s criteria are what unfold the conceptual space as such. The range 
of the analysis of Austin’s criteria is thus short and limited. The issue of criteria in 
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, has broader implications for the relations between 
language and the world. A language user’s not being able to tell, say, a goldfinch from a 
bittern does not pose any serious questions about her competency in using language. She 
knows that it is a bird yet she cannot tell what type of a bird it is. Her being unable to 
identify the bird correctly does not put a considerable distance between her and other 
language users. She is not a stranger to the normative community that establishes and 
applies criteria to tell whether a bird is a goldfinch or a bittern. We can also imagine, by 
contrast, a fully competent language user whose language does not share the concept of 
bird with English. There is no conceptual space in her language that is specifically 
reserved for what we call birds, and accordingly the language games we play using the 
concept of bird are not available to the language users of that language. She does not 
draw a conceptual line as we do between, say, cats and birds. Cats and birds live happily 
under the same concept, say that of animal in her conceptual universe. But what if we 
extend this thought experiment and ask: what if her language does not have a concept that 
we can recognize as our concept of animal? In this case, we certainly feel more distanced 
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from her conceptual world. We can go one step further and ask what if her language does 
not allow her to make a distinction between animate and inanimate things? Is it possible 
to speak a language and not be able to distinguish living beings from inanimate ones? Is it 
just difficult or simply impossible for us to imagine a language having no such distinction 
between rocks and birds? There are no definitive answers to these questions in Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein. However, what is interesting in these questions is the difficulty and 
challenge they pose to our reason and imagination. As Wittgenstein says “…to imagine a 
language means to imagine a form of life”125, and the difficulty/impossibility of 
imagining a language user who cannot make a distinction between animate and inanimate 
beings, is the difficulty/impossibility to imagine a life in which living beings and 
inanimate beings are treated the same. 
Wittgenstein’s inquiries into grammatical criteria reveal that even the simplest 
concepts of our language, which are easy to use and require no special training, are 
sustained by intricate relations among our concepts. Austin takes the network of 
conceptual relations for granted and therefore not knowing the criteria in Austin means 
the lack of a piece of information which can be easily learned. However, when “…you do 
not know the grammatical criteria of Wittgensteinian objects, then you lack, as it were, 
not only a piece of information or knowledge, but the possibility of acquiring any 
information about such objects überhaupt; you cannot be told the name of that object, 
because there is as yet no object of that kind for you to attach a forthcoming name to: the 
possibility of finding out what it is officially called is not yet open to you.”126 For Cavell, 
the capability to use a concept competently and the capability to recognize an object 
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under a concept are based on the same capacity to be absorbed in a form of life. The 
emergence of an object in our lives means putting new marks and limits in our conceptual 
space. These new marks and limits are made possible by prior marks and limits which are 
sustained and maintained by a certain form of life. The emergence of a bird as an object 
in one’s life requires one to be a member of a normative community that maintains and 
sustains a network of distinctions between animate and inanimate beings. This, of course, 
does not mean that the distinction between animate and inanimate objects is the 
privileged ground which makes our more mundane distinctions possible. On the contrary, 
the grammatical relationship between the concept of bird and that of animate is one 
among many such relations that mutually sustain each other.  
Criteria and Politics: 
We can summarize the above discussions about the existence of objects by saying 
that what is social is not only our relationship to the other language users but also the 
mode in which our objects emerge in our world. The order of objects projects our 
sociality and vice versa. As our sociality depends on forms of availability and 
accessibility of the subjects whose mutual responsiveness is based on shared grammatical 
forms of responsiveness, a shared intelligibility of objects points to their social formation 
based on shared criteria. Objects emerge in our world only in a shared social space, and 
the shared social space is made possible by our shared judgments. In other words, our 
agreement in judging what kind of an object a thing is is the ground on which the object 
in question has a place in our world. In Cavell’s questioning the character of our 
agreement, the political dimensions of our ordinary world start emerging. He establishes 
highly original parallelisms between social contract theories and Wittgenstein’s idea of 
 133
agreement according to which our capability and capacity to use language have 
indispensible political dimensions. This, in return, means that our capacity and capability 
to think, imagine, and act politically have fundamental indispensible grammatical 
dimensions which, as we will see, is the terrain where Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s 
thoughts intersect. 
Grammatical criteria are binding to the members of a normative community that 
establishes them and controls their application in various linguistic contexts. Grammatical 
criteria order and classify the human surrounding and render it a shared habitable world. 
At the same time, it is also grammatical criteria that tell what justice is, what equality is, 
and what beauty is. In this sense, as much as grammatical criteria project our interests, 
needs, and desires to our surrounding, they also project our struggles, agonies, and 
discontents. Cavell claims that the spirit of Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy 
points to ‘us’, the competent language users, as a normative collective that establishes 
grammatical criteria and has authority on their applications. “It is for [Wittgenstein], 
always we who ‘establish’ the criteria under investigation.” (CR, p. 18) But who is this 
‘we’ that pervasively exists in the voice of each and every language user? And what does 
it have to do with politics?  
To answer these questions, I start with a passage by Cavell which explains what 
‘the claim of reason’ is.  
 The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we 
say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to community is always a search for the 
basis upon which it can or has been established. I have nothing more to go on than my conviction, 
my sense that I make sense. It may prove to be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction 
isolates me, from all others, from myself. That will not be the same as a discovery that I am 
dogmatic or egomaniacal. The wish and search for community, are the wish and search for 
reason.127 
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‘The philosophical appeal to what we say’ is a trademark of ordinary language 
philosophy. In a more or less standard understanding of ordinary language philosophy, 
the emergence of philosophical problems is due to the philosopher’s use of our ordinary 
concepts outside their appropriate contexts, which thereby exceeds the effective range of 
their application. Because our ordinary concepts fail to reach the aims the philosopher has 
established, the philosopher tries to compensate by establishing philosophical concepts 
like ‘universal’ and ‘form.’ However, they only bring more philosophical puzzlements in 
train. Against this movement, the task of ordinary language philosophy is to show that 
what seems to be the failure of our ordinary concepts is, in fact, the failure of the 
philosopher to come to terms with our predicament as language users. Ordinary language 
philosophy, in this standard understanding, shows to the philosopher that her established 
philosophical aims are phantasmatic expressions of her philosophical frustrations and her 
philosophical concepts are pointless efforts to avoid facing human finitude.  
What distinguishes Cavell’s account of ordinary language philosophy is that he 
finds it problematic, and indeed patronizing, to ask the modern philosopher (who is 
always the skeptic in Cavell) to come back to the terrain of the ordinary, to recognize, 
acknowledge, and conform to the authority of the ordinary, as if the terrain of the 
ordinary and its authority were not the origins of the skeptical questions in the first place. 
In short, Cavell accepts that the skeptical perspective is a result of a metaphysical exile 
where the modes of the binding authority of the ordinary cannot respond to our inquiries. 
Yet, the skeptical demand is not a call to prove and re-prove that the metaphysical exile is 
not habitable by language users. The skeptic herself would be the first to declare the 
inhabitability of the metaphysical exile. Rather, the skeptical demand is to reconsider the 
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habitability of the ordinary. The invitation (the call) to the skeptic to return to the 
ordinary, as if the ordinary were peacefully free from philosophical questions, does 
nothing but cause the skeptic to recite her well established arguments that have sent her to 
her metaphysical exile in the first place. Cavell sides with the skeptic and expresses his 
protest:  
The skeptic does not gleefully and mindlessly forgo the world we share, or thought we shared; he 
is neither the knave Austin took him to be, nor the fool the pragmatists took him for, nor the 
simpleton he seems to men of culture and of the world. He forgoes the world for just the reason 
that the world is important, that it is the scene and stage of connection with the present; he finds 
that it vanishes exactly with the effort to make it present.128  
 
For Cavell, the skeptic is the tragic hero because, like the tragic hero’s deeds, the 
skeptic’s words cannot be redeemed by her community. As the irredeemability of the 
tragic deed is not an answer to the tragic question, but its cause, and as it reveals the 
conditions of redemption that refuse to accommodate the tragic deed, the  failure of the 
ordinary to meet the epistemic demands of the skeptic reveals more about the demands of 
the ordinary on us than the demands of the skeptic. The skeptic’s metaphysical exile is an 
avoidance of the demands of and consequent responsibilities to the ordinary. Acceptance 
of the existence of the world (or, at least, a world) is a demand of the ordinary and the 
skeptic refuses to meet this demand.     
In a self-reflexive maneuver, instead of problematizing the voice of the skeptic 
which questions the legitimacy of the demands of the ordinary, Cavell problematizes the 
voice of the ordinary language philosopher, his own philosophical persona. The first 
thing Cavell questions in the voice of the ordinary language philosopher with regard to 
the ‘necessity’ to accept the existence of the world is that she has unquestioned, and 
indeed unquestionable, confidence in her knowledge about how ‘we’ use our ordinary 
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words in ordinary contexts. What is the source of her confidence? Cavell’s point is that 
her confidence has nothing to do with her philosophical training and skills. The 
philosopher cannot claim to know more than any other language user knows about her 
language. All the philosopher can claim is that she looks more closely at, and demands 
more from, what we say. In other words, the degree of grammatical knowledge which is 
sufficient to be an ordinary language user is also sufficient to be an ordinary language 
philosopher. The criteria she voices belong to a normative community, and her 
confidence lies in her conviction that she can represent her normative community in 
voicing the criteria of her language. Even if she has never asked for and ‘we’ have never 
given her the right to speak for us (in the name of us), she is fully authorized in saying 
‘we say X, when…’. In this sense, the precondition to speak is to have the ability to speak 
for a normative community, and each and every competent speaker always speaks 
claiming to be representing her normative community. In other words, communication 
between language users is their claims on each other to be representatives of the same 
normative community.  
The individual language user’s ability to speak in the name of her normative 
community relies on her conviction that when she formulates and reveals grammatical 
criteria she voices the agreement of her normative community. The authority with which 
she says ‘We say X, when…’ is the authority of the agreement among the members of her 
normative community. It is in this sense that Cavell defines philosophical appeal to 
grammatical criteria as a claim to community, and the skeptical appeal as a disclaim to 
community. In discovering and formulating grammatical criteria, the ordinary language 
philosopher makes a claim about the collective agreement about her normative 
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community. According to Cavell, such grammatical claims about community have to be 
claims to community, because what is voiced is not a plain grammatical given, but our 
investment and commitment to the normative community. In this sense, when the 
ordinary language philosopher talks about a necessity to accept the existence of the 
world, it is a necessity to be in community with other language users. This is because the 
world, the existence of which is at stake in the discussion between the skeptic and the 
ordinary language philosopher, is a shared world the refusal of which has to mean 
withdrawal of our commitment to and investment in the sharing parties.   
The possibility of the meaningful individual voice relies upon the confirmation of 
the relevant language users representing the normative community, to which the ordinary 
language philosopher makes a claim. If another philosopher disagrees with her 
grammatical claims about criteria, they have no ultimate authority to appeal to other than 
‘us’. “If two are in disagreement they vie with one another for the same confirmation. 
The only source of confirmation here is ourselves. And each of us is fully authoritative in 
this struggle.”129 For Cavell, disagreement about what we ordinarily mean signifies not 
only an intellectual quarrel, but the fact that the disagreeing parties do not occupy the 
same social space. The point is not that language users who share the same social space 
cannot disagree with each other about the meaning of words, or that such a disagreement 
cannot be expressed without fracturing the social ground both parties stand on. It is that 
the social space and our meaning claims are mutually constructive of each other. We 
cannot keep disagreeing forever without repudiating the social bond. Furthermore, this 
means that the social space that makes our encounter with each other possible is itself 
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possible on the basis of our acknowledging and recognizing each other’s authority in 
using words. What keeps us together, happily or unhappily, is the fact that we are 
authorized by the same grammar the criteriality of which is the common ground we stand 
on. In this sense, Cavell’s discussion of criteria is a discussion of sociality as such. 
Cavell thinks that our calling grammatical criteria ‘our’ criteria depends not only 
on our ability to acknowledge them as such, but also on our ability to repudiate them. “If 
we could not repudiate them, they would not be ours, in the way we discover them to be, 
they would not be our responsibility.”130 In this sense, the skeptic’s total repudiation of 
our criteria and the ordinary language philosopher’s total endorsement of them arrive by 
different paths to the same point of avoidance of the responsibility of ‘meaning what we 
say’. The skeptical and anti-skeptical positions with regard to grammatical criteria fail to 
accommodate the politics of knowing the world and of knowing each other. The skeptic 
claims that the presentness of the world is sustained and maintained by the ways we share 
it, and therefore what becomes intelligible through our acts of knowing is the ways in 
which we share the world, and not the world itself. The ordinary language philosopher 
protests that what we call knowledge is a way to share the world by having shared 
criteria, therefore the skeptic’s wish to know the world without sharing it is an impossible 
wish.  
For Cavell, neither party takes our moral/political commitments into the 
consideration when they appeal to our grammatical criteria as a source of (dis)trust in 
knowing the world. Cavell, by contrast, evokes the place of the concept of agreement in 
social contract theories to describe the place of the normative community in our speech 
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acts. At first sight, this is a surprising move because one can easily point to 
incommensurable elements between social contract theories and Wittgenstein’s account 
of language. For example, as Cavell himself argues, in Wittgenstein, one cannot make a 
distinction between nature and convention in the forms of life language users have. For 
language users, the conventional is the natural and vice versa. In other words, our ‘state 
of nature’ is to be conventional. It is obvious that ‘the state of nature’ in social contract 
theories cannot be easily accommodated within a Wittgensteinian framework. Why does 
Cavell risk possible and plausible objections, and suggest that the concept of agreement 
in social contract theories is a good context to understand Wittgenstein’s concept of 
agreement? 
Cavell utilizes not so much the answers but the questions of social contract 
theories to dismantle both the image of the normative community as a barrier to our 
knowledge claims and its image as a shelter for them. Our appeal to the criteria of our 
normative community is neither epistemologically void as the skeptic is anxious about, 
nor epistemologically ensuring as the ordinary language philosopher wishes for. The ‘we’ 
that resonates in our speech acts is not Descartes’ deceiving devil, nor is it the Platonic 
realm of forms that substantiate our knowledge claims. The ‘we’ is a projection of our 
need to be in community with others. One important aspect of Wittgensteinian criteria is 
that they are mythic projections which emerge when we need an account of our 
judgments. We do not appeal to grammatical criteria to form our judgments. On the 
contrary, we appeal to grammatical criteria when there is a crisis in sharing our 
judgments. In this sense, criteria are to be discovered in our mythic projections of a ‘we’ 
that would rectify our judgments as well as who is included in (and excluded from) the 
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projected ‘we’. In this sense, the normative community is not the guarantor of the unity of 
our speech and of the validity of our knowledge claims. On the contrary, appeals to the 
normative community are indicative of how fragile the ways we share the world are and 
how capable language users are to disunite on their judgments.  
In a normative community where the shared judgments among language users are 
total, and never lead to a crisis situation, the fact that they have shared judgments would 
be incomprehensible to the members of that normative community. Consequently, the 
issue of grammatical criteria would not be an intelligible object of philosophical inquiry. 
In Cavell’s view, the working of our language excludes such an option. As mentioned 
before, Wittgenstein’s criteria are inquiries into the possible relations we can establish 
among several concepts. Language use is projection of concepts into new contexts which 
is made possible by the capacity of our concepts to be combined with each other in 
different configurations. To be sure, the systematicity of the intra-conceptual relations is 
crucial to our use of language. However, a conceptual systematicity that cannot 
accommodate elasticity, and hence forces us to establish the same relations again and 
again would result in a stuttering speech that repeats itself forever failing to connect to 
the context it is directed to. The conditions of total agreement are the conditions of 
speechlessness. It is the elasticity of our concepts in combining with each other that 
allows the language user to communicate her own singular point by uttering words that 
are neither singular nor exclusively hers. The fact that there is always a possibility of 
rebuff points not only to the fragility of her meaning claim, but the fragility of the 
language user’s relations to her normative community. The fragility of our relationship to 
our normative community is not an effect of our ability to say something new with old 
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words. On the contrary, our ability to speak something anew is an effect of the fragility of 
our relationship with our normative community. For Cavell, the openness of our shared 
judgments to repudiation is a fragility that enables us to be a part of the normative 
community as competent speakers whose speech acts are not the empty reproductions of 
accepted combination of words, but projections the range of which cannot be known a 
priori.      
Cavell’s philosophical interest in social contract theories, especially Rousseau’s, 
is not due to their explanatory capacity with regard to social facts. Rather, Cavell takes 
them to be myths expressive of a ‘we’ to which we appeal to discover ‘our’ criteria. The 
concept of agreement in social contract theories is suggested as a philosophical response 
to a set of questions which are similar to the set of questions Wittgenstein responds to by 
offering the concept of agreement. The idea of a social contract is a solution to a problem.  
How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with 
the collective force of  all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, 
obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before. This is the fundamental problem to which 
the social contract holds the solution.131 
 
One may interpret this question as pointing to the conditions of a form of politically 
justifiable ‘obedience’ which is only possible when a citizen follows the rules of the 
public realm simply by obeying herself. The conditions under which the social contract 
requires the citizen to obey must be the same conditions under which she is motivated to 
obey by her own reasoning. Understood in this way, social contract theories seek rational 
forms of obedience as the basis of a politics which promises social order as well as 
autonomy. However, Cavell thinks that the key question is not obeying but the possibility 
of disobeying: “Given the specific inequalities, and lacks of freedom and absence of 
                                                 
131
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin Classics, 1968), 60. 
 
 142
fraternity in the society to which I have consented, do these outweigh the ‘the 
disadvantages’ of withdrawing my consent? This is the question the theorists of the social 
contract teach us to ask…”132 Reformulated in this way, social contract theories show, on 
the one hand, how deeply a member of society is united with it. On the other hand, 
however, social contract theories put the society at a distance where the individual 
member is able to see it as an ‘artifact’ rendering it open for political interventions. As 
Wittgenstein’s idea of agreement in searching for shared criteria evokes our responsibility 
in saying what we say, the idea of agreement on a social contract holds the consent-givers 
responsible for their consent. It is a myth that allows reformulation of our political 
responsibility for social interactions which we have found ourselves participating.   
The epistemological problem social contract theories provoke is a moral problem, 
because the question how one can know oneself to have consented to the formation of her 
society becomes a question of how one can recognize a society as her own without 
claiming moral responsibility. The contractual relationship is not about political actors 
having ‘advantages’ by inscribing their own interests in the terms of the contract. Since it 
is the contract that forms political actors who can, only then, have political interests, 
guarding of political interests cannot be a motivation to give consent to the agreement.  
How is it, then, the contract came into being?  
Cavell thinks that Rousseau was the deepest among the social contract theorists 
because he did not claim to know how the state of nature was or how the leap from the 
state of nature to the civil life happened, if it ever happened. Rousseau, as opposed to 
Locke and Hume, is able to find a way to transform the epistemological question into an 
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ethical/political question. Cavell argues that all Rousseau claims to know is his own 
relation to his society. Rousseau’s ‘philosophical datum’ is that the individual members 
of a society can speak for it and vice versa, and, in this sense, the ordinary language 
philosopher, in her claim to speak of criteria in the name of her community, shares the 
same ‘philosophical datum’ with Rousseau. His philosophical aim is to question how it is 
possible that the individual and society can mirror each other. In other words, in neither 
case is the aim to discover new facts about society. The social contract is an inquiry into 
the character of normative relations between the individual and her society. This is, for 
Cavell, the discovery of an original mode of knowledge, ‘…a way to use the self as 
access to the self’s society.’133 Likewise, ordinary language philosophy shows that the 
language user’s authority to speak for herself and her authority to speak for us are 
indistinguishable from each other. Cavell claims that “the alternative to speaking for 
yourself politically, is not: speaking for yourself privately…The alternative is having 
nothing (political) to say.”134 If I cannot recognize in the voice of the language user the 
voice of the community which I recognize as my own, she is not available and accessible 
to me as a competent speaker. By talking to me, she not only makes a claim to a 
community, but also a claim on me to belong to the community with her.  
What Cavell finds intriguing in social contract theories is that each speech act 
directed to us gives us an opportunity to participate to the normative community in 
different forms changing the very form of the normative community itself. This is 
because the normative community appealed to in our speech acts is not predetermined. 
The form of the normative community comes into being in a piecemeal fashion through 
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our responses. This is why Cavell identifies the appeal to criteria as a ‘wish and search 
for community and reason’. When we engage in a conversation, our responses are 
indicative not only of what kind of a normative community we belong to, but also what 
kind of a normative community we wish to belong to. We may be total strangers and you 
may be just asking for directions to find a coffee shop. Or you may be a guardian 
repeating the disciplinary orders of the prison and I an inmate. In either case, the 
community we belong to together is not there until I respond to you. To be sure, neither 
of us knows who else belongs to that community. Yet, the form of our appeal to the 
community, (the form of our availability and accessibility to each other as competent 
speakers, is what shapes the form of community that comes into being in the medium of 
our mutual responsiveness to each other. The fact that we participate across our 
differences in the formation of the normative community shows that the binding authority 
of the normative community that demands us to be available and accessible is not 
uniform and homogeneous. My unwillingness or failure to respond to a request for 
directions to the coffee shop could be impolite at worst, while my unwillingness or failure 
to respond to the disciplinary orders as an inmate may be defined as an act punishable by 
solitary confinement. I may not be searching for other impolite responders in my 
unwillingness to respond to your request for the directions to the coffee shop. However, 
my risking solitary confinement as an inmate by the form of my respond to you, the 
guardian, in most of the cases, is a form of participation that seeks and wishes for a 
resisting normative community. And this brings us to the politics of intelligibility. 
 
Politics, Intelligibility, and Subjectivity 
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In this section, I connect Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity with Cavell’s 
reflections on acquisition of language to show that politics of intelligibility is an 
underlying common dimension in Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s works especially in their 
understanding of the life of the subject. The politics in Foucault’s genealogies is a politics 
of intelligibility in the sense that both his archaeological and genealogical works focus on 
the risks and costs of making the world and ourselves intelligible. In the same fashion, 
Cavell thinks that Wittgenstein’s philosophy takes the issue of intelligibility as a moral 
question which manifests itself most explicitly in Wittgenstein’s ideas about private 
language and children’s acquisition of language. In Cavell, what is at stake in 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about the idea of a private language is not to show that the 
working of our language renders it impossible but articulating intelligibility as a moral 
task to make ourselves intelligible to others and commit to the intelligibility of their 
speech and actions. In this sense, the private language argument cannot be isolated within 
the framework of the validity and accuracy of the inner/outer distinction in describing and 
imagining ourselves. The question is the moral implications of such a way of imagining 
and describing ourselves centered around this distinction. Cavell focuses on moral 
implications of describing ourselves as having an inaccessible inside, and Foucault 
reveals the power effects of such a distinction.  
The philosophical question of subjectivity, in this context, is a site in which we 
can reveal connections between Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s moral/political standings 
with respect to intelligibility. Such a connection between them is most obvious in their 
refusal to imagine the subject in terms of the binary opposition between a publically 
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available objective outer realm and an inner realm of the private and inaccessible life of 
the subject. As opposed to such a picture of the subject residing in its self-contained 
internal space, both Wittgenstein and Foucault conceptualize forms of subjectivity as 
historical forms that render language users available and accessible to each other in a 
shared public realm. Our availability for the other language users and our accessibility by 
and to them do not have a singular form which could be described once and for all. 
However, on the most basic level, our availability to each other can be understood as our 
responsiveness to each other, and, on the same basic level, accessibility of language users 
is mostly a matter of the intelligibility which is language users’ ability to make sense of 
each other’s speech, gestures, and actions. Seen from this perspective, there is an 
immediate relationship between forms of subjectivity and politics, because to be in a 
power relationship is to be in a state of availability and accessibility to the practices and 
demands of power mechanisms. This picture of subjectivity and political life gets more 
sophisticated in Wittgenstein and Foucault, because the very forms that render the 
language user available for and accessible to mechanisms of power are also the forms 
through which the language user recognizes and acknowledges her own being. In this 
sense, the language user’s self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and actions upon herself 
are sustained by the forms of subjectivity that is also her vulnerability to power 
mechanisms. Consequently, as identity politics exemplifies, under modern conditions, 
forms of subjectivities become sites of power and resistance and the questions of who we 
are and how we define ourselves become more and more politicized.  
Augustine the Child and Cavell’s Daughter: 
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Cavell thinks that the condition of possibility of the intelligibility of the world of 
objects is our attunement to each other as language users. Attunement of language users 
is what makes possible the language users’ experience of the world as the constellation of 
orderly differentiated beings. This means that the individual language user recognizes the 
order of beings in her linguistic relations to her linguistic community. Attunement is what 
makes possible our active use of concepts in a flexible and precise way – flexible enough 
to project concepts into hitherto unknown contexts and precise enough to express the 
subtlest differences and relations among the objects. Cavell thinks that our attunement to 
each other with regard to our fellow language users, the world of subjects, has an 
irreducible moral character. As the epistemological standing of objects in our world is 
shaped by our acknowledgement of our mutual attunement, the moral standing of the 
subject is also a matter of acknowledgement. While practical and instrumental necessities 
to acknowledge an object as a hammer or as a tomato are pervasive in our talk about 
things, the moral standing of other language users is not exhaustive of such necessities. 
The terminal point of the acknowledgement of the moral standing of language users is 
our sheer responsibility to make ourselves known to the other and acknowledge the 
other’s attempts to make herself intelligible. In other words, our capacity to be responsive 
and to respond to the invitations, suggestions, orders, and compulsory gestures of other 
language users to play language games is morally conditioned. In this sense, the 
intelligibility of other language users is not simply a matter of knowing them. The 
intelligibility of the other is conditioned by her capacity to play language games, and her 
capacity to play language games is conditioned by the other language users’ capacity to 
respond to her. The moral dimension of the mutual intelligibility of language users is 
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inevitable, because it is based on the acknowledgment of the responsibility to participate 
on the games of intelligibility. In discussing the skepticism about the existence of other 
minds, Cavell claims that the issue cannot be isolated within the limits of epistemological 
field, for it necessarily implies a moral dimension. To put more precisely, the 
traditionally drawn philosophical limits between epistemology and morality becomes a 
form of injury, a scar, when the issue at stake is intelligibility of the other as a language 
user.  
   As I will discuss more fully in the next sections, both Wittgenstein and 
Foucault destabilize the inner/outer distinction with regard to the issue of subjectivity and 
Foucault’s use of the concepts of objectification and subjectivization in the text discussed 
above is a clear moment of such destabilization. The issue of availability and accessibility 
is, in fact, directly connected to the inner/outer distinction. What this distinction implies 
is that being a subject is to have an inner space available and accessible only to the 
subject. To use Wittgenstein’s example, being a subject is understood as having a beetle 
in a box to which only the subject has access. Wittgenstein’s criticism of the subject as an 
internal entity finds its clearest expression in his private language argument. Even if he 
fully develops the private language argument only toward the middle of the 
Investigations, we witness the emergence of the idea of a private language in the very 
beginning of the Investigations where Wittgenstein uses a passage by Augustine as an 
example of a pervasive and long-standing understanding of language in philosophy. In 
this short passage, Augustine describes the way he learned language use.  
When they (my elders) named some objects, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this 
and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. 
Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all 
peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of the other parts of the 
body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or 
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avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various 
sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my 
mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.135 
 
Augustine imagines language to be composed mainly of names which stand for things. 
There are, on the one hand, things that populate the world, and on the other hand, there is 
a reservoir of words that constitute the content of communication between language 
users. Accordingly, meaning is a function of the systemic and stable relations between 
words and things. In this context, ostensive definitions are the most fundamental tools to 
teach what words in a language mean. The adult simply points to things, uttering the 
corresponding words in teaching language. After a sufficient amount of repetition of the 
same gesture, the meaning, i.e. the connection between the vocal signs and things, 
becomes apparent to the child.  
Wittgenstein thinks that the majority of our philosophical frustrations stem from 
such a picture of language in which words and things are bounded mysteriously outside 
the sphere of speakers’ interactions. A word, being a name for a thing or a class of things, 
always refers to the same object in any context and under any conditions. In this picture, 
the apparent systematicity of language is thought to be possible only if the connections 
between words and things have a static character. If the being I called a cat yesterday is 
called a dog today, the very condition of the possibility of language use is undermined. In 
the same fashion, if the word cat can be used to refer to another being I cannot 
immediately recognize as a cat, my use of the word becomes, to say the least, 
problematic. As new things are discovered or made and some old things disappear from 
our world, new words are added to our vocabulary and old words become obsolete. 
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 Like any other picture, drawn for the purpose of making our life intelligible, such 
a picture is not necessarily a bad one when it is drawn and used for specific and limited 
purposes. “What Augustine says (or is remembering about his learning to speak) is not 
just inappropriate; it is also appropriate, but to something else (something more limited, 
or more specific) than Augustine realized.”136 It really is the case that the language game 
of naming requires a more or less static application of names. The problem Wittgenstein 
diagnoses arises when the philosopher uses this picture to measure all of our linguistic 
activities. When the philosopher’s expectation for a static systematicity is not fulfilled by 
our actual linguistic practices, out of frustration, she starts assuming metaphysical entities 
like universals or essences to fill the gap between her expectation and the actual practices 
of language use. As in psychoanalysis, Wittgenstein thinks that these metaphysical 
fictions are defense mechanisms developed by the philosopher to deal with her 
frustration.  
In a sense, the whole point of the Investigations is to overcome the philosophical 
frustration by putting this picture of language next to countless other ones to show that 
meaning is not a function of a relationship between words and things but a relationship 
between language users. The systematicity and stability of our language are not features 
of the world or of the structure of language to be discovered and revealed, but parts of our 
linguistic efforts to be available and accessible to each other. Wittgenstein does not deny 
the apparent systematicity of our language, but he reformulates it on the basis of ordinary 
uses of language. The concept of language games does help us to see, however, that the 
systematicity of language is not uniform and total. Each language game is rule-based in 
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its own way, and thus is both regular and flexible. In the same fashion, the concept of 
family resemblance indicates that the systematicity of language is not mechanical and 
static but historical.    
Notice that in the passage by Augustine, there is no actual engagement between 
Augustine the child and his elders. His elders address the objects through sounds and 
bodily gestures but they do not specifically address Augustine the child. He observes 
adult language users and derives a vocabulary from his observations.  Even before his 
observations on adult language users, Augustine the child must know that things in the 
world have names. Augustine the child must have been born with some innate intuition 
and knowledge of language. 
And now, I think we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child 
came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country: that is, as if it 
already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet 
speak. And “think” would here mean something like “talk to itself”.137 
 
The Augustinian picture of language assumes a peculiar kind of human subject. It is pre-
discursive, or, if not, then the discursivity that constitutes it precedes all the forms of 
publicly shared discursivity. All Augustine the child has to do is to give expressions to 
his already formed thoughts and desires. Language, then, is an interface that mediates 
between the world of things and the monadic world of Augustine the child. Language is a 
mere means to carry the inner content of the mind to the outside world where other minds 
pick up these words and decipher their meaning. The subject does not need the public 
language to think. She needs public language to package her thoughts only when she 
wants to communicate a part of the content of her mind to the others. The subject, in this 
picture, is a pre-discursive entity in the sense that it is already equipped with fully 
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articulated thoughts, needs, and desires. Its relations and connections to public discourses 
are merely instrumental to translate them in a form which is intelligible to the other 
language users. Accordingly, each and every language user is, in fact, a bilingual subject. 
She first understands and speaks the language of her thoughts, needs, feelings, and 
desires, that is, a private language immediately available and accessible only to her inner 
self. The public language is never able to provide her with the kind of intimacy her own 
private language is able to provide by presenting her state of being to herself. More 
importantly, from a political perspective, the language using subject in the Augustinian 
picture has no room for resistance against language presented to him by his elders. Unlike 
the other children in the Investigations, Augustine the child does not question his elders’ 
linguistic habits.   
In contrast to the way Augustine the child learns138 language, Cavell presents 
another picture of a child acquiring language which also contains a Wittgensteinien 
understanding of subjectivity and human agency substantially different from the 
Augustinian subject. Cavell thinks that the fact that Wittgenstein starts the Investigations 
with the Augustine passage is philosophically remarkable, because ‘Augustine’s words 
                                                 
138
 Cavell has reservations about the use of the concepts of learning and teaching to describe the scenes of 
language acquisition. He thinks that these concepts are too didactic and portrays the language ‘learning’ 
process in an over-intellectualized manner as if it is basically a transmission of fully articulated 
grammatical knowledge from adults to children. He claims that learning and maturation, especially in the 
context of a child acquiring knowledge, are inseparable.  What he has in mind in criticizing such a picture 
of language acquisition is twofold. First, what the adult teaches the child and what she learns from the adult 
is not as determinate as this picture presupposes. Second, language acquisition is not just a matter of 
acquiring grammatical knowledge about words, but it is a matter of practical changes in how the world 
presents itself to the child, in the ways she acts on her world, and in who she is in relation to the other 
language users. While didactic models portray the child as incognizant and the adult as omniscient with 
respect to language, in Cavell, the linguistic interactions of the adult and the child reveal how incognizant 
we, as fully competent language users, are with respect to what we mean and what we say. The real 
problematic Augustine the child and the other children in the Investigations force us to face is the fact that 
the authority of the adult in ‘teaching’ language is not based on the adult’s full linguistic knowledge, which 
nonetheless is to be presupposed in the scenes of language acquisition.   
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precisely set the topics’ of the Investigations. Literally, almost each and every word of 
the Augustine passage is an explicit theme of the Investigations:  
…when, my, elders, name, some object, accordingly, move, toward, I, saw, this, grasped, called, 
sound, uttered, meant, point, intention, shown, bodily movements, natural language of all peoples, 
expression, face, eyes, voice, state of mind, seeking, having, rejecting, words, repeated, used, 
proper places, various sentences, learnt, understood, signified, train signs, express my own 
desires.139 
 
Except for the last item (expression of desire), the Augustine passage is, in fact, the 
thematic index of the Investigations. This is to say that Augustine the child is the source 
of the themes of the Investigations, and, moreover, he is not alone in initiating 
philosophical questioning. The Investigations contains voices of other children asking 
quasi-philosophical questions which never get answered satisfactorily.  
 For Cavell, the textual function of the voices of children in the Investigations is 
not merely to present easily comprehensible forms of sophisticated philosophical 
problems, as if children’s language use gives us less sophisticated and more transparent 
modes of language where we get what the sophistication and opaqueness of adult 
language refuse to give us. On the contrary, the issues related to the children’s acquisition 
of language are philosophically substantial in their own rights, because, “…our idea of 
what language is is bound up with our ideas of what acquiring language is (and what 
using language is).”140 The sheer fact that language is something acquired, bequeathed, 
inherited, and transmitted has a claim on philosophy. One of the originalities of 
Wittgenstein’s thought is to make this undeniable (yet to the same extent banal and mute) 
fact of language philosophically relevant. This fact of language is philosophically 
relevant because what we acquire by acquiring language, what we inherit from the past, 
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what we bequeath to the future, and what happens to our language in the endlessly 
ongoing process of its transmission are always open questions demanding philosophical 
response. In other words, what we inherit from the past is never obvious and transparent 
but always requires philosophical attention. As we have seen in relation to the idea of 
family resemblance among language games, the question of inheritance is also a common 
ground between genealogy and Wittgenstein’s thought because genealogy also questions 
the elusive content of what we inherit from the past.  
The multiplicity of ways children acquire language teaches us the multiplicity of 
ways we use language. To give an account of the connection between the multiplicity of 
the ways we use language and the multiplicity of ways we learn language, Cavell uses the 
concept of projection. What is transmitted in children’s acquisition of language is 
inherent in the ways it is transmitted. What is transmitted is the ability to project words 
into different contexts in attunement with the other language users.  According to Cavell, 
Wittgenstein’s statement that ‘we learn words in a certain contexts’ can be understood in 
two ways. On the one hand, it means that we do not learn the ways a word can be used in 
all possible contexts. This is because the set of possible contexts a word can be used 
legitimately is not a closed, finite set the members of which can be pre-determined. No 
language user can provide an exhaustive lists of contexts in which a word can be used. 
On the other hand, Cavell argues, the same statement can be taken to tell us that not every 
context appropriate for the use of a word can be a context for learning a word. Cavell 
gives the example of metaphorical uses which are unquestionably an important part of the 
life of words, but not good candidates for a newcomer to language to acquire skill and 
mastery of the uses of the word. Understood in either way, Wittgenstein’s statement 
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invokes a very general philosophical question about language. The things of the world 
words of language address are singular and particular beings, but words are general 
categories. How is it possible to reconcile the singularity of beings and generality of 
language? Philosophical answers to this question are formulated around the concept of 
the essence and of the universals to which our words supposedly refer.  
Foucault and Forms of Subjectivity: 
Foucault clarifies his understanding of the connections between forms of 
subjectivity and power relations in one of his last writings. In this text, he rejects the 
common conception of his work as oriented toward investigating historical forms of 
power relations and, instead, defines the cumulative objective of his study as ‘to create a 
history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’. 
141
 In this quotation, there are three clues to Foucault’s understanding of power. First, 
Foucault’s use of a passive verb form indicates that becoming a subject means subjection 
to certain procedures and processes.142 Second, the field of subjectivity is differentiated in 
the sense that the subjective spaces available vary historically. And third, subjectifying 
practices are time- and space-bound local events that defy any universalist and 
transcendental principle of intelligibility.  
Even if Foucault privileges and prioritizes the theme of subjectivity over that of 
power, as the title of the text, “The Subject and Power”, indicates, the two themes cannot 
be questioned in isolation from each other. But still, Foucault does respond to the 
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common criticism that he understands history as a blind, nihilistic struggle among various 
power-hungry forces. By putting the theme of subjectivity before the theme of power, 
Foucault gives, not a telos perhaps, but a direction to relations of power.  Relations of 
power gain existential weight, for what is at stake in them is nothing less than possible 
forms of our existence in the world.  
At this juncture, then, it is necessary to ask about the character of the relationship 
between the subject and power. Foucault’s answer is short and precise: “My work has 
dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects.”143 
As paradoxical as it may sound, Foucault thinks that the power that constitutes 
individuals and groups of people as subjects through procedures and practices of 
objectification. The first mode of objectification is the discursive practices of the human 
sciences. In his archaeological period, Foucault focuses on the subject as the object of 
knowledge. The discourses of human sciences locate the subject in a nexus of activities 
such as language use and production. The second mode of objectification consists in what 
Foucault calls ‘dividing practices’ that fragment conceptual space as well as social space 
into cells inhabited by the insane, the criminal, the sick. Needless to say, dividing 
practices and production of the knowledge of the subject are intertwined for the insane, 
the criminal, the sick are also objects of knowledge. The third mode is self-objectification 
for which Foucault gives sexuality as an example. In becoming sexual beings, “…men 
have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality.’”144 
One distinguishing feature of these modes of objectification is that the forms of 
subjectivity associated with each distinct mode of objectification are also new forms of 
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availability and accessibility. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault claims that before 
the emergence of psychiatric discourses, reason recognized its own limits in madness. In 
what he later recognized as a romantic move, Foucault sees a strange dialogue between 
reason and unreason before the discourses of psychiatry started its great monologue with 
madness. Even if the expressions of the insane cannot be articulated within the field of 
reason, her expressions contain a different kind of truth originated on the other side of 
reason. The insane, though fully present in the social space145, are fundamentally 
inaccessible and unavailable. The supposed dialogue between reason and unreason 
reaffirms the limit between them. Therefore, in the Classical age, rather than an attempt 
being made to render the inaccessible accessible and the unavailable available, the 
dialogue with the insane is a limit experience where the categories of reason terminate. 
Madness, at this moment of history, is neither a disease of the soul nor a distorted form of 
subjectivity. With the emergence of the discourses of psychiatry, the insane person 
becomes a mental patient, and madness, having gained a medical form, becomes a form 
of subjectivity. Foucault focuses on the discursive and institutional transformations led by 
Pinel in France and Tuke in England to show that medicalization of madness in the hand 
of these two prominent reformers had a very strong moral content. The mental patient 
was asked to recognize her guilt and responsibility. 
…by this guilt, the madman became an object of punishment always vulnerable to himself and the 
Other; and, from the acknowledgement of his status as object, from the awareness of his guilt, the 
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madman was to return to his awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject, and 
consequently to reason. This movement, by which, objectifying himself for the other, the madman 
thus returned to his liberty…146  
 
The violence induced on the insane was not an expression of arbitrary cruelty any more. 
The violence took the form of therapeutic punishment the intensity and frequency of 
which varied in relation to the degree to which the insane recognized herself as a moral 
agent. In short, it was demanded that the insane be morally responsive, if not responsible. 
The point of medical intervention into the life of the insane was to reconstitute her 
subjectivity. The new medical practices invented by Pinel and Tuke included patient and 
insistent explanation of the situation and conditions of the insane to the insane by the 
asylum personnel and forcing the insane to recognize and respond to these explanations. 
The insane was asked to be available for the reasoned discourse initiated by the asylum 
personnel, and make her internal motivations accessible to them. At the same time, 
madness within psychiatric discourse became an enormously sophisticated object of 
knowledge classified into countless subspecies and described endlessly.  While the pre-
psychiatric concept of madness signified an undifferentiated human condition with fuzzy 
limits, the modern psychiatric discourse charted the terrain of madness to create a precise 
map of it. This conceptual map was used to access the life of unreason as the mental 
patient was treated and regimented according to where her specific madness is located in 
this charted terrain of unreason. In other words, psychiatric discourse invented new forms 
of intelligibility by establishing new categories to classify the insane which are at the 
same time new forms of subjectivity. In return, these new forms of subjectivity allowed 
                                                 
146
 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Vintage Books, 
1988), 247. 
 159
the psychiatric discourse to have more and more access to the lives of the insane within 
the asylum through specific treatments, regiments, and exercises. 
What we have seen above in the case of madness is not an isolated case. 
Foucault’s genealogies show the proliferation of the forms of subjectivity under the 
conditions of modernity. Each new form of intelligibility gives rise to a new form of 
subjectivity through which we become available and accessible to each other, to the state 
and its institutions, and to ourselves. As opposed to picturing subjectivity as an 
inaccessible internal space, Foucault pictures forms of subjectivities as historically 
constructed discursive spaces in which the individual human beings become responsive to 
various demands and expectations within various normative frameworks. In his 
genealogy of criminology and prison, we witness the emergence of the category of the 
criminal as a new subjective space. In contradistinction from the pre-modern practices of 
corporeal punishment, the new punitive order takes the soul of the criminal as the object 
of punishment. While pain was the primordial instrument of punishment, the new device 
of punishment is constant surveillance through which the criminal becomes incessantly 
available to the punitive gaze. Criminology opens a gate to the soul of the criminal and 
hence her motives and reasons become accessible for the rehabilitative program of 
imprisonment. One can say that the emergence of criminology marks the shift of the 
crime from the criminal act to the criminal subject.  Before the emergence of the 
discourses of criminology, it was the act that was criminal. Whereas, now, it is the 
criminal who is the subject and the criminal act is a mere manifestation of the criminal 
soul. Crime, now, is not a simple matter of transgressing the legal order but a symptom to 
be deciphered which provides access to the depths of human beings.  
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In the same manner as with madness and criminality, Foucault focuses on the 
emergence of the sexualized subject in the nexus of knowledge and power in History of 
Sexuality. The difference modern discourses of sexuality have brought in our lives, 
Foucault claims, is neither a stricter moral code nor the liberation of libidinal energy. He 
argues that understanding power relations in terms of repression and liberation leads to a 
one-dimensional picture of power in which power appears to be a purely negative 
phenomenon. In this picture, power appears to repress the manifestation of sexual energy, 
or regulate it strictly on moral, religious, and legal grounds.147 Instead, Foucault takes 
power to be positive mechanisms that produce the reality of sex by producing sexualized 
subjects. Desire has a special place in these discourses. It opens the gates to the deepest 
truths of human beings. Desire becomes the new discursive center from which various 
forms of sexualized subjects radiate into the social realm. A clear example is the 
emergence of the category of homosexual. Foucault compares the sodomite and the 
homosexual as two different concepts belonging to two different epochs, and argues that 
the concept of homosexual is not the scientifically revised, corrected, and improved 
version of the concept of sodomite. The sodomite was defined by the act of sodomy. 
Sodomy was a legal/moral category that signified a transgressive act against the order of 
admissible sexual acts, whereas, the discourses of sexuality invented the homosexual as a 
species. The focus of the concept of homosexual is not the acts of sex between same-sex 
individuals; rather, what the concept distinguishes is a specific form of desire that 
manifests itself in various ways, same-sex physical intimacy being only one of them. For 
                                                 
147
 Foucault acknowledges the uniqueness of psychoanalysis on this issue. Psychoanalysis does not take the 
law and desire as two separate phenomena. Instead the law and desire are constructive to each other. 
Nonetheless, Foucault argues, even the psychoanalytic model forces us to think power in terms of 
“juridico-discursive” paradigm.  
 161
example, a concept like latent homosexuality that refers to homosexual desire 
manifesting itself in any form except for physical intimacy with the same-sex individuals 
is possible and meaningful only within the framework of modern discourses of sexuality. 
A latent sodomite, by contrast, is an oxymoron, for one becomes sodomitic only by 
engaging in sodomy. Foucault’s claim here is that the power effects with respect to field 
of sexuality should be sought not in prohibitions and silences, but in the ways forms of 
subjectivity, like the homosexual, become publicly available as objects of knowledge. It 
is through such a form of subjectivity that the scientific-legal complex produces power 
effects in the field of sex. 
The Subject at the Intersection of Genealogy and Ordinary Language Philosophy: 
Cressida J. Heyes  
In her book, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies, 
Cressida J. Heyes points to rich connections between Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument and Foucault’s genealogies of the modern subject. She argues that both 
Wittgenstein and Foucault challenge the dominant philosophical picture of the subject as 
an inner authentic being. Heyes thinks that two pictures dominate our modern 
understanding of the self. The first is the picture of an authentic inner self that represents 
itself in the medium of the flesh. Accordingly, to imagine the subject as an authentic 
inner being is to imagine ‘the self as monarch, residing within the palace of the body, 
guiding its renovation so that its unique status will be made manifest’.148 The second 
picture is of power understood as a substance held by a sovereign who exercises it from 
without by repressing the self. Heyes sees a complex relationship between these two 
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pictures. The inner/outer distinction ‘plays to the sovereign model’: While there is an 
external sovereign who holds power over us, each of us is also a sovereign in our bodies. 
The more we escape the external power, the freer our internal sovereign is. Hence 
resisting power is a matter of becoming authentic individuals true to our inner selves.  
For Heyes, the postulation of such an inner authentic being is not a politically 
neutral philosophical move because the established binary opposition between a 
homogenous self-same subjective space, an inside, and an objective differentiated space, 
an outside, is corollary to the binary opposition between the figure of the sovereign who 
holds power and the figure of the subject who resists it. In other words, the picture of the 
inner/outer distinction designates the outside as the site of power and the inside as the site 
of resistance. Heyes suggests that destabilizing the conception of the subject arrested in 
the inside/outside distinction will reveal the blind spots of political perspectives that are 
‘held captive by a picture’ of power as a substance held by a sovereign. Foucault thinks 
that a huge network of power practices take place precisely in the blind spot of such 
political perspectives, and drawing on Foucault, Heyes argues that the ‘picture of the 
inner/outer distinction masks…the advance of normalizing practices into novel territories 
– especially corporeal features not previously scrutinized for their deviance, or to 
behaviors once unremarked that now become indicators of a problematized identity.’149 
The demands of disciplinary mechanisms that seek normalization take the appearance of 
an inner voice expressing the needs and desires of an inner being, while oppressive power 
relations are imagined to be external constraints limiting and regulating the outwardly 
manifestations of the inner self. As a result, normalizing practices that elude such a 
perspective also escape critical scrutiny and political attention.  
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 Heyes mainly focuses on practices of body modifications such as aesthetic 
surgery, tattoos, sex reassignment surgeries, and weight-loss programs and observes that 
the desire to modify the body is perceived as an expression of an inner authentic self. In 
each case the relationship between the body and the inner self poses a different problem 
that requires a different kind of intervention. In the case of sex reassignment surgeries, 
the inner self finds itself in a body of the wrong sex. The gender of the inner self and the 
sex of the body do not fit. In some cases of aesthetic surgery, the pace of the aging 
process of the body and of the inner self is out of sync. The body is older than the inner 
self and therefore it has to be modified to reflect the ‘true age’ of the self. However 
differentiated the demands to modify the body, the objective is to render the body more 
suitable and loyal to the experience of the inner self. Heyes’ point is that even if a great 
degree of agency is ascribed to the inner self in the practices of body modifications, this 
ascribed agency functions to disguise the lack of agency. Under modern conditions, the 
body has been more and more subjected to disciplinary mechanisms and normalizing 
practices that are enmeshed with various specialized discourses. For example, in the case 
of sex reassignment surgeries, surgical capabilities and psychiatric discourse decide what 
‘true sex’ is for an individual whose sexual experience lies on the limits drawn by 
heteronormativity.150 The medical/psychiatric discourse establishes its authority on its 
capability to decipher the true meaning of what the inner self says through psychiatric 
signs and bodily symptoms about its ‘true’ sexual identity. Hence, an authentic inner 
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being ontologically prior to linguistic conventions and discursive formations is a 
necessary element for the establishment of the authority of medical/psychiatric discourse.  
Heyes argues that both Wittgenstein and Foucault, in their own ways, criticize 
such an understanding of the subject as an inner authentic being, and in the light of their 
criticisms the practices of body modifications appear to overlap with normalizing 
practices more than is commonly understood. Instead of assuming an authentic self, 
expressing itself in the medium of the body, Heyes, following Foucault, sees the subject 
as embodied through disciplinary practices which aim at normalization of individuals. 
The self as an authentic inner being, a monarch in the body, is more an agent of 
disciplinary mechanisms than it is an autonomous entity resisting a repressive power. In 
the same fashion, Wittgenstein’s private language argument undermines the idea of a 
sovereign subject as the terminal point of our linguistic activities. On the contrary, the 
language using subject in Wittgenstein emerges gradually in and through various 
language games. One of the morals of the private language argument is that the subject is 
not a self-contained entity. The agency of the language user resides in linguistic space in 
a diffused state.   
Heyes also points to convergences between Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thought 
in terms of their understanding of what philosophy can offer politically. She utilizes 
David Owen’s concept of ‘aspectival captivity’151 (Owen 2003) and James Tully’s 
Wittgensteinien criticism of Habermas (Tully 2003) to show where the critical edges of 
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Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thinking converge.152 Owen contrasts ‘aspectival captivity’ 
with ‘ideological captivity’ and argues that whereas ‘ideological captivity’ more or less 
implies a right way and a wrong way to see the world and ourselves in it, ‘aspectival 
captivity’ does not give rise to such connections between epistemological accuracy and 
political positions. A picture by itself is not true or false; it is, rather, the necessary 
medium for claims to truth to emerge. Tully, in the same fashion, criticizes Habermas’ 
critical model that even our most articulated rational claims are intelligible only on the 
basis of some such shared pictures. What Owen calls ‘aspectival captivity’ is our shared 
commitment to such pictures, while Tully shows that our commitment to such pictures 
cannot be judged rational or irrational in themselves, for such judgments are meaningful 
only when they are made against the background of our commitment to certain pictures. 
Accordingly, the point of criticizing ‘aspectival captivity’ is not to get rid of these 
pictures and see the world aright, but to reveal the historical contingency of our 
commitments to such pictures.  
How does a picture hold us captive? Aspectival captivity is aspect blindness in the 
sense that we are captivated by an aspect when it does not appear to us as an aspect. A 
very simple, obvious, and immediately recognizable pictorial representation of a rabbit 
may hide a duck in its two dimensional and totally transparent body, and vice versa. The 
perceptual shifts between the vision of a rabbit and of a duck are marked by what 
Wittgenstein calls aspect dawning. Similar to our experience of the duck/rabbit figure, the 
kinds of world the background pictures of our linguistic and discursive practices present 
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to us may change radically when we start seeing different aspects of it.153 In other words, 
our relationships to these pictures are not stable. On the contrary, we might be discontent 
with some pictures or some aspects of them because the ontological implications of these 
pictures sometimes conflict with our ethical and political concerns. In Heyes’ words, ‘a 
disjunction’ emerges between our ontological and ethical/political commitments which 
gives rise to counter discourses. These counter discourses open up new perspectives from 
which some hitherto unnoticed aspects of our pictures become visible and hence available 
for critical scrutiny and political intervention.  
Both Wittgenstein and Foucault think that our pictures of the subject as a pre-
given entity are not responsive to our ethical/political concerns. They both develop 
counter discourses that point to various different and hitherto unnoticed aspects of our 
pictures of subjectivity. Neither of them has a theory of subjectivity as such. Rather, they 
show different modes and states of subjectivity in different fields of experience. 
Wittgenstein focuses on the most ordinary linguistic practices such as expecting 
someone, executing a simple mathematical calculation, giving directions, and so on, and 
in each case, he shows that assuming a self-contained entity in control of these practices 
is not only superfluous but also presents a very diminished and poor picture of ourselves 
as language users. In the same fashion, Foucault focuses on different modalities of 
modern subjectivity and argues that the subject is not the founder of her experience. The 
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history of subjectivity is not the history of the self-same subject moving through 
historical events. It is, rather, the history of discursive events and practices that give rise 
to different modes of being in the world.  
 
Genealogy as Critical Therapy 
 
Genealogical Pursuit of Family Resemblances: 
Genealogy is a pursuit of the intelligibility of the systems of constraints with a 
specific emphasis on the facticity and contingency of the formation of these systems. This 
also suggests a further similarity between Wittgenstein’s grammar and Foucault’s power. 
As grammar, for Wittgenstein, is always specific to particular language games, 
Foucault’s power is also always specific to particular relations. What gives consistency 
and stability to our use of the concept of power is not a common element present in each 
and every power relation. What makes possible our use of the concept of power then? 
The best answer seems to be in one of the most central concepts in Wittgenstein’s later 
thought: the concept of family resemblance the very name of which suggests and invites a 
genealogical approach in rendering our use of language intelligible. Genealogy, in this 
light, is a historical search for a network of familial conjunctions and disjunctions among 
operations of power.  
In his later period, Wittgenstein gives up his earlier search for a model that 
explains the totality of language in favor of the idea of language games. In fact, we can 
claim that for Wittgenstein there is no Language but only language games. There is no 
common logic shared by all language games but only local grammatical rules specific to 
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each and every language game. However, even if there is no formal unity among 
language games, it is obvious that our linguistic practices, i.e. our playing language 
games, are not totally fragmented, segregated, and isolated from each other. The fact that 
our language games are connected to each other expresses itself in the ways our linguistic 
practices invite and overlap with each other. A small talk can turn into a fight as well as a 
fight can give way to another language game, and so on. Wittgenstein uses the 
concept/metaphor of family resemblance to refer to similarities among language games 
and how language games are connected to each other. His point in using this concept is, 
on the one hand, to deny that there is a common form shared by all linguistic activities. 
On the other hand, he also wants to be able to show that these similarities and 
connections among language games point not to a singular homogenous plain but to a 
‘complicated network’.  
The concept of family resemblance suggests the singularity and uniqueness of 
language games as well as the facticity of our language use. The formation of an actual 
family tree is shaped by arbitrary encounters, births and deaths of offspring, marriages, 
divorces, and other countless factors. When one looks at the formation of such a family 
tree, one sees nothing but the facticity of familial events mentioned above and the 
contingent character of the shape of the family tree which is nothing but the culmination 
of the traces of a concrete history. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s concept of family 
resemblance underlines the facticity and contingency of the formation of language games 
and this implies that the intelligibility of formation of language games lies in the concrete 
history of the emergence of these language games. In other words, the concept of family 
resemblance suggests a historical dimension to our linguistic practices. Wittgenstein 
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emphasizes this point further in the Investigations: “We are talking about the spatial and 
temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal 
chimera.”154  
It seems plausible to assume, without doing considerable violence to 
Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thoughts, that what Foucault calls a discourse or a form of 
rationality can be understood as a large extended family of language games. Wittgenstein 
thinks that language games are discernible and identifiable not because of a shared 
transcendental logic or an ahistorical form but by virtue of their place in the network of 
family resemblances that are due to a shared familial history. “We see that what we call 
“sentence” and “language” has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of 
structures more or less related to one another.”155 In the same fashion, Foucault thinks 
that what brings different statements together in a discourse is neither a set of rational 
principles nor some supposed pre-discursive features of the objects of discourse. What 
keeps them together is a grid formed by specific and concrete historical events. The task 
of genealogy is to ‘record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it 
must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without 
history…’156 The genealogist does not assume that the divisions and disjunctions among 
the discourses of the present and the internal unity of each discourse were already given 
in the beginning of their formation. The appearance of internal unity within discourses 
and orderly divisions among them is a result of a misleading retrospective vision. The 
genealogical perspective allows us to see the present formation of discourses as an 
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assemblage of the effects of singular events just as the concept of family resemblance 
allows us to see our linguistic activities in their singularity and uniqueness as well as their 
relationality.  Wittgenstein makes some remarks about number as an example of a family 
of language games which would be useful to understand this genealogical vision: 
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 
“number”? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – relationship with several things that have 
hitherto been called number; and this may be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things 
that we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist 
fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.157 
 
Here, Wittgenstein imagines the formation of a family of language games as a matter of 
extension and integration bit by bit. The resulting unity is not beyond or behind the actual 
‘overlapping of many fibers’. The task of genealogist is to seek those moments of ‘twists’ 
where singular events overlap and form ‘what we tend to feel is without history’.   
How Necessary the Concept of Necessity? 
For years, Wittgenstein’s voice has remained confined within the mainstreams of 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Recently, however, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has 
become available to a more diverse philosophical audience which utilizes his thought in 
different philosophical areas including politics. One way to approach politics from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective is to describe and analyze the grammar of our political 
concepts such as justice, freedom, equality, struggle, and oppression, and see what kind 
of language games we play using these concepts. Accordingly, Wittgensteinian political 
thinking would be a matter of applying his general philosophical remarks to the specific 
field of politics. Such an instrumentalist approach, however, would not allow us to learn, 
and learn from, the politics immanent to Wittgenstein’s Investigations. More relevant to 
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our purposes, it does not allow us to trace the common lines of thought between 
Wittgenstein and Foucault with respect to politics.  
It is one of Cavell’s contributions to Wittgensteinian thinking to reveal the 
moral/political dimensions in Wittgenstein’s account of language. As opposed to 
commonly held interpretations of Wittgenstein within the circle of Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy, Cavell argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophical aim is not merely to 
provide a ‘correct’ and ‘accurate’ account of how our language works. On the contrary, 
Wittgenstein’s thinking, according to Cavell, is motivated by an urge to respond to 
historical conditions that Cavell identifies as ‘the loss of the ordinary’. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein’s thought can be seen as a critique of modern conditions which privileges 
the cognitive dimensions of our life at the cost of the disappearance of our intimacy with 
the world. The skeptical impulse in modern thought is a symptom through which Cavell 
reads the cost of our becoming knowing subjects. The world is lost in the thought of the 
skeptic because its existence cannot be sustained in structures of knowledge alone. Cavell 
thinks that the lost world is not the phantasmatic element in skeptical thought. On the 
contrary, it is its truth. The phantasmatic element in skepticism is the desire to contain the 
totality of the world in knowledge. To use Foucault’s term, under the reign of the will to 
know, a world that cannot be sustained in our knowledge is under the risk of 
disappearance. 
By developing such an argument, Cavell emphasizes the critical, as opposed to 
corrective and didactic, character of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein describes 
his own understanding of philosophy “as a battle against the bewitchment of our 
 172
intelligence by means of our language.”158 The aim of this battle, in his own words, is 
“[t]o shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.”159 In Cavell’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, our bewitchment means that we are under the spell of ‘false necessities’ 
that trap us in the fly-bottle: “…a vision of human life as distorted by false necessities 
links Philosophical Investigations with opening preoccupations of Plato’s Republic, and 
Rousseau’s Social Contract, and Thoreau’s Walden, and Marx’s Capital…”160 (In a 
sense, the whole aim of this dissertation is to add Foucault’s name to Cavell’s list of 
thinkers who are linked to Wittgenstein in their efforts to reveal such ‘false necessities’.) 
In this sense, Wittgenstein’s insistence on the conventionality of our speech and practices 
is an invitation to reconsider and question the constraints in our lives that are sustained 
and maintained by what we take to be the necessities of our form of life. In a nutshell, 
Wittgenstein asks his reader to recognize and respond to these necessities as our own 
artifacts. Moreover, our failure to recognize our form of life as ours has its own 
systematicity, that is metaphysics, which an active grammatical engagement with its 
concepts.  
Cavell’s preoccupation with skepticism should be understood within the context 
of false necessities. He claims that Wittgenstein responds to the modern predicament by 
responding to ‘the threat of skepticism’ which is “a sort of human compulsion to over-
intellectuality (not simply a Faustian desire to know everything but a demonic will to 
measure every relation against that of knowing).”161 In the modern era, the false 
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necessities that we have created and imposed upon ourselves have taken the form of 
knowledge claims. As a response to this threat, Wittgenstein gives us worldly pictures to 
bring language and reason back from timeless and eternal metaphysical realms to finite 
and contingent media of history. He shows that what we call knowing connects us to 
things and other language users more intimately than a purely epistemological 
understanding of knowledge can reveal. As we have seen, knowing a thing is not simply 
or exclusively to have knowledge about that thing, but making that thing a part of our 
world and rendering it available and accessible for our practices. Wittgenstein’s response 
to the threat of skepticism reveals what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ which, on 
the one hand, shows that our relation to the world and to each other is not primarily a 
relation of knowing, and on the other, what we call knowing is not an isolated 
relationship to the world and to each other. 
The threat of skepticism in Cavell is not a threat to our ability to produce 
knowledge. On the contrary, it is a manifestation of a crisis in which the epistemic mode 
of our relations with the world and to each other colonize our moral, political, and 
aesthetic relations. In this sense, the real threat of skepticism is our unwillingness to 
acknowledge the costs of our knowledge claims, especially when the object of knowledge 
is ourselves. Knowledge about ourselves brings varying regions of our lives into the 
domain of the necessary which, in turn, places more constraints on the possibilities of 
human experience. Needless to say, as knowledge about ourselves brings constraints in 
our lives in the name of necessity, it also liberates and brings new possibilities in the 
domain of our experience. Cavell’s point is that as knowing has become the main 
hegemonic mode of our being in the world under the conditions of modernity, knowledge 
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has been on the way to becoming the measure of each and every relation we have with 
the world and to each other. We have deprived ourselves of the means to measure and 
evaluate the necessities embodied in our knowledge claims about ourselves and, in 
Cavell, critical thought is a response to this lack of means to critically evaluate our 
epistemic capabilities. This means that the critical task is not to measure and evaluate our 
knowledge claims in terms of their truth or falsity. The critical task, rather, is to render 
the constraints on the possibilities of our experience questionable by removing the cover 
of necessity on them.  
For Cavell, the public character of language in Wittgenstein is also an attack on 
such false necessities. As Cavell puts it, “The communicative power of language 
…requir[es] nothing beyond (behind, beneath) our sharing and maintaining, our forms of 
life…”162 What makes language use possible is neither ‘the order of things’ that mirrors 
itself in the order of our concepts nor a timeless rationality that we are somehow endowed 
with. Language use is possible on the basis of contingently formed agreement among the 
members of a linguistic community. The force of our agreements among ourselves is the 
force of our history over ourselves. Our history is never a dead past because it is alive in 
the force exerted over us by our agreement on linguistic forms. In this sense, the 
contingency of linguistic agreement we have in the present is a projection of the 
contingency of our history. Our capacity to use language and our capacity to live socially 
contain each other. To put it differently, our capacity to share the world and our capacity 
to share words are one and the same thing. Wittgenstein’s private language argument 
teaches us that an unshared language is not language because meaningful language use 
requires the criterial authority of a community of language users. The fact that language 
                                                 
162
 Ibid., xxii 
 175
use requires shared criteria among language users implies that the world of language 
users is necessarily a shared world. 
  If language use is possible on the basis of publicly shared rules and criteria that 
demands varying degrees and forms of conformity from language users, then the 
constraints that these rules and criteria put on our speech and actions are formative of our 
meaning claims and our world. The public character of language use, in this sense, points 
to the fact that the formative constraints that limit, and thereby render possible, our 
speech and actions are social constraints embodied in our linguistic agreement which is 
the sedimentation of our history. This means that the necessities imposed on our lives by 
forms of rationality are not timeless metaphysical forces but the claims of our own 
history on our present. 
The theme of false necessities underlines a convergence point between 
Wittgenstein’s grammatical inquiries and Foucault’s genealogical work. Like 
Wittgenstein, Foucault also thinks that the critical task is to question the perception of 
constraints as necessities. “But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits 
knowledge must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must 
be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of 
arbitrary constraints?”163 The necessities and constraints are projections of conceptual 
relations established through the discursive order. In other words, we can only recognize 
and acknowledge what we take to be necessary within a discursive network of conceptual 
relations. We are captivated by a network of conceptual relations which subsume some 
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features of our lives under the category of necessity. The genealogical analysis of the 
descent of these conceptual relations sheds light on the historical formation of them and 
thereby loosens our captivation by them.  
Foucault, parallel to Cavell, also thinks that modern structures of knowledge has a 
privileged place in drawing distinctions between what is necessary and what is not. His 
genealogies reveal that both the structures of knowledge production and the place of 
knowledge in our lives started changing dramatically in the era of the Enlightenment. A 
family of certain forms of rationality in the modern West called ‘human sciences’ has 
gained significant authority over us. In some cases, moral-religious traditional authority is 
replaced by the epistemic authority of the discourses of human sciences, while in others, 
the discourses of human sciences create new fields of power relations.164 Even if these 
forms of rationality claim that they operate on an objective domain producing knowledge 
of phenomena existing prior to their discursive acts, Foucault maintains that the effect of 
these forms of rationality is more formative than epistemic – meaning that, in the very act 
of producing knowledge, they in fact produce new discursive spaces in which these new 
subjectivities come into being. Translated into Wittgenstein’s terms, these forms of 
rationality are grammatical structures that tell us what kind of subjects the mad, the sick, 
the criminal, the homosexual are. In telling what kind of subjects they are, these forms of 
rationality also draw limits to possible social spaces that such subjects can occupy and to 
possible ways in which members of the linguistic community relate to them. In other 
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words, these forms of rationality, by the authority to draw limits to what we can become, 
impose necessities on our lives.   
The political dimensions of Foucault’s genealogies are to be understood at this 
junction where the discourses of human sciences entwine with the establishment of 
modern institutions such as hospitals, mental asylums, prisons, and schools. The direct 
authority of these institutions to put constraints on our lives is inseparable from the 
epistemic authority of human sciences to produce knowledge claims about us. It is 
through the network of such knowledge claims that various distinction between what is 
necessary and what is arbitrary have been constantly established. In this sense, we can 
claim that for Foucault, the modern West has already started realizing what Cavell calls 
the epistemic phantasms of the skeptic to contain our experience and world in structures 
of knowledge. The proliferation of epistemic structures called human sciences in the 
modern era is entwined with the proliferation of technologies of power to regulate and 
administer the social body.  In this sense, the ‘demonic will’ Cavell defines above is what 
Foucault calls the will to knowledge. The more the being of humans become the object of 
knowledge, the deeper the effects of power penetrates into the social medium. The 
prisoners’ cells in Bentham’s panopticon are as much the manifestations of the phantasm 
of total power as they are materializations of phantasms of total knowledge.  
 Linguistic Captivity and Genealogy as Therapy: 
I would like to elucidate the link between Wittgenstein and Foucault on the theme 
of ‘false necessities’ by referring to two Foucault commentators, David Owen and Hubert 
Dreyfus who, in their own ways, underline the similarity between Wittgenstein’s 
therapeutic philosophy and Foucault’s genealogies.  
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Owen establishes a parallel between Wittgenstein’s concept of perspicuous 
representation and Foucault’s genealogical description of discursive practices. He argues 
that both Wittgenstein and Foucault aim at liberating us from ‘aspectival captivity’ which 
is “a certain class of nonphysical constraints on our capacity for self-government.”165 
Owen states that what he means by aspectival captivity is rooted in Wittgenstein’s 
statement: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our 
language and language seems to repeat it to us inexorably.”166 Having pictures of the 
world and of ourselves is not, by itself, a target for critical thought. On the contrary, 
Owen claims that having pictures is just another way to point to our mindedness. As we 
are inhabitants of a linguistically constructed world, it is inevitable that we hold various 
pictures of the world and of ourselves which function as the scene and the stage of our 
language games, rendering our grammatical judgments possible. Our speech acts are 
meaningful only against the background of such pictures. Most of the time, during our 
ordinary linguistic activities, these pictures do not stand out. In this sense, not every 
picture is an obstacle before our judgments. On the contrary, these pictures are a 
precondition to exercise our freedom to make judgments and decisions, and act 
accordingly. Our pictorial captivity begins when there is “a disjuncture…between our 
ways of making sense of ourselves, on the one hand, and our cares and commitments, on 
the other.”167   
To elucidate the concept of aspectival captivity, Owen makes use of an example 
Wittgenstein gives in Culture and Value.  A man in a room cannot get outside, not 
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because the door is locked, but because he pictures the door opening outwards while the 
door opens inwards.168 Such a picture leads him to push the door rather than pulling it. 
His judgment, decision, and action could not serve his desire and commitment to get 
outside because he does not notice an aspect of the door. In this case, the aspectival 
captivity is due to his failure to question what is imposed on him by this picture. His 
unquestioning reliance in his judgments on a picture of doors that only open outwards is 
not a problem until he encounters a situation where the door opens inwards. The picture 
that has mediated his desires and his judgments so far fails because the picture fills the 
man’s horizon so completely that there is no room for an alternative picture. The picture 
of doors gives the man a world where the possibility of a door opening inwards is absent. 
Such a picture rules out the act of pulling instead of pushing the door as a possible course 
of action. The point of the little drama of the man who is locked in an unlocked room is 
that however simple facts are, they do not just pop up in our world. The pictures we have 
emphasize and render visible some aspects of the world while, at the same time, hiding 
some other aspects by ruling them out from the realm of the possible.  
One might argue that Wittgenstein’s example is counter-intuitive. If someone 
cannot open a door by pushing it, it is reasonable to assume that, at some point, she will 
surely try pulling it as well. However, the counter-intuitiveness of the example serves 
Wittgenstein’s point. It is reasonable to try pulling the door only against the background 
of a picture which contains the possibility of a door that can open inwards or outwards. 
The counter-intuitiveness of the example re-performs the point of the example, namely 
how hard it is to imagine a picture different than our own. We are committed to a picture 
where doors open both inwards and outwards, therefore it seems absurd to us that the 
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captivated man just cannot discover the simple fact that the door opens inwards. The 
distance between us and the man in the room, created by the counter-intuitiveness of the 
example, is indicative of the force with which our own pictures grip us.  
Against our aspectival captivity in which our picture of the world and of each 
other fails to respond to our concerns, cares, commitments, and desires, Wittgenstein 
suggests ‘perspicuous representations’ as a way to question, modify, transform, or 
dismantle our pictures. To connect Owen’s point with Cavell’s, we can note that the 
critical edge of perspicuous representations is in their capability to reveal the 
conventional, and therefore modifiable character of our commitment to our pictures. 
Thus, any necessity that springs from these pictures becomes an object of critical inquiry. 
How do perspicuous representations create such emancipatory effects? Owen connects 
the idea of aspectival captivity to intellectual heritage through the views of Quentin 
Skinner who says that “it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our 
own intellectual heritage.”169 Owen detects two lines of thought that aim at dispelling the 
spell of our inherited forms of thinking: ideology critique170 as it is understood as a 
struggle against our captivation by false beliefs which constitute the content of false 
consciousness, and genealogical critique that focuses on aspectival captivity. As opposed 
to ideology critique, genealogical critique bypasses the truth or the falsity of our beliefs 
and focuses on various pictures on the background of which our statements and beliefs 
become truth candidates. More specifically, genealogical critique targets the universality 
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and uniformity of our pictures by historicizing them. In a sense, genealogical critique 
adds history as a third dimension to our two-dimensional pictures, and thereby gives them 
the depth through which what seems to us universal shows its beginnings (and hence its 
finitude) and what seems to us seamlessly uniform shows its points of suture where 
polymorphous events get connected to each other.  
Owen refers to Foucault’s genealogical critique of ‘repressive hypothesis’ and of 
the idea of a sovereign who holds power as examples of loosening our captivity by the 
pictures of politics that give rise to a peculiar understanding of power. In these pictures, 
power appears to us as a substance the effects of which are always articulated in negative 
terms. Hence, they give rise to an idea of power which could be held by someone or some 
institution to repress those who are under its rule. Foucault’s genealogies of power, on the 
other hand, provides a perspective through which what we call power emerges in a 
historical depth and shows its relational, as opposed to substantial, character, and its 
positive and constructive, as opposed to repressive, effects. The critical function of 
Foucault’s genealogy of power is to show that “our captivation by this sovereignty-based 
picture of political relations facilitates forms of domination based on forms of power not 
disclosed by this picture.”171 In this sense, what Foucault does in his genealogies of 
various power relations is to provide perspicuous representations of power in which our 
desires and concerns that cannot be accommodated in a picture of power as a repressive 
substance can be seen. Through such perspicuous representations, there emerge more 
comprehensive and sophisticated pictures of politics which allow us to address 
domination relations invisible in the sovereignty-based pictures of politics. These new 
pictures of politics redefine the domain of politics and reconfigure political agency. 
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As opposed to Owen, Dreyfus does not explicitly mention Wittgenstein’s name in 
his evaluation of the critical character of Foucault’s thought, but he uses the concept of 
therapy in defining the critical effects of genealogy.172 In his foreword to Foucault’s 
earliest work, Mental Illness and Psychology, Dreyfus uses the following quotation from 
Foucault as his closing words where Foucault alludes to Nietzsche’s understanding of 
history: “Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy…Its task 
is to become a curative science.”173 This early work by Foucault is crucial for Foucault 
scholarship because it reveals some fundamental archeological layers of Foucault’s 
thought. He originally wrote it in 1954 and radically revised it in 1962. As Dreyfus 
reports, in the original 1954 version, Foucault tries to combine Marxist and Heideggerian 
perspectives to analyze psychology as a science and mental illness as an existential 
condition. He was dissatisfied with it, and in the 1962 version, he removed all Marxist 
elements in the text. Instead, he added a section which is a short account of his arguments 
in Madness and Civilization. In the original version, Foucault does not question the 
discursive emergence of the phenomenon of mental illness as a medical object, and 
instead seeks its causes in social conditions. In the 1962 version, however, he is much 
more interested in the discursive transformations in which madness becomes a mental 
illness, and hence an object of medical knowledge and intervention. “Foucault’s task thus 
changes from situating personal existence in a concrete social situation to studying the 
historical and discursive practices that define a ‘psychology’ in which the notion of 
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mental illness becomes thinkable as something that can be the object of scientific 
study.”174  
Similar to Owen’s distinction between aspectival captivity and ideological 
captivity, Dreyfus also distinguishes two senses of critique that become visible in 
Foucault’s shift from social conditions as the cause of mental illness to discursive 
practices that construct a medical object out of the historical experience of madness. The 
former approach takes critique to be a matter of revealing the truth of madness by 
locating it in a causal nexus, whereas the latter approach is guided by the question of how 
madness becomes a medical object about which we can produce statements that are truth 
candidates. To put it in Owen’s words, Foucault is much more interested in the picture 
that emphasizes the medical aspect of madness than he is in the truth or falsity of medical 
statements about madness. Our aspectival captivity by this picture is hidden from us as an 
unstated necessity to take madness as a mental illness. This unstated necessity 
accompanies all our medical statements about madness. In other words, this picture does 
not allow us to think about madness as anything other than a medical object.  
What is the use of a critical discourse on madness that does not even tell us 
whether what we say about madness is true or false? Dreyfus thinks that the criticality of 
such a discourse lies in its therapeutic effects. “Historical therapy nonetheless loosens the 
grip of our current understanding of reality by letting us see how we got where we are 
and the cost of our current understanding.”175 Similar to Wittgensteinian therapy, 
Foucault’s genealogical therapy aims at a change of attitude toward ourselves by 
recognizing and acknowledging the ordinariness of our present. Instead of picturing 
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ourselves in deterministic and necessitarian lines, Foucault’s genealogies establish 
perspectives on our history through which we can recognize our present as contingent. 
Neither the emergence of past events nor their conjoining to each other manifests a 
principle of necessity. In this sense, genealogical perspective is a form of recognition and 
acknowledgement of the past and the present as ours. Genealogical repudiation of any 
‘law of history’ is not a repudiation of the intelligibility of history. On the contrary, 
genealogy seeks forms of intelligibility of ourselves which do not require any meta-
historical explanatory laws and principles. Genealogical perspective enables us to see that 
making history intelligible is nothing other than making ourselves intelligible and vice 
versa. The genealogical discovery of the facticity of history is a form of intelligibility 
through which we come to terms with our own facticity marked by our own finitude. 
Recognition and acknowledgement of the past and the present as ours is as much a 
projection of our own contingency into history as it is a form of acceptance of the 
contingency of our present.  
The common point between genealogical therapy and Wittgensteinian therapy is 
that both aim at loosening the constraints of false necessities on our lives. In 
Wittgenstein, the idea of the ordinary plays a central role in deflating such necessities. 
Without excluding other possible philosophical implications, we can say that the idea of 
the ordinary has two related senses in Wittgenstein. On the one hand, it points to the 
ordinariness of human existence as such. Recognition and acknowledgment of the fact 
that we, language users, inhabit this world as an ordinary, that is transient and contingent, 
fact is one of the meanings Wittgenstein conveys in his constant emphasis on the 
ordinariness of our existence. On the other hand, the ordinary is the form of our 
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inhabitation of the world. In this sense, the ordinary is established through our active 
engagement with the world that maintains and sustains it as a habitat for our forms of life. 
In the former sense of the concept, Wittgenstein emphasizes the finiteness of human 
existence both on an anthropological level and on the level of the singularity of life each 
individual pursues. At both levels, nothing but our shared ways of speaking and doing 
things shape the ordinary forms of inhabiting the world. Genealogy as therapy, as 
Dreyfus says, is a philosophical/historical inquiry into ‘how we got where we are’, and 
the genealogical stories of ‘how we got where we are’ shows how ordinary our present is 
in the sense Wittgenstein uses the term. Genealogy draws a picture in which the 
ordinariness of our existence is reconstituted. There is no reason and no necessity beyond 
our present conventions to think that the specific form of life each of us, and at the same 
time all of us, pursue right now, in the present, has any historical privilege with regard to 
the past forms or future forms in terms of their ‘fate to be overcome’. Our present 
becomes one present among the countless others. Neither the past (conservatism) nor the 
future (socialism) can be a measure of the present. Through such a picture of the present 
as the ordinary, Foucault, like Cavell’s Wittgenstein, sees our impulse to ascribe 
necessity and universality to our present as an avoidance of moral/political 
responsibilities we have toward our own present. As a therapeutic process, in its standard 
psychological sense, aims to establish forms of engagement with one’s life different from 
those ways which give rise to the need of therapy in the first place, Wittgenstein’s and 
Foucault’s historical/philosophical therapy removes self-imposed obstructions on our 
vision of ourselves to realign it with our current needs and concerns.  
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If one of the therapeutic effects of critical thought is to empower us to transform 
the ways to engage with our forms of intelligibility, then Allan Janik’s comments on 
Wittgenstein are useful to emphasize the availability of resources in our language for 
such a therapeutic transformation.176 Janik argues that some of our concepts openly invite 
contested, competing, and even conflicting applications. In other words, our linguistic 
agreement on such concepts encourages us to disagree with each other. The concepts of 
morality, aesthetics, and politics are such concepts which have varying, and most of the 
time conflicting, ways to be applied in different contexts. In fact, most of the time, the 
contexts in which these concepts are applicable and the specific ways we apply them are 
the fundamental meaningful content of these concepts. To go back to my banal example 
of a tomato, the grammar of the concept of tomato allows and encourage us to converge 
on a more or less consistent set of practices, whereas the concept of, say, beauty, or 
justice, has a useful place in our aesthetic or political discourse in as much as it allows us 
to diverge from each other. This is not to say that these diverging concepts never 
converge us and put us in community with each other. Rather, my point is that the 
convergence with others we pursue using these concepts must necessarily lead us to 
diverge from others. A total agreement on the uses of the concept of tomato does not 
obstruct our uses of the concept and connected practices. However, total agreement on 
the uses of the concept of justice would negatively impact the binding force of the 
concept in our moral/political engagements. Janik does not openly delve into the question 
why concepts, in varying degrees, open up heterogeneous paths in their application, but 
we can say, with Janik, that the heterogeneity of paths these concepts open up project the 
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hetereogeneity of the histories of their formation. The disagreements and contestations 
voiced through these concepts are claims to histories behind these concepts. If the 
histories of our concepts contain the possibilities to use our concepts differently, then 
these possibilities of different application of our concepts are the resources that nourish 
the therapeutic process to learn how to think and live differently.        
According to Janik’s interpretations of Wittgenstein, informed by William E. 
Connolly, our relationship with grammatical constraints is what makes us political 
beings. The introduction of a concept into linguistic circulation as a new element in our 
language games, or the removal of a concept from our linguistic exchanges, inevitably 
shifts the terrain of available possibilities for our practices. Language users act by 
employing concepts and their employment of concepts is acting. In this sense, the 
formation of concepts and their use cannot be purely epistemic events. Using concepts in 
Wittgenstein is mastering a technique which requires you to conform and follow the rules 
of the technique. Therefore, Janik concludes, ‘to use language, then, is, in a certain sense, 
to be ruled in the sense of being disciplined.’177 However, Janik does not think that this 
dimension of language use exhausts the political character of our employing concepts. 
What is political in the use of concepts and the ways we act associated with concepts 
springs from the fact that employment of concepts and following grammatical rules are 
not homogenous among language users. Our concepts and, therefore our ways of acting, 
are always contested by different ways to employ concepts and hence act differently. The 
contestation and disagreement among language users in employing concepts are as 
essential and significant as the mutual attunement and agreement among them. The 
grammar of certain explicitly political concepts such as justice, power, equality, and 
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freedom allows significantly different, and frequently conflicting, applications of these 
concepts. For Janik, what is political is rooted in our ability to apply these concepts in 
creative and yet opposing ways. The heterogeneity of the ways we apply these concepts is 
due to our ability to interfere with the agreement that renders possible the circulation of 
these concepts. This interference with the agreement may take several forms but at the 
end it relies upon our ability to invent new uses of these concepts, politics being one of 
the forms of our inventiveness.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
What kind of politics is the politics of grammar? If grammar is pervasive in the 
lives of language users, then the concept of the politics of grammar seems to lose its 
capacity to distinguish our specifically political concerns. The claim that using language 
means being constrained seems to deflate the meaning of being constrained. A bounded 
space of possibility is the condition of possibility of human action in the sense that action 
is only possible in the medium of certain constraints. A politics that aims at erasing each 
and every kind of constraint from human life, then, is not only futile but paralyzing. In 
the same fashion, a politics that emphasizes the ineluctability and absoluteness of 
constraints in our lives is equally misleading. The sheer existence of constraints is not a 
matter of politics for language users who have to act always in a bounded space of 
possibilities. On the contrary, the descriptions that make human actions possible are 
scattered through the historical sediments of our practices without forming a total system. 
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Politics, then, is not concerned with constraints as such, but with the specific constraints 
of this or that set of descriptions. 
Janik suggests that the sheer existence of grammatical rules in our speech and 
actions does not tell anything by itself with regard to politics of grammar. He claims that 
what necessarily characterizes language users as political is the actual relationships that 
language users have with actual grammatical rules and criteria. For example, there is a 
grammar of the concept of justice that makes possible its use in our language games. 
However, the grammar of justice works precisely because it allows conflicting 
applications of the concept. In his genealogical inquiries, Foucault shows that the 
emergence of the systems of constraints attached to our ways to employ certain concept 
clusters, such as those around madness, sexuality, and crime, is neither a manifestation of 
any kind of necessity nor the realization of a rational kernel. Thus, Foucault’s genealogies 
invite us to see that even if these concepts seem to have converging uses in our present, 
the histories of their formation are responsive to diverging, that is political, uses of these 
concepts. In Foucault, what is political lies in the way we relate to these constraints and 
the kind of claims they have over our lives. He analyzes those constraints which create 
the illusion that they are historically final and necessary due to their rational character. 
Foucault’s genealogies aim to uncover the contingent historical formation of these 
epistemic structures to show that the present constraints that are brought into our lives as 
necessary and rational share the same fate with all historical forms: to be overcome and 
replaced. Even Wittgenstein and Foucault’s therapeutic mode of thought will share the 
same fate. As the present to which their thought is responsive becomes our past, 
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Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thoughts will lose their immediate claims on the ways we 
think and become part of our archive.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The fact that both Wittgenstein and Foucault have been identified and criticized as 
conservative thinkers178 allows us to recognize similarities between their thought in the 
mirror of these criticisms, and in the similarities of the resources that can be mustered 
against such criticisms from within their philosophies. Most of the conservative 
interpretations of Wittgenstein and Foucault are articulated on the basis of what we can 
call the problem of normativity which points to the alleged lack of any rational norms in 
their works for a coherent philosophical criticism in the service of fundamental radical 
transformations of social and political conditions. In this chapter, I will elaborate on the 
similarities between accusations of conservatism directed against Wittgenstein and 
Foucault, and show that these similarities, rather than being coincidental, spring from the 
similarities of the insights, perspectives, and instruments Wittgenstein and Foucault share 
in their philosophical works. I will first present an overview of the conservative 
                                                 
178
 At this point, it is necessary to clarify that those who qualify Wittgenstein as a conservative thinker do 
not necessarily criticize him for being so. On the contrary, Wittgenstein’s conservatism is mostly 
considered to be what makes his philosophical thought consistent and self-contained. Those who call 
Foucault a conservative thinker, on the other hand, consider his conservatism a contradictory and 
inconsistent element in his work. While Wittgenstein is thought to be a self-consciously committed 
conservative, Foucault is seen to be a victim of his own thought who has fallen into conservatism in trying 
to be a defender of politics of radical transformation. The questions ‘Why does Wittgenstein’s thought 
allow sympathetic conservative interpretations, not necessarily accompanied by criticisms?’ and ‘Why does 
a conservative interpretation of Foucault have to be, at the same time, a criticism of his work?’ are 
interesting questions in their own rights, and pursuing these questions may allow us to understand them 
further. However, such a task is outside the scope of my arguments with respect to the problem of 
normativity. Therefore, I bracket this difference to focus on the similar conceptual structures embodying 
conservative interpretations of their works.   
 192
interpretations to demarcate the problem of normativity. Then, I will focus on two 
paradigmatic examples of the conservative interpretations as embodied in Ernest 
Gellner’s and Jurgen Habermas’ respective criticisms of Wittgenstein and Foucault. In 
the final section of this chapter, I will develop philosophical responses against the 
charges of conservatism by arguing that the conservative interpretations are based on 
one-sided and narrow readings of Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s works.     
 
An Overview 
 
It is possible to summarily grasp the problem of normativity as the central 
component of conservative interpretations of Wittgenstein through his example of the 
standard meter stick in Paris. “There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is 
one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in 
Paris.”179 This example is about the standing of our criteria with respect to our linguistic 
practices. The standard meter stick has the ultimate authority in saying how long a meter 
is. What gives it such an indisputable authority is the agreement to accept its length as the 
definition of a meter. The special place it has in our language games of measurement 
renders it an unmeasurable object precisely because all of our measurement practices in 
the metric system refer back to it. From the perspective of conservative interpretations, 
Wittgenstein’s point in emphasizing the unmeasurability of the standard meter stick is 
that the conventional rules of our grammar in relation to our linguistic practices have the 
same normative standing as the standard meter stick in our ordinary practices of 
measurement carried out in the metric system. It follows from this analogy that the 
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conventional grammatical rules have also the property of unmeasurability due to their 
roles in our language games.  As our measurements can be right or wrong only in 
reference to the standard meter stick, our practices can be evaluated as right or wrong 
only in reference to existing grammatical criteria. The conservative interpretations of 
Wittgenstein define the moral of this example as a form of quietism. Philosophy shows 
how our practices are possible on the basis of socially established criteria, and, on this 
account, the positive critical role of philosophy is to relieve us from mental cramps by 
providing a descriptive therapeutic account of these socially established criteria.  Yet, it 
cannot judge and evaluate those criteria. Nor can it propose better ones. Such an attempt 
would be equivalent to saying that the standard meter stick is not exactly a meter long. 
The problem with such an attempt to measure the standard meter stick is not that it is 
inaccurate, but that the very condition of the possibility of our measurement practices 
excludes the possibility of measuring the standard meter stick as a meaningful option. 
The therapeutic effect, in this sense, is to prepare the ground on which we acknowledge 
the constitutive role of grammatical criteria in the ways we speak and act. To sum up, the 
conservative interpretations of Wittgenstein take the unmeasurability of the standard 
meter stick as a paradigm example of the uncriticizability of conventional grammatical 
norms.  
As I will argue, Wittgenstein’s point in the example of the meter stick is not to 
suggest quietism. On the contrary, the meter stick example itself is a form of 
philosophical exercise to demystify our criteria by way of vocalizing and articulating our 
relationship to grammatical rules. In the context of the Wittgenstein and Foucault 
connection, the standard meter stick example shows 
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forms of criticism in areas where the discourses of human sciences claim a form of 
authority over our lives as rigid and pervasive as the standard meter stick in Paris does 
over our measuring practices. One, perhaps, cannot say how long the standard meter is, 
but she does not have to commit to a form of quietism based on the unmeasurability of 
the standard meter stick. Wittgenstein’s example motivates us not to be silent, but ask 
ourselves how the standard meter stick has come to occupy the place it occupies and 
exercise its authority in our language games of measurements. The critical task, in this 
sense, is not to ask the meaningless question of how long the standard meter stick is, and 
thereby reduce the critical philosophical attitude to the question the accuracy of our 
measurements. The critical task is to demystify the standard meter stick and thereby 
prevent ourselves from being captivated by it. To comprehend the role of the standard 
meter stick on the background of its history renders it a transformable object if the need 
and desire to transform it emerges.  
Similar to Wittgenstein’s case, the conservative interpretations of Foucault see a 
normative paradox in Foucault’s criticisms of the historical forms of rationality that 
emerged in the 18th and the 19th centuries as the human sciences. Foucault not only 
provides minute descriptions of mechanisms of domination entangled with the discourses 
of human sciences, but also claims that the mainstream critical terms such as rights and 
legitimacy (liberalism), class struggle and ideology critique (Marxism), and repression 
(psychoanalysis) are blind to these mechanisms. These normative concepts are too 
general and totalistic, and therefore they fail to articulate specific mechanisms of power. 
The charges of conservatism against Foucault claim that even if one takes his 
genealogical works to be historically accurate and his criticisms against mainstream 
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normative terms to be plausible, Foucault does not point to any other resources of critical 
norms that would ground a rational and coherent critique of modern mechanisms of 
power.180 From the perspective of conservative interpretations, Foucault draws a picture 
of our modern life in which neither truth nor knowledge can guide the oppressed to 
emancipation. In this allegedly Foucauldian view, as opposed to the common rationalist 
sentiment, truth does not liberate the oppressed, but subjects them to a ‘regime of truth’. 
In the same fashion, the more knowledge we produce about ourselves, the more 
objectified we get in epistemic structures. Accordingly, in Foucault’s genealogical works, 
reason, truth, and knowledge are so inseparably entangled with mechanisms of 
domination that it is an illusion, if not a strategy of power, to take them as normative 
resources for criticizing our practices. Foucault’s ardent critic Habermas provides a 
compact formulation of this criticism: “Foucault contrasts his critique of power with the 
‘analysis of truth’ in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative 
yardsticks that it would have to borrow from the latter.”181 Thus, Foucault’s paradox is 
that the very concepts and values Foucault’s work sets out to undermine are the concepts 
and values necessary for his work to have any normative content at all. Consequently, 
either Foucault’s paradox cannot be resolved rendering his genealogies inconsistent, or 
the paradox is resolved if we assume that he has an implicit, and perhaps unwilling, 
romantic commitment to forms of authority other than the rational ones. In either case, 
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the demands and needs for radical social political transformations cannot be consistently 
articulated in the medium of Foucauldian genealogy.  
The charges of conservatism against Foucault can be deflected in the context of 
Wittgenstein’s standard meter stick example. For Foucault, the knowledge claims and 
truths generated in the medium of human sciences have gained a form of authority in our 
lives similar to that of the standard meter stick in Paris, except that while the historical 
contingency182 of our agreement to use the standard meter stick as the criterion of our 
measurements in metric system is self-evident, the discourses of human sciences claim to 
produce universal and necessary truths and knowledge, systematically suppressing the 
contingent element in the perspective from which they speak. As Wittgenstein’s point is 
not about the accuracy of the results of our practices of measurements, which can be 
evaluated and corrected in so many different ways, Foucault is not so much interested in 
the validity and accuracy of specific truths and knowledge claims of human sciences. 
Foucault’s point is that the discourses of human sciences are historical forms of 
rationality that render ourselves intelligible to us. As Wittgenstein does not ask how long 
the standard meter stick is, Foucault does not ask how true and accurate the truth and 
knowledge claims of the human sciences are. He is rather concerned with the history of 
how ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘scientific’ truth generated in the discourses of the human 
sciences have come to occupy the central hegemonic place in our human capacity and 
ability to make sense of ourselves.183 In this sense, similar to Wittgenstein’s 
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demystification of our grammatical criteria, Foucault’s genealogies are historical 
reminders not to be captivated by the pictures of ourselves drawn by the human sciences 
so that we are able to intervene in and interrupt the contingent and arbitrary elements in 
these pictures which, in the name of universality and rational necessity, create discontents 
and dissatisfactions by forming spaces of subjectivity as the sites of asymmetrical power 
relations.  
 
The Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Conservative Thinker by Ernest Gellner 
 
The Wittgensteinian Diversion 
Gellner thinks of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as the beginning point of a larger 
philosophical movement that we nowadays call the linguistic turn and that Gellner simply 
names linguistic philosophy.184 He sees Wittgenstein as the initiator of this philosophical 
movement but does not necessarily distinguish Wittgenstein’s philosophy from that of the 
other important figures such as G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s 
thought appears in Gellner’s criticisms of this movement as a manifestation of the basic 
tenets of linguistic philosophy. Linguistic philosophy sees traditional ways of 
philosophical questioning as an ‘abuse of ordinary language’. Philosophical questionings 
about the issues such as knowledge, truth, being, and meaning are simply a sign of 
confusion or misunderstanding. These concepts are used appropriately in their contexts 
by competent language users without provoking any philosophical questions. When used 
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in their proper contexts, these concepts do not raise any unanswerable question as to what 
they mean. They become a source of confusion when philosophers detach them from the 
contexts of their uses. In other words, the actual use of a concept is not simply an 
arbitrary occasion where the meaning of the concept manifests itself. The actual use is 
constitutive of the meaning of the concept. Philosophers look for clarity, exactness, and 
determinacy in the meaning of a concept in their philosophical questionings. When the 
concept in question is irresponsive to these philosophical demands, the questioning 
results in philosophical anxiety and frustration.  
For Gellner, the use theory of meaning is a conservative attack on the 
philosophical ethos to search for truth and knowledge on rational grounds. Wittgenstein 
thinks that the appropriate form of philosophy is conceptual therapy which shows the 
philosophers that the source of anxiety and frustration is not the inexactness of our 
concepts but our very demand for exactness. What seems a deficiency to philosophers is, 
in fact, the condition of the possibility of a concept to be a functioning element in our 
linguistic practices. Hence, in Gellner’s interpretation, the aim of philosophical 
questioning according to linguistic philosophers is to acknowledge that the meaning of a 
concept is shaped by its place in our language games. We play language games by 
exchanging words. Even if the exchange of words takes place under grammatical rules, 
the agreement by language users on these rules is both the necessary and the sufficient 
condition for the rules to be valid and effective. Moreover, this agreement is never in a 
state of crystalline purity that philosophers crave for. Indeed, it is as impure as it can get. 
It is contaminated not only by the social and historical conditions but also by the desires, 
interest, fears, and needs of language users. This means that the medium of language is 
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never transparent enough for us to see the world as it is. In this sense, it is futile to 
criticize our concepts and offer new ones because no criteria are available to make a 
distinction among competing concepts. 
Beside these more general observations and criticisms, Gellner specifically 
addresses what he considers as a problematic philosophical position linguistic philosophy 
occupies with respect to the tasks of modern thought. He thinks that the main tasks of 
modern thought are shaped by two specific problems, namely, the problem of validation 
and the problem of enchantment.185 The problem of validation has its roots in the 
development of liberal individualistic societies where the individual must justify what she 
says and does without recourse to a clerical and/or political authority. However, in a 
society where political and/or clerical authority is not the terminal point of the chain of 
justification, reason pursues a final ground of justification which is deferred ad infinitum. 
As beautifully expressed in Lewis Carroll’s “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, each 
and every premise of a rationally sound argument requires at least one reason for its 
justification. Yet, each and every reason standing as a justification of a premise becomes 
a premise in the reasoning process requiring further reasons to be justified. At the heart of 
the problem of validation, then, lies the problem of infinite regress which points to the 
impossibility to validate a truth claim outside the framework of its presumptions. Gellner 
thinks that the problem gets more complicated as the problem of validation equally 
applies to procedures to disprove and invalidate ‘rival’ truth claims. Thus, we can neither 
validate nor invalidate truth claims including the ones that seem to us most obvious and 
self-evident or absurd and contradictory.    
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Linguistic philosophy in general, and in Wittgenstein specifically, develops 
responses to the problem of validation in modern thought, but Gellner claims that these 
responses do not qualify as an actual and serious philosophical engagement with the 
challenge the problem poses for modern thought. They are, in fact, ways of avoiding the 
challenge by some unjustifiable philosophical maneuvers. The tactic Wittgenstein 
employs to bypass the validation problem is what Gellner calls ‘the meaning ploy’ by 
which the concept of meaning unjustifiably replaces the concept of truth. The problem of 
validation paralyzes the philosopher because she can neither put forward any 
philosophical truth nor criticize other rival philosophical truth claims without getting 
trapped in the problem of regress. Therefore, instead of employing truthfulness as a 
criterion in her critical engagement with philosophical problems, she appeals to 
meaningfulness as the critical term in developing her own philosophical claims or in 
criticizing the rival philosophical theses. Philosophical discussions on meaning and 
meaninglessness of statements in the context of linguistic philosophy are substitutes for 
genuine philosophical deliberations, produced as an expression of philosophical despair 
before the problem of validation. If you cannot criticize a set of philosophical claims by 
showing that they are not true, you can show that they are meaningless. Hence, linguistic 
philosophy replaces truth as the central critical term with that of meaning.  
The problem of enchantment, as the term suggests, is a reference to Max Weber’s 
diagnostic concept of disenchantment as the underlying condition of life in modern times. 
Modern science, technology, rational organization of mass society, and the like have 
brought comfort and affluence to our lives in certain areas. However, “these in their turn 
 201
destroy warmth, idiosyncrasy, individualism, magic, enchantment.”186 In his famous 
speech, now a classic article, “Science as a Vocation”, Weber states that there is a direct 
connection between disenchantment and the intelligibility of the world within rational 
forms of scientific knowledge. The world becomes more and more accessible and 
available for our habitation through the accumulation of scientific knowledge. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that under the conditions of modernity we have become 
more and more knowledgeable about the conditions of our lives. Weber gives the 
example of a streetcar, which we can generalize to any item in our surrounding, and 
claims that unless one is a specialist, she cannot know how it works. She does not have to 
know in order to ride in it either. The epistemic condition leading to disenchantment is 
the pervasiveness of the possibility of calculative knowledge: “…one can, in principle, 
master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted.”187 
Disenchantment, in this sense, is a paradoxical social condition under which the more the 
world becomes intelligible the more it becomes devoid of meaning. The more we know 
the world the less it means to us. The closer we look at the world, the further away it 
stands from us. As the complex production and knowledge structures that make a 
streetcar possible demystify the world by rendering it accessible and available as an 
object of knowledge, they simultaneously re-mystify it due to the parallel complexity of 
the structures of the division of intellectual labor which render these structures of 
knowledge inaccessible for non-specialists.  
According to Gellner, disenchantment has direct bearings on philosophy, because 
under the conditions of disenchantment, ordinary language becomes more and more 
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inadequate to make sense and provide a critical account of our surrounding. If we are to 
refer back to Weber’s example of the streetcar, only a complex web of specialized 
terminologies and languages can fully render it intelligible, even if it is a common and 
ordinary object of life. In this sense, our life is surrounded by objects and events our 
ordinary language fails to render intelligible. Gellner concludes that one feels at home 
when her ‘intuitive conceptualization of the world’ seems adequate enough. Since the 
disenchanted world denies this possibility to its inhabitants, a perpetual homelessness 
necessarily accompanies us under the conditions of disenchantment. Gellner summarizes 
the relationship between disenchantment and ordinary language as “the loss of confidence 
in one’s own natural idiom.”188   
Gellner criticizes Wittgenstein as blind to the conditions of disenchantment. 
Wittgenstein, he claims, has overconfidence in the capabilities and abilities of ordinary 
language to articulate our experience and the conditions under which we live. In this way, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy functions like an ideological apparatus to render the effects of 
disenchantment over our lives invisible. Disenchantment is the loss of confidence in 
one’s ordinary speech, and Wittgenstein claims to reinstate the authority of ordinary 
language without paying any attention to the historical and material conditions which 
have led to the loss of confidence in ordinary speech in the first place. The historical 
context in which Wittgenstein writes, and is read, is the least likely one to celebrate 
ordinary speech and its forms of articulation, precisely because ordinary speech more and 
more loses its grip on life under the conditions of disenchantment. Therefore the authority 
of ordinary language Wittgenstein reinstates in his philosophical work is nothing but an 
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ideological phantasm that conceals rather than reveals the conditions of disenchantment. 
Understood in these terms, his philosophy is false re-enchantment. 
The Four Pillars of Linguistic Philosophy 
Gellner identifies four pillars on which Wittgenstein builds his most critical 
concepts such as language games, family resemblances, and forms of life. These are: 
1- The argument from the paradigm case: In Gellner’s portrait of linguistic 
philosophy this pillar stands out as the most basic. It points to the linguistic philosopher’s 
conviction that the actual use of any word (including philosophically relevant ones) in 
ordinary contexts is the only and ultimate source of appeal with respect to its meaning. 
Accordingly, the linguistic philosopher unquestionably relies on paradigmatic ordinary 
uses of concepts in dissolving philosophical problems.  Philosophical problems arise 
precisely because philosophers seek a fixed meaning for the concepts like truth, 
knowledge, meaning, etc. outside the ways these concepts are used in ordinary linguistic 
practices. It is alarming for Gellner that the use theory of meaning elevates the contingent 
agreement among language users to the position of the ultimate authority in establishing 
the standards of rationality. “Linguistic Philosophy is the buttressing up of common sense 
by an argument based on a theory of meaning namely that ‘the meaning of an expression 
is its use.’”189 The argument from the paradigm case, aside from being philosophically 
untenable, has an inevitable conservative ideological dimensions.   
Linguistic Philosophy is not merely unacceptable but also inherently inconsistent: in as far as it 
maintains that no criteria outside the actual use of language can be found for that use, it thereby 
entails irrationalism as defined: but in as far as this doctrine can also be read as maintaining ‘that 
all propositions are perfectly in order as they are’, it can also be shown to entail a conservatism.190 
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In this sense, philosophy and ideology merge into one another inseparably, and based on 
this insight, Gellner argues that Wittgenstein’s commitment to take ordinary uses of 
words as the ultimate source of appeal is an expression of romantic and conservative 
sentiments in Europe that emerged as a reaction to the Enlightenment ideals. 
Accordingly, Wittgenstein’s concepts of ‘form of life’ and ‘language games’ allow no 
rational criticism of the ways lives are lived and language games are played.  
2- Generalized naturalistic fallacy: In reference to G. E. Moore’s concept of 
naturalistic fallacy, Gellner thinks that the linguistic philosopher commits the fallacy of 
deriving norms from facts. According to Moore, numerous ethical philosophical accounts 
attempt to explain what is ‘good’ in terms of some natural property of actions and things 
such as useful, pleasurable, etc.191 However Moore thinks that the concept of good is 
simple and therefore indefinable as opposed to complex concepts which can be defined in 
terms of the analytical relations between qualities and properties they refer to. He 
employs what is called the open question argument to make his point. When the concept 
of good is defined and explained by a property, say usefulness, it is always possible to 
ask the meaningful question if doing useful things is good. If usefulness is a definition of 
the good, the answer must have the form of tautology (X is X). However, in the case of 
usefulness the answer is informative (X is Y), and therefore not tautological. Moore 
concludes that “If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is 
the end of the matter.”192 Gellner claims that committing a generalized version of the 
naturalistic fallacy amounts to a reduction of the task of philosopher to that of 
                                                 
191
 G. E. Moore,  Principia Ethica (Prometheus Books, 1988) 
192
 Ibid., 6 
 205
‘philologists and lexicographers.’193 The philosopher’s task cannot merely be to register 
linguistic facts, because, contrary to the presumption of the linguistic philosopher and as 
indicated by Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, there is no easy and direct access from facts of 
language to linguistic philosophy. 
3- The contrast theory of meaning: This presumption of the linguistic philosopher 
is the mirror image of the argument from the paradigm case. While argument from the 
paradigm case assumes that in order for a word to have a meaning, there must be 
paradigm cases in which a fact, a situation, or an abstract function falls under it in an 
ordinary context, according to the contrast theory of meaning if a word is to have a 
meaning, there must be at least one paradigm case in which it does not apply. The 
linguistic philosopher uses these two presumptions in combination to dismantle 
philosophical concepts by claiming that they are either too general, having application in 
each and every imaginable relevant case, or too narrow and speculative, having no 
application in ordinary contexts. Gellner uses the contrast theory of meaning against itself 
to argue that the linguistic philosopher’s vision of language is misleading. The contrast 
theory of meaning falsifies itself because its range of application covers each and every 
linguistic practice, leaving no room for a case in contrast to what it means. Hence the 
contrast theory of meaning cannot satisfy the criterion it formulates with respect to 
linguistic practices. This self-contradiction is due to the blindness of the linguistic 
philosopher towards the unifying functions of language in favor of its functions to 
separate. 
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4- Polymorphism: The last one of the pillars points to the irreducible and open-
ended plurality of uses of words in equally numerous kinds of language games. 
Therefore, “general assertions about the use of words are impossible.”194 This pillar, like 
the previous two, rises on the ground of the argument from the paradigm case, for in her 
pursuit of paradigm cases, the linguistic philosopher discovers that each paradigm is 
unique and irreducible. The rich varieties of the forms linguistic practices take are not 
instances in which a coherent and uniform rationality manifests itself. Notwithstanding 
the complex relations and overlapping points among families of language games, 
paradigmatic uses of words are self-contained, having their own unique horizon of 
meaning. Moreover, the uncertainties, indistinctiveness, and opaqueness polymorphism 
introduces into the linguistic space are not obstacles to our meaning producing activities, 
but, on the contrary, necessary conditions for a satisfactory flow of linguistic exchanges 
among language users. In Gellner’s own formulation, polymorphism is a philosophical 
commitment to the vision that “[our] concepts, being the verbal activities of complex 
organism in a complex social and natural environment, are bound to be untidy.”195 
Gellner’s critical employment of the concept of polymorphism is twofold. First, he argues 
that linguistic philosophy is not an articulated engagement with traditional philosophy but 
a simple reversal of its basic vision of language and the world, keeping all its problematic 
aspects in their reversed form. “Past philosophy assumed one language and many or 
problematic ‘worlds’ or realms. Linguistic Philosophy has many language uses in one 
unproblematic world.”196 In this sense, polymorphism is the way by which the linguistic 
philosopher dislodges the authority of philosophy to problematize the world. Second, the 
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linguistic philosopher’s celebratory emphasis on the polymorphous aspects of our 
language blinds her to cohering and unifying functions of language.   
In Gellner’s understanding, our capacity and skill to criticize and transform our 
practices are based on our ability to transcend the socio-historical conditions and see 
beyond the context within which our linguistic practices arise. Transcending the social 
conventions is the condition of the possibility of any critical discourse. In Wittgenstein’s 
thought, Gellner argues, there is a hermetically sealed relationship between language 
games and forms of life. Whenever one thinks beyond a particular form of life, she steps 
out of the context that makes her speech meaningful. However, the livelihood, that is, the 
meaningfulness, of any language game is conditioned by the context. No language game 
can breathe outside the limits of its own form of life. Any attempt to criticize a particular 
practice is either pseudo-criticism or it is plain nonsense. Critique can make sense only at 
the cost of undermining its own critical character because its meaning has to be based on 
its sharing the basic conventions and agreements on the basis of which the criticized 
practice itself is possible. If critique targets those very conventions and agreements, then, 
from the perspective of linguistic philosophy, it undermines its own conditions of 
meaningfulness and becomes nonsense.   
In Gellner’s view, Wittgenstein’s account of language denies thought the 
possibility to have any degree of autonomy from its social and historical conditions, 
because in his philosophy, our intellectual abilities and capabilities are ‘bound and 
enslaved’ by the normative structures of the ordinary. In suggesting that the appropriate 
response to philosophical questions is therapy, linguistic philosophy in general and 
Wittgenstein specifically imply that philosophical form of thinking is a linguistic 
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pathology. For Gellner, however, “what Linguistic Philosophy considers to be the 
essence of the pathology of thought – namely, shifts in meaning – is, on the contrary, the 
essence of genuine thought.” Genuine thinking, intellectual progress, the development of 
better and more perceptive concepts do not fit in the picture of language emerged on the 
basis of four pillars, because novelty, creativity, and progress in thought all require 
serious violations of the principles of linguistic philosophy. Genuinely new ideas are able 
to articulate what they express by criticizing, i.e. in Gellner’s view stepping outside, the 
existing language games.  
Moreover, as Wittgenstein suggests that the role of philosophy is to describe and 
not to explain, his philosophy forgoes any normative role with respect to the evaluation of 
different discourses. For him, a religious fundamentalist discourse is as meaningful and 
rational as, say, the discourse of evolutionary biology, even if they narrate conflicting 
stories about how we become who we are. At this point, Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
endorses quietism, irrationalism, and conservatism in an unstable and inconsistent 
combination. It is quietist because it does not have anything to say to intervene in 
social/political disputes and struggles such as the one between fundamentalist religious 
discourses and the discourses of science. It is irrational with respect to social/political 
choices, because no such choice can be evaluated and justified independently from the 
terms of the chosen social/political position. The claims of the evolutionary biologist and 
the religious fundamentalist are equally justified within the framework of language games 
they play. Finally, it is politically conservative, precisely because it cannot articulate any 
political reason to rationally criticize and transform the existing forms of life each of 
which is rational and meaningful according to its own internal normative structure.  
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The Portrait of Foucault as a Young Conservative by Jurgen Habermas 
 
I begin this section by reusing the quotation by Habermas I refer to in the 
beginning of this chapter: “Foucault contrasts his critique of power with the ‘analysis of 
truth’ in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that 
it would have to borrow from the latter.”197 In criticizing Wittgenstein, Gellner uses the 
same metaphor of the yardstick to point to the lack of normative resources necessary for a 
critical discourse in his account of language. “In as far as there is no such logical-
linguistic absolute, all other languages are indeed ‘perfect’ – though only in the left 
handed sense that there is no yardstick in terms of which they could be measured.”198 It is 
not possible to equate Gellner’s and Habermas’ respective criticisms of Wittgenstein and 
Foucault in terms of the depth and rigor of their arguments. Gellner is openly hostile to 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and he considers linguistic philosophy as a whole an alien 
enterprise to critical creative thought. Even if Habermas’ criticism of Foucault has its 
own moments of unarticulated and unjustified hostility toward Foucault’s genealogies, in 
general, he takes their themes and problematics seriously enough that he recognizes the 
critical/creative potentials of the kind of a philosophical undertaking Foucault initiates. 
As a result, Gellner’s criticisms of Wittgenstein are hasty and superficial, while 
Habermas’ are thoughtful and engaging. Nonetheless, the thematic and structural 
similarities in their criticisms of Wittgenstein and Foucault are striking in that they 
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mutually reveal each other’s deeper dimensions enabling us to respond to them in more 
satisfactory ways.  
Just as Gellner accuses Wittgenstein of accepting uncritically the ways we live our 
lives, Habermas criticizes Foucault for being a conservative in disguise who turns a blind 
eye to the possibilities of rational scrutiny and evaluation of our practices. Habermas 
thinks that Foucault’s analytics of power presents us a ‘crypto-normative’ account of 
modern relations of dominations. Foucault painstakingly describes modern disciplinary 
practices that are, to say the least, revolting for our modern political sensibilities. Yet, 
Habermas thinks that Foucault’s works are impaired by an internal contradiction. In 
Foucault’s work, what makes our modern political sensibility possible, that is, a 
humanistic picture of ourselves, is also a collaborator in disciplinary practices. In other 
words, what makes disciplinary practices appear to be revolting to us is itself an element 
of those disciplinary practices. The modern political subject endowed with political and 
legal rights is as much a product of disciplinary technologies as it is a product of 
contractual legal discourses of modernity. Habermas, in this context, protests that 
Foucault’s unqualified characterization of humanistic values as collaborators in the 
proliferation of disciplinary mechanisms of power leaves no room for a normative 
framework necessary for a philosophical/political criticism of these disciplinary 
mechanisms. He argues that, in the absence of such a normative framework and despite 
Foucault’s own personal political engagements, his work betrays Foucault’s own political 
positioning of himself with those who are dominated within the disciplinary mechanisms 
of power.     
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In order to have a grasp of the effective range and implications of these three 
points in Habermas’ criticisms of Foucault, we should have a clear view of his expository 
narration of Foucault’s intellectual journey. According to Habermas’ reading, Foucault 
begins his philosophical journey as an archaeologist of discursive structures called human 
sciences, and, later, the methodological problems of his early archaeological approach 
leads him towards developing a genealogical position as a response to these problems. 
“The turn to a theory of power must, rather, be understood as an internally motivated 
attack on problems with which Foucault saw himself confronted after he had carried out 
his unmasking of the human sciences in The Order of Things using only the tools of 
discursive analysis.”199 Accordingly, Habermas thinks that the problems pervasive in 
Foucault’s genealogies have their roots in his early archaeological works.  
Habermas considers Foucault’s first major work, Madness and Civilization, as an 
attempt to synthesize a structuralist methodology with depth hermeneutics. On the one 
hand, Foucault, in this work, brackets the contents of knowledge claims produced in the 
rational/scientific discourses on madness in favor of a quasi-structuralist analysis of the 
discursive structures that render those knowledge claims possible. He captures the 
emergence of madness as a medical phenomenon on a formal level, treating the 
medical/psychiatric concept of madness as a form that draws limits between the realm of 
reason and that of unreason. On the other hand, in a romantic move, which Foucault 
recognizes as a mistake later on, he thinks that there is an authentic experience of 
madness the truth of which should be emancipated from the discourses of psychiatry to 
be reinstated through a depth hermeneutics. Foucault’s attempt to combine in his 
archaeology a quasi-structuralist methodology with a perspective of depth hermeneutics 
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proves to be paradoxical. The paradox is twofold. First, some crucial elements of 
structuralism and depth hermeneutics in Madness and Civilization are incommensurable, 
if not irreconcilable. As a result, we have epistemic structures devoid of meaning 
(discourses of psychiatry), and, at the same time, an experience, though saturated by 
meaning, devoid of any structure (the authentic madness). Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the structuralist method and the approach of depth hermeneutics prove 
problematic in their own rights. Foucault quickly realizes the problems of the 
hermeneutical approach with respect to the kind of critique of reason he would like to do, 
and gives up any hermeneutical inclination. However, the real problem of Madness and 
Civilization is that the structuralist methodology does not allow Foucault to develop an 
account of how rational/scientific discourses on madness are related to practices of 
confinement, exclusion, ordering of the asylum space, individuation of mental patients, 
etc. In short, as Foucault himself later accepts, the concept of power haunts Madness and 
Civilization precisely because it appears in the text as an unarticulated and undefined 
implication of the relations between the mad and the institutions of mental health.   
According to Habermas, in the 1970’s, at the beginning of his genealogical and 
more Nietzschean period, Foucault starts employing one of his key concepts, the will to 
truth, to connect practices of exclusion to the inner functioning of discourses. Foucault’s 
critique of reason aims at showing the self-constitution of rational speech in which reason 
draws its own limits and thereby demarcates itself by excluding unreason from the terrain 
of reason. Habermas refers to a speech Foucault gives in 1970, “The Discourse on 
Language,”200 in which he identifies three historical mechanisms in which rational 
discourses draw their boundaries to sustain and maintain their rational identity. The first, 
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and probably philosophically the least interesting, is open censorship and prohibition  
through which undesired contents and themes are suppressed and silenced in the name of 
the purity and uniformity of the bounded territory of rational discourses. The second 
mechanism of exclusion is based on the division between madness and reason through 
which the speech of the mad becomes “null and void”. Foucault recognizes that his 
characterization of rational discourses on madness as a monologue in Madness and 
Civilization is not exactly accurate any more due to the emergence of discourses like 
psychoanalysis. However, he thinks that reason’s self-identification through the exclusion 
of madness is an ongoing project in which the boundary between reason and unreason is 
constantly redrawn. Finally, and most importantly for Foucault, the rules and procedures 
to exclude the false and the erroneous from the realm of truth are the most effective 
discursive mechanisms for reason to maintain and sustain its self-integrity.  
In Habermas’s words, Foucault thinks that “[t]ruth is an insidious mechanism of 
exclusion, it only functions on condition that the will to truth prevalent within it remains 
hidden.” (Habermas 1994, p. 56) Foucault’s Nietzschean appeal to the concept of the will 
to truth is his attempt to fill the gap between discursive formations and coercive and 
exclusive practices in institutions like mental asylums where these discourses claim 
exclusive authority through supervisory isolation of the inhabitants of these institutions. 
Accordingly, the will to truth that plays an inevitable role in the formation of discourses 
by setting up procedures and rules to distinguish true statements from the false ones is 
also the will to power to act over the lives of those about whom the discourses establish 
an accumulative network of true statements. The power effects of the discourses of 
human sciences need to be unmasked precisely because the will to power effective in the 
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formation of rules and procedures of truth is invisible to those charmed by truth. The will 
to power is invisible to us because we commit to the illusion that truth is transparent, 
hiding nothing behind it. To a certain extent, Habermas is forgiving to the problems of 
Foucault’s archaeology as honest confusions and mistakes. He thinks, however, that 
Foucault’s appeal to the concept of the will to truth as an expression of the will to power 
is, so to speak, his first sin which will perpetuate itself endlessly in his later genealogical 
work. With this philosophical move from structuralism to a Nietzschean vision of the 
omnipresence of power, Foucault steps out from the legitimate project of a reasoned 
critique of reason to the unjustifiable partisanship of the anti-Enlightenment tradition. 
This move takes him further away from the possibility of the recognition of the “lack of 
coercion of the cogent argument by which truth claims, and validity claims in general, 
prevail.”201 In a similar fashion to Gellner’s criticism of Wittgenstein, Habermas thinks 
that Foucault avoids the problem of validity, and therefore is blind to the critical 
possibilities a serious intellectual engagement with it would offer. Gellner criticizes 
Wittgenstein for removing from the horizon of his thought truth and truthfulness as the 
philosophical ethos by leveling truth and validity to mundane and random elements in our 
ordinary linguistic practices, denying in the process the potentials of truth to transcend its 
social context. In a similar vein, Habermas criticizes Foucault for reducing truth to the 
contingent effects generated by the practices of power, denying its communicative and 
non-coercive potentials in the context of inter-subjective action. It should be noted here 
that Habermas’ own philosophical project recognizes that the truths of instrumental 
reason can be entangled with power structures. In this sense, he criticizes Foucault to 
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have a reductionist, and hence, monolithic understanding of truth which is blind to the 
fundamental differences between truth claims generated in different spheres of reason.  
Besides Foucault’s identification of the non-coercive authority of truth with 
contingent coercive power relations, the place of the concept of the will to power in the 
genealogical historiography creates a serious tension with Foucault’s self-proclaimed 
anti-presentism. While his anti-presentism is based on the rejection of all forms of 
transcendence, the will to power emerges in Foucault’s genealogies as having all the 
privileges of a historical constant that transcends the present. Presentism is mainly a 
mode of self-privileging through which modern thought recognizes its distinctiveness as a 
form of epistemic superiority over the past forms of rationality. Foucault proposes that 
one should suspend, if not abandon, such judgments in questioning the present:    
I think we should have the modesty to say to ourselves that, on the one hand, the time we live in is 
not the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything is completed and 
begun again. We must also have the modesty to say, on the other hand, that – even without this 
solemnity – the time we live in is very interesting; it needs to be analyzed and broken down…With 
the proviso that we do not allow ourselves the facile, rather theatrical declaration that this moment 
in which we exist is one of total perdition, in the abyss of darkness, or a triumphant day break, etc. 
It is a time like any other, or rather, a time which is never quite like any other.202    
 
Foucault proposes that genealogy is a mode of critical approach that enables one to 
recognize the radical difference of the present. This difference, however, should not be 
translated into the terms of historicist progressivism as an improvement. Neither should it 
be understood in romantic lines as a loss of the intimacy and comfort of a remote past. As 
different as it is, our present is also identical with the past in terms of its contingency. Just 
like any other present, our present is also formed and hardened by the events of the past. 
Yet, the movement from the past to the present is a blind one, not guided by rational 
                                                 
202
 Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977 – 1984 (Routledge, 
1988), 35 – 6. 
 
 216
principles inherent to history. The intelligibility of the present is in contingent and 
scattered beginnings in the past which constitute what counts necessary for us in the 
present. Thus, revealing the contingent beginnings allows us to question and transform 
what appears to be necessary in our present.  
However, Habermas thinks that even if we accept Foucault’s criticisms of 
presentism, the validity of his anti-presentism does not entail the kind of historical view 
he has. Foucault denies that there are constants of history, such as class struggle, 
repression of libido, or unfolding of reason. Yet, Habermas thinks, power, or one might 
say the will to power, is exactly such a constant in his genealogies.  
Just as “life” was once elevated by Bergson, Dilthey, and Simmel to the basic transcendental 
concept of a philosophy (which still formed the background to Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein), 
so Foucault now raises “power” to a basic transcendental-historicist concept of historiography as 
critique of reason.203  
 
In Foucault’s genealogies, the formation of discourses follows no rules and forms of 
practice appear and disappear in a disorderly fashion not even leaving a historical 
sediment behind them. Yet, Foucault the genealogist sees through the dense layers of 
contingent events to the relentless struggles of power among various forces. Power, then, 
becomes the singular principle of intelligibility in his genealogies. Therefore, Habermas 
concludes, Foucault falls back on a transcendental form of historiography that he 
passionately criticizes in his genealogical works.  He does not see in the proliferation of 
discursive formations reason’s development through its self-critical and self-corrective 
ability. What proliferates is the empty sameness of the will to power in the disguise of the 
will to truth. Since the space of history, i.e. the space of discursivity, is ultimately 
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unconditioned and unbounded for Foucault, it becomes an empty stage for the comings 
and goings of power struggles.   
 Habermas claims that the emergence of the transcendental element in Foucault’s 
genealogies of power relations is due to the fact that his thinking is trapped within the 
framework of the philosophy of the subject regardless of his overt rejection of the idea of 
an originary, constitutive, and unified subject. The philosophy of the subject reduces the 
relations between human actors and the world into two basic categories. The subject 
either enters into a cognitive relationship with the world through her true judgments about 
it, or she develops practical relations to the world through her successful actions.204 From 
the perspective of the philosophy of the subject, the success of the subject’s actions is 
dependent on the truth of her judgments. In this picture, the power the subject holds is 
truth dependent. Foucault’s genealogies, in Habermas’ reading, present a mirror image of 
this picture. Instead of a power relying on the truth of the subject’s judgments, we have a 
truth the validity of which relies on the successful operations of power. As a 
consequence, the subject is removed from its central and constitutive place only to be 
substituted by power itself which retains all constitutive and originary metaphysical 
privileges of the subject. Moreover, Habermas detects a positivistic passion in this 
strategy of reversal. “Anthropocentric thought is drawn, by the dynamism of boundless 
self-mastery on the part of a subject become reflective, into the vortex of objectivism, 
that is, of the objectification of man; the genealogy of knowledge is supposed, by 
contrast, to rise to true objectivity of knowledge.”205 Habermas even thinks that what 
Foucault has in mind in terms of the epistemic status of his genealogies is exactly the 
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prestige and success the natural sciences have been enjoying since the scientific 
revolutions. The positivistic element is in Foucault’s claim to describe hermeneutically 
empty disconnected historical events which are explainable in isolation from the meaning 
and validity claims of the involved actors. In this sense, Habermas takes Foucault’s claim 
to be a “happy positivist” seriously, because the form in which Foucault describes the 
object of his genealogical studies cannot be distinguished from the way the natural 
sciences describes theirs. In this context, Habermas says, Foucault’s identification of 
genealogy as an anti-science should be understood to “overcome the pseudo-sciences.”206 
Foucault’s insistence on abstaining from making any normative judgments about the 
discursive events he describes, then, should be understood as a sign to his commitment to 
the possibility of a value-free historiography.    
At the end of his critical evaluation of Foucault, Habermas writes the following 
statement concisely summing up what he considers to be the internal flaws in Foucault’s 
genealogical works. “To the extent that it retreats into the reflectionless objectivity of a 
non-participatory, ascetic description of kaleidoscopically changing practices of power, 
genealogical historiography emerges from its cocoon as precisely the presentistic, 
relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science that it does not want to be.”207 These three 
problems are immanent to Foucault’s genealogical discourse, because they are the direct 
results of three reductive philosophical presumptions that, to use Gellner’s metaphor, 
function as pillars which support Foucault’s genealogical account. Foucault reduces the 
meaning claims of the participants in discourses into the formal structures of discourses. 
In the absence of any hermeneutic attempt to decipher the self-understanding of the 
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participants of discourses, the genealogist’s own present suppresses the historical voices 
of the actors of the past, and thereby hermeneutically pressures these discourses to speak 
the concerns and interests that strictly belong to the present of the genealogist. Foucault 
also reduces the validity claims to their discursive functions to produce power effects. 
Therefore the validity of each and every truth claim is relative to its functionality in “self-
maintenance of a given totality of discourse. That is to say, the meaning of validity claims 
consists in the power effects they have.”208 Foucault reduces the ‘ought’ to ‘is’ because, 
aside from his personal political engagements as a dissident intellectual, in his 
genealogical descriptions, his prose stoically abstains from taking any normative stance 
toward what he describes. In this sense Foucault would like his readers to deduce from 
his genealogical descriptions of power relations (the ‘is’) moral/political reasons (the 
‘ought’) to develop and maintain critical attitudes towards the very same power relations.   
Presentism:  
Habermas’ accusation of presentism in Foucault is a mirror image of Gellner’s 
criticism of Wittgenstein’s arguments from paradigm cases. While Gellner complains that 
Wittgenstein excessively relies on the meaning claims of ordinary language users (a form 
of radical hermeneutics), Habermas accuses Foucault of entirely ignoring the meaning 
claims and self-understanding of participant actors of the past (a form of radical 
historicism). According to Habermas, in Foucault’s genealogical method, the genealogist 
“should not try to make comprehensible what actors are doing and thinking out of a 
context of tradition interwoven with the self-understanding of actors. He should rather 
explain the horizon within which such utterances can appear to be meaningful at all in 
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terms of underlying practices.”209 Habermas would like to see an account of ordinary 
meaning claims as well as the self-intelligibility of actors, but he would like this account 
to be separate from an account of the ‘horizon of underlying practices’. This is because, 
similar to Gellner, Habermas thinks that there is an analytically meaningful and 
philosophically significant difference between meaning claims and practices. Therefore, 
in Foucault’s descriptions of practices, he sees a void where the meaning of these 
practices should be.  
In this context, the example he gives is very telling. In this example, Habermas 
imagines Foucault the genealogist inquiring into the prohibition of gladiatorial fights in 
Rome once the ruling elite of Rome converted to Christianity. In Habermas’ view, the 
prohibition is intelligible against the background of a hermeneutical shift in which the 
rulers of Rome no longer conceived the population under their reign as a herd of sheep, 
but rather children in need of care, guidance, and education. It is this hermeneutical shift 
that led the rulers of Rome to ban gladiatorial fights which were not appropriate for a 
population considered to be children.210 In Habermas’ mind, Foucault’s genealogy is 
structurally oblivious to such hermeneutical shifts for what it sees in such historical 
transformations is just a transition from one form of domination to another one. Thus, 
carrying out this genealogical task, Foucault “will trace back the prohibition of 
gladiatorial fights in Late Rome, for example, not to the humanizing influence of 
Christianity, but to the dissolution of one power formation by its successor.”211 In this 
passage, Habermas is the one who is a presentist, precisely because he fails to bracket 
ascriptions like ‘the humanizing influence of Christianity’ which is, in Foucault’s mind, 
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an expression of retrospective historiography. For Foucault, historical events are not 
meaningless, as Habermas imagines him claiming, but saturated with meanings that 
support and nourish each other as much as they conflict and contradict with each other. 
The task of the genealogist is not to commit to one meaning claim against another but to 
point to the multiplicity of perspectives from which a specific historical event was 
articulated. Genealogy is not general historiography, but one method among others to 
articulate the emergence of these perpectival spaces within a discursive network. In this 
sense, Foucault would not turn a blind eye to the claim that prohibition of gladiatorial 
fights is an expression of “the humanizing influence of Christianity”, but bracket the 
validity of this claim to reveal the perspective from which the prohibition of gladiatorial 
fights was articulated.  
Habermas still considers such a reply problematic:  
The speeches that justify establishing or dismantling gladiatorial fights are regarded [by 
genealogy] only as objectifications of an unconscious, underlying practice of domination. As the 
source of all meaning, such practices are themselves meaningless; the historian has to approach 
them from outside in order to grasp them in their structure.212 
    
Habermas argues in this passage that Foucault’s perspectivalism proves his point. 
Foucault’s ‘happy positivism’ strips the historical event of its meaning and hence the 
event itself emerges in his genealogy as an objective constant around which different 
perspectives emerge and disappear, struggling against each other. In this sense, 
Foucault’s perpectivalism on historical events is a disguised positivism implying the 
methodological possibility and the necessity “to approach them from outside”. Historical 
meaning claims, such as “the humanizing influence of Christianity” in his example, erase 
the traces of perspective from which they are articulated, and thereby claim the authority 
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and privileges of an objective and universal truth, indicating at the same time the 
objective ontological status of the historical event they articulate. Foucault, on the other 
hand, writes his genealogies with a strict observance and awareness of the principle that 
the elusive ontological standing of historical reality of the past is established through our 
historiographical practices the material and medium of which are nothing but historical 
traces left behind by the disappearance of the perspectives of the past into our present. In 
this sense, the historical event, the object of genealogy, cannot be grasped outside its 
articulation through multiple perspectives. Foucault, in this sense, does not reduce 
meaning claims of the participants of discourses to the formal discursive structures. 
Neither does he postulate a naked historical reality stripped off of meaning. What he does 
is to reconstruct a web of relevant perspectives the conjunction and disjunction points of 
which bound the historical event in question, giving it a recognizable form.     
Relativism:  
Relativism is another concept Habermas and Gellner share in articulating their 
criticisms. In his criticism of Wittgenstein, Gellner claims that the self-referentiality of 
language games entails that using them as criteria for adjudicating validity-claims implies 
a form of relativism. He imagines Wittgenstein’s language games as being tied to specific 
forms of life in a hermetically sealed fashion. It is language users’ shared forms of life 
that keep language games meaningful, effective, and alive. Since Wittgenstein does not 
allow any privilege to any particular language game/form of life pair, the language game 
one engages in, for instance, buying groceries, is no different in terms of the conditions of 
validation from the language games to establish and validate scientific/objective truth 
claims. Accordingly, as the effectiveness and meaningfulness of language games 
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performed in buying groceries can be evaluated according to criteria and standards of the 
form of life shared by the seller and the buyer, the validity of truth claims cannot 
transcend the limits of a specific linguistic context shaped by a specific form of life. In 
this sense, the validity of truth claims is relative to the linguistic context in which 
language users play truth-producing language games. According to Gellner, such an 
understanding of truth not only degrades truth claims to a contingent agreement among 
language users, but also renders Wittgenstein’s own philosophy inconsistent. If truth 
claims are relative to the procedures and conditions of their articulation, then whatever 
Wittgenstein postulates as a philosophical truth is subject to the same relativistic pressure 
to size down its range of projection from a philosophically proper generality to the limits 
of the specific form of life. The form of life which makes it possible for him to put 
forward his philosophical truth claims is also the ground of his relativistic 
conceptualization of language games, and therefore the truth of relativism cannot be 
generalized to language games and forms of life other than that which grounds 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein’s version of relativism, like any other 
form of relativism, is self-defeating.   
Habermas accuses Foucault of relativism in a similar fashion to Gellner. As truth 
claims in Wittgenstein, pace Gellner, are confined to the relevant language games, truth 
claims in Foucault are confined within specific discourses due to the self-referentiality of 
discursive practices. Moreover, in Foucault, discursive structures are generative sites of 
power effects. Consequently, not only is the validity of truth claims discourse dependent, 
but the power effects they have are also relative to the discourse. In this sense, Foucault’s 
genealogical truth claims are also relative to the conditions and procedures of the 
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genealogical discourse. More importantly, genealogical truth claims emerge in the 
context of Foucault’s relativism as relative to the power effects they produce. Therefore, 
Habermas claims, “Foucault’s theory would exhaust itself in the politics of theory.”213  
Habermas anticipates that Foucault would respond to his criticisms using his 
concept of ‘subjugated knowledge’ and therefore focuses on this concept. The concept of 
subjugated knowledge in Foucault refers to two interrelated fields. First, subjugated 
knowledge is “historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist 
coherence or formal systemization.” And, second, it is “a whole set of knowledges that 
have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition 
or scientificity.”214 Foucault’s twofold description of the concept of subjugated 
knowledge is indicative of its twofold significance for him. First methodologically, 
subjugated knowledge provides a platform of resistance against “the inhibiting effect of 
global, totalitarian theories”.215 Instead of portraying power relations and discursive 
formation in terms of a totality which is supposed to integrate multifarious social 
relations, subjugated knowledge allows the genealogist to articulate local criticisms 
“whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of 
thought.”216 Theorizing in terms of a totality has an inherent inclination to claim to 
articulate and represent the historical experience exhaustively within its rational forms 
leaving no excess behind. What the genealogical analysis aims at is to uncover 
fragmented and scattered pieces of historical experience that cannot be articulated within 
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the rational forms of totalitarian systemic theories. The second political significance of 
the concept of subjugated knowledge enters the picture at this point. The uniformity and 
integrity of totalitarian discourses are maintained by a systemic suppression and silencing 
of these unarticulated experiences such as that of slaves, women, children, homosexuals, 
and colonized people. The space of signification opened up by totalitarian theories expels 
the voices of these underprivileged groups to the blind spots of the discursive spaces 
where they remain invisible and silent. Therefore the genealogist must develop a 
methodological sensitivity to detect these blind spots which are saturated by unheard 
voices. The subjugated knowledge, in this sense, is an access to these blind spots of 
totalitarian discourses.  
Habermas is more or less sympathetic Foucault’s attempt to ground his genealogy 
on subjugated knowledge. Yet, he chooses to understand Foucault’s politicization of 
epistemology with reference to György Lukács who in his early period develops a 
Marxist theory of ideology in which the historical perspective of proletariat is 
epistemologically superior to that of bourgeoisie because while the bourgeois perspective 
is conditioned by the particular interests of the bourgeois class, the class perspective of 
proletariat is shaped by universalizing elements. The universalizing element in the 
proletarian class perspective is due to its specific place in history to erase all class 
differences. In this sense, the class consciousness of proletariat has a claim on the totality 
of society. Habermas argues that Foucault’s appeal to subjugated knowledge makes sense 
only on the condition that the perspectives from which subjugated knowledge claims are 
produced have a historic/epistemic privilege like the one Lukács claims with respect to 
the special place of proletariat in the history of class struggle. Since, Habermas 
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concludes, Foucault’s concept of power and his portrayal of the formation of discourses 
do not allow him to postulate such a historic/epistemic privilege on the side of subjugated 
knowledge claims, his genealogy still remains in a relativistic aporia.  
Habermas indicates two reasons to identify Foucault’s work as relativistic: 
1-The relationship between truth and power is articulated by Foucault in such a 
way that the validity of truth claims is reduced to their functions to generate power 
effects. 
Habermas’ Lukács reference with respect to relativism is indicative of his 
misperception of the relations between the discursive production of knowledge/truth and 
power effects. It is no accident that he refers to Lukács to grasp Foucault’s concern with 
subjugated knowledge, because he conceptualizes truth and power in 
instrumentalist/functionalist lines. If we follow the Lukács example, then we will see that 
in Lukács, there is an inevitable connection between the historical interests of a social 
class and knowledge and truth claims produced from the historical perspective of that 
class. In this sense, within the framework of ideology critique, such knowledge and truth 
claims are both articulations of the class interest on the one hand, and, on the other, 
means to further the social/political struggle for those interests. Lukács’ point is that the 
objective historical position of the bourgeoisie forces this class to produce class-specific 
knowledge and truth, while the proletarian class position forces it to articulate its interests 
in terms of the totality of society. Foucault does not think that the line between the 
particular and universal provides us with a political handle as Lukács imagines. 
Therefore, his point about subjugated knowledge is not to postulate an epistemic privilege 
of them, and he does not think that genealogical critique is in need of postulating such an 
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epistemic privileging of subjugated knowledge. On the contrary, he is well aware that 
subjugated knowledge claims are ‘local memories’ with a very limited range of 
projection. However, what makes them valuable and knowledge-worthy for genealogy is 
precisely their ability to re-signify what is suppressed by epistemically privileged 
totalitarian discourses. His appeal to subjugated knowledge should be understood in 
terms of the immanence of power in truth and truth in power. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, Foucault’s concept of power is mostly about the ability and capability 
of discourses to construct spaces of subjectivity and restrain human action on a 
grammatical level by bounding the domain of possibilities. In this context, power-
dependency of truth can only be claimed within a functionalist/instrumentalist framework 
where the relationship between truth and power is confined to the dynamics of a closed 
circle of means and ends. Foucault’s genealogy of the human sciences, however, is 
precisely a philosophical attempt to articulate a sophisticated co-formation of truth and 
power outside the closed circle of means and ends dialectic.   
2- Foucault’s genealogies are caught up in the very same self-referentiality he 
ascribes to the human sciences.  
In Habermas’ criticism of Foucault, the concept of self-referentiality is an 
avoidable philosophical mistake which Foucault nonetheless commits. As the Lukács 
example reveals, according to Habermas, the way out of the paradoxes of self-
referentiality is to commit to a quasi-transcendental philosophical position by postulating 
a historic/epistemic privilege to certain perspectives. Indeed, in his own theory of 
communicative rationality, the ideal speech conditions function in such a quasi-
transcendental fashion, enabling Habermas to break free of the paradoxical consequences 
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of self-referentiality. Foucault, on the contrary, embraces the conditions of self-
referentaility. Accordingly, if ascribing a historical epistemic privilege to certain 
perspectives is the only way to critically articulate our experience in the present, without 
being trapped in the aporia of relativism, then, Foucault would certainly choose to be a 
relativist. Yet, we must ask if Habermas’ demand in this context is a reasonable one. He 
takes Foucault’s perspectivalism for relativism, arguing that he cannot provide an account 
of the validity of his truth claims. Habermas can articulate this criticism, however, only 
by suppressing the conditions of self-referentiality that shape his own thought. Michael 
Kelly, commenting on the Habermas – Foucault discussion, suggests that self-
referentiality is a paradigmatic condition under which, not only Foucault’s thought, but 
also all post-metaphysical and post-religious modern thinking, including that of 
Habermas, takes shape.217 Kelly accepts that the self-referentiality of thought may 
necessarily lead to paradoxical consequences, but it is not therefore to be considered a 
mistake. In fact, he implies that self-referentiality is constitutive of critical thought in the 
sense that it burdens thinking with the task of generating its own epistemic and ethical 
norms. In this sense, Habermas’ demand that Foucault break free from the conditions of 
self-referentiality is not reasonable. Habermas might reply that even if the self-
referentiality of thought is a common condition shared by Foucault and himself, Foucault 
does not provide epistemic and ethical norms for his criticism of modern power relations 
even in a self-referential fashion. This brings us to his critical term of cryptonormativism. 
Cryptonormativism:  
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Before going into the details of Habermas’ claim, it should be noted that the 
parallelism between Gellner and Habermas seems to be broken at this point. With respect 
to providing ethical/political norms, Gellner has the following to say under the heading, 
“Failure of Normativeness”: 
The educated reader who has no specialised training and initiation into modern philosophy tends 
generally to have the following reaction when faced with Linguistic Philosophy: this kind of stuff, 
apart from being extremely dull, fails to provide any illumination and guidance. What is 
conspicuous about Linguistic Philosophy is its abdication of any kind of normative role, both in its 
practice and in its programmatic announcements.218 
 
Gellner’s point is that Wittgenstein’s philosophical analyses of ordinary language, being 
sterile and apolitical, are of no help to his readers in terms of ‘providing illumination and 
guidance’ in the ways they live their lives. Habermas’ concern in criticizing Foucault at 
this point is that even if his genealogical works seem to invite us to a form of 
ethical/political life in which struggling against relations of domination is valued, he 
insistently avoids articulating the ethical/political life entailed by such struggle in rational 
terms. The difference between Gellner’s and Habermas’ lines of criticisms is obvious. 
Yet, reading Habermas’ criticism against the background of Gellner’s allows us to reveal 
a form of cryptonormativism in Habermas. Habermas is well aware that being critical and 
being didactic are two extremely different philosophical positions, and, accordingly, he 
does not openly ask Foucault to provide ‘guidance and illumination’ to his readers. 
However, Habermas is blind to the possibility that Foucault’s avoidance to formulate 
rational norms for political struggles and resistance is itself a normative stand against the 
philosophical temptation to provide his readers with ‘illumination and guidance’. At this 
point, Wittgenstein and Foucault have a common disillusioned view of the limits of the 
power of philosophical thinking. They both reject that philosophy provides rational 
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grounds for the ways human beings struggle to live their lives. What Habermas considers 
to be cryptonormativism, and Gellner as quietism, is a philosophical ethos of humility 
that refuses to intervene in life in the name of reason. They both think that such attempts 
instrumentalize thought in general, and philosophy specifically, in an over-
intellectualization of life which they diagnose as the central pathology of modern life.     
 Habermas’ criticism of Foucault in terms of cryptonormativism boils down to the 
question “but why fight at all?”219 He thinks that Foucault cannot even begin asking this 
question, because in his portrayal of power relations there is no normative space for the 
question if and how some forms of power relations could be more or less legitimate than 
other forms of power relations. Foucault thinks, however, that the old liberal question of 
the legitimacy and illegitimacy of power relations masks, rather than reveals, the forms of 
power relations that bypass the legal limits through disciplinary mechanisms on the 
individual bodies and biopolitics on the whole of the population. He also rejects the 
normative frameworks of political struggles established in Marxist ideology critique and 
psychoanalysis because of their humanistic assumptions. Habermas, then, considers 
Foucault’s genealogies as tactical weapons, in the service of counter-power forces, used 
against an all-pervasive power. However, even this portrayal of political struggles as 
anarchistic guerilla fights for the subversion and interruption of the normalizing effects of 
power cannot answer the question “but why fight at all?”. In reference to Nancy Fraser’s 
criticism of Foucault, Habermas thinks that Foucault’s genealogies are burdened with 
telling his reader what is wrong with modern power relations.220  
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For Foucault, the question “but why fight at all?” can be answered from a variety 
of different perspectives from which those who fight speak. Accordingly, in Habermas’ 
own words Foucault gives constant references to “the asymmetric relationship between 
powerholders and those subject to power, as well as the reifying effects of technologies of 
power, which violate the moral and bodily integrity of subjects capable of speech and 
action.”221 Why is it that Habermas finds these normative qualifications of modern power 
relations unsatisfactory? For Habermas, these normative qualifications of our modern 
agonistic relations do not pass a threshold of moral/political rationality because Foucault 
stops short of articulating these normative qualifications into a coherent moral/political 
vocabulary. Yet, for Foucault, as there is no one singular structure shared by all modern 
power relations, there is no singular normative structure that enables the voices of 
resistance. James Tully argues, in favor of Foucault, that Habermas’ demand is a moment 
of philosophical temptation when evaluated in the context of Wittgenstein’s thought. 
Tully approaches Habermas’ and Charles Taylor’s theories from a Wittgensteinian 
perspective, and elaborates on the meaning and significance of asking such a question 
about our political positions. He argues that, it is a “mistaken convention…that our way 
of political life is free and rational only if it is founded on some form or other of critical 
reflection.”222 For Tully, while appeals to critical reflection are supposed to emancipate 
us from conforming blindly to social conventions, such appeals themselves become a 
convention in turn. He thinks that Habermas holds “the mistaken view that identifies 
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‘reasonable’ with providing reasons ‘in the end’.”223 Tully argues that such an insistent 
demand, like the one Habermas thinks Foucault should meet, would block our ability to 
communicate our political concerns to each other. Because, as Wittgenstein says, our 
giving reasons comes to an end quickly. Tully criticizes Habermas for taking a form of 
juridical thinking as an ultimate boundary for our critical activities. Against Habermas’ 
narrow understanding of critical activity, Tully proposes that Foucault’s thinking, in line 
with Wittgenstein’s sense of criticality, widens our critical perspectives.  
In our complex language-games of freedom, we provisionally follow the conventional boundaries 
in trying to reach understanding/agreement on some issue and we also play Foucault’s game of 
calling into question one conventional boundary at a time (by means of a geneaology of its 
historical role as a boundary) and of seeking to go beyond it.224  
 
Habermas might still wish to demand normative reasons at this point. Tully’s point is that 
such a demand would be equivalent to asking Habermas what is good about mutual 
understanding that he formulates as the telos of communicative rationality.  
 Echoing Tully’s argument, in his very short essay, “Useless to Revolt?”, Foucault 
expresses his thoughts on revolt which would be a good response to Habermas’ question 
“but why fight at all?”. In this short essay, Foucault characterizes the moment of revolt as 
a limit case in which the revolting forces momentarily steps outside the order of history. 
“The impulse by which a single individual, a group, a minority or an entire people says ‘I 
will no longer obey’ and throws the risk of their life in the face of an authority they 
consider unjust seems to me to be something irreducible.”225 For him there is always an 
inexplicable and indeterminate moment in disobedience. No rational form of explanation 
can fully articulate the actual moment of revolt. For Foucault, the resistance of the 
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moment of revolt to exhaustive articulation in rational forms is indicative of the fact that 
“no authority is capable of making it utterly impossible.”226 In this context, he 
emphasizes the place of the concept of revolution in political philosophy and 
historiography of the West, and argues that the discursive space of the modern concept of 
revolution is a manifestation of “a gigantic effort to domesticate revolts within a rational 
and controllable history.”227 Through these rational forms, a revolt appears to be a 
reiterable historical experience which happens in a causal nexus of objective conditions. 
Regardless of the revolutionary or reactionary political intentions behind them, what 
theories of revolution suppress is exactly the singularity of the moment of revolt which is 
what makes a revolt irreducible and inexplicable. In this sense, Foucault detects in these 
theories of revolution a will to render historical experience controllable and manageable. 
Foucault’s claims should not be understood as implying the unintelligibility of revolts. 
His point is rather that the forms of intelligibility of our political lives should be 
accommodating for the indeterminacy inherent even in the strictest and harshest power 
relations. Habermas’ question “but why fight at all?”, demands reasons not to obey. 
Foucault’s answer is that one can provide several answers to this question using the 
concepts such as rights, legitimacy, equality, and justice. Foucault would have no 
objections to these kinds of questions and answers, but Habermas’ framing of this 
question implies that people revolt justly against power because power violates some 
rational principle, or that the intolerability of a power relation can turn into a just revolt 
only when it is articulated in a rational form. According to Foucault, pace Tully, people 
are perfectly capable of articulating various reasons to obey authority as much as they are 
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capable of articulating reasons to disobey. The language games of reason giving is an 
important element in power relations as much as in resisting these power relations, yet, as 
Wittgenstein says, reason giving comes to an end at some point. Foucault’s point is that 
the question if and when a set of reason giving language games terminates in obedience 
or disobedience does not have the kind of rational ground Habermas would find 
satisfactory. Indeed, what the critic should be concerned with is not that the question of 
disobedience does not have an all-embracing response. Because if it was possible to 
provide such an answer, the beneficiary of such a knowledge would be first and foremost 
the agents of power, and not necessarily those who revolt. 
 
Inviolability Interpretations 
 
It is a curious and somewhat confusing phenomenon that Wittgenstein’s and 
Foucault’s works, as understood by Gellner and Habermas, are taken to be in line with 
conservative thought, because their works are also appropriated by the strain of political 
thought which explicitly seeks ways to articulate and reveal possibilities for 
social/political transformations through political action. There must be a specific 
perspective from which Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thoughts appear to support a 
conservative understanding of their works. Alice Crary’s concept of ‘inviolability 
interpretations’ is illuminating in defining such a perspective which would be also helpful 
to develop further responses to Gellner and Habermas. For Crary, those who read 
Wittgenstein along the lines of conservative thought commit to what she calls 
‘inviolability interpretations’, a peculiar interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of 
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meaning which  limits, if not prohibits, reasoned criticisms of  our form of life.228 Even 
though Crary develops her concept in evaluating political readings of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, including Gellner’s critical account, what she says about conservative 
interpretations of Wittgenstein also applies to a great extent to Habermas’s picture of 
Foucault as a conservative thinker.  
As exemplified in Gellner’s arguments, ‘inviolability interpretations’ are based on 
a use theory of meaning according to which the use of a concept determines its meaning. 
Crary argues that if meaning is fixed by its use, then, no one can tell if one case of using a 
concept is more appropriate than another one. If we detect a significant difference 
between two cases of the employment of the same concept, we can only claim that these 
two cases produce different meaning claims. Those who employ the same concept in 
significantly different ways are not right or wrong with respect to each other, but they 
simply talk about different things. This is because ”the game we play with a particular bit 
of language is not distinguishable from and thus not answerable to what we are talking 
about.”229  
There are, of course, available ways within language games in which language 
users can engage in meaningful disputes about the meaning of a concept and convince 
one another that one way of employing a concept is better or more appropriate than 
another way. However, what allows us to convince each other through reasonable 
disputes about the meaning of terms is the shared form of life on the basis of which we 
also share forms of reasoning. In a sense, both the possibility of a reasonable dispute and 
the possibility of coming to an agreement through it are enabled by the social conventions 
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that render our speech possible in the first place. Crary calls this form of exchange among 
language users ‘internal form of criticism’ which is permissible by the standards of the 
use theory of meaning.  
Such a fully conventionalist vision of our language sees our concepts and terms 
that express logical necessity also as a part of our shared linguistic conventions. Thus, 
even the logical standards do not allow us to assess a particular linguistic practice 
independently from its place, significance, meaning, and value that commonly shared 
social conventions assign to it. Any attempt to reassess a particular language game 
beyond the range of social conventions is prohibited by the structure of our language. 
Crary calls such attempts ‘external criticisms’ that seek significance and value of a 
particular language game outside the sphere in which social conventions locate it. Such a 
critical engagement is in vain because “it would require us to undermine whatever critical 
or normative concepts we want to use in assessing it by bringing into question the 
practices within which they function and are intelligible.”230 ‘Inviolability interpretations’ 
that fix meaning in terms of use entail a kind of political relativism from the perspective 
of which a form of life appears to be immune, and thus irresponsive, to criticisms. The 
differences among various ways of speaking and doing do not have any political bearings 
on each other, and in this sense the distance between different forms of life is 
unbridgeable.   
The conservative commentators place external criticism in a position akin to the 
place of the inexpressible in the standard readings of the Tractatus. In the Tractatus, the 
structure of language prohibits us to assign meaning to propositions about logic, ethics, 
and aesthetics. Language is capable of expressing any logically possible combination of 
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things (states of affairs) and nothing else. Propositions, including the ones about logic, 
ethics, and aesthetics, that try to express something which is not a possible combination 
of things violate the logic of language and fail to communicate anything meaningful. 
Thus, in such a reading of the Tractatus, the limits of sense are determined a priori by the 
logical structure of language.231 In the same fashion, ‘inviolability interpretations’ imply 
that external criticism is a futile attempt to express what the structure of language renders 
inexpressible.  
Crary thinks that the way ‘inviolability interpretations’ present Wittgenstein’s 
account of the limits of sense leads us to oxymoronic concepts like ‘coherent nonsense’ 
or ‘intelligible nonsense’. The paradox of the perspective of ‘inviolability 
interpretations’, expressed by these oxymorons, is that one can simultaneously recognize 
the form and know the content of what the external critic says, and cannot recognize the 
form and know the content of what she says. Here, it is critical to notice that language 
users within a linguistic community cannot falsify what the external critic says, because 
what she says is not even a candidate for verification or falsification. A statement like 
“The death penalty is unjust, because nothing justifies killing someone in the name of 
justice” is a meaningful statement only in a linguistic community where the grammar of 
punishment has overlapping areas with that of the grammar of the concept of justice. We 
can imagine a linguistic community in which the family of language games played using 
the concept of punishment has no recognizable kinship relations with the family of 
language games played using the concept of justice. (A twin of Foucault’s carceral 
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society with no hypocritical proclivity may be a good picture of such a community.) In 
such a society, subjecting the practices of punishment to the standards of justice is not 
going to be a meaningful speech act.232 Such a statement would be equivalent to asking 
‘What color is today?’ in a society like ours where the days of the week are called by 
their proper names and not by their presumed colors. If what the critic says is nonsense, 
we should not be able to recognize the nonsensical content of her speech as critical. And, 
if we recognize what she says as critical, we cannot say that what she says is nonsensical.  
Crary shows that ‘inviolability interpretations’ are inconsistent because they 
assume a vantage point outside the linguistic space and, paradoxically, assign meaning to 
statements to show the meaninglessness of the very same statements. This is because 
what they present as Wittgenstein’s view is a mirror image of what he criticizes. In order 
to reject the patent metaphysical view that how things are in the world fixes the meanings 
of concepts we use, ‘inviolability interpretations’ assume that how we use concepts fixes 
their meaning. In the former case, the inherent order of things in the world sets the limits 
of intelligibility independently from our linguistic conventions. In the latter case, 
historically established linguistic conventions limit what is articulable in a given moment 
in history. ‘Inviolability interpretations’ put us in a position where “we must choose 
between, on the one hand, having the world and forfeiting responsibility and, on the 
other, having responsibility and losing the world.”233 Crary thinks that such an idea of 
limits of intelligibility goes against Wittgenstein’s idea of the limits of sense. For 
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Wittgenstein, the limits of sense are not invisible, imperceptible, and undetectable 
barriers that prevent us from saying certain things. It is not as if we have something to say 
but there is no language game available to express it. In Wittgenstein’s words, ‘when a 
sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless.’ In an important 
sense, there are no homeless thoughts, as there can be no formless contents. In the way 
Crary formulates the limits of language, any conceivable idea, by definition, must have a 
home, that is, a place in our linguistic practices.  
The concept of the limits of sense in Wittgenstein refers to those cases in which 
we utter a statement and “we have no notion what (if anything) will count as the 
fulfillment of the words we are uttering.”234 The limits of sense do not point to 
inexpressible contents – contents that have not found their appropriate forms yet.  What 
appear to be formless contents are, in fact, forms without contents.  In Wittgenstein’s own 
words, an utterance to which we have failed, or do not know how, to assign a meaning is 
‘a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the 
mechanism.’ The limits of sense do not mark the predetermined endpoints of the 
linguistic space lying on the horizon, waiting to be discovered. They are linguistic 
occurrences that fail to engage with the neighboring statements in linguistic space. The 
limits of sense, then, are symptoms of the absence of connections required by an 
utterance to be a part of the working of language. In this sense, there is nothing mystical 
or metaphysical about the limits of sense in Wittgenstein. Just like what appears to be an 
idle wheel may be connected to the rest of the mechanism to enrich and modify its 
functions in combination with the movements of the other wheels, an idle statement can 
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be made to mean something when it is connected to and aligned with the other 
statements.   
What exactly is Crary’s solution to the problem of normativity with respect to the 
politics of Wittgenstein’s thought? The answer lies in another piece of her writing where 
she employs the term ‘inviolability interpretations’ in criticizing feminist critics who 
develop a perspectival line of feminist criticism as opposed to ‘objectivist’ feminist 
criticisms.235 She argues that perspectivist feminists dismiss the notion of objectivity too 
quickly by equating it with the voice of patriarchy under the guise of ‘a voice from 
nowhere’. These feminists commit to the view that the structure of language makes any 
objective standpoint unavailable, and therefore a voice that speaks in the name of 
objectivity basically masks its own privileged situatedness. Against such criticisms of the 
notion of objectivity, Crary argues that a wider conception of objectivity is available in 
Wittgenstein’s account of language. Such a wider conception of objectivity allows 
feminists to articulate feminist concerns without sacrificing objective norms to reveal the 
suffering and subjugation of women.   
We have good reason to follow feminist objectivists in insisting that we can remain committed to 
the kinds of perspectival investigations that have historically played an important role in 
uncovering sexist (and other forms of) bias without losing our politically empowering 
understanding of ourselves as committed to developing modes of thought and conduct that are 
truly – objectively – more just and consistent.236 
 
Her siding with objectivity in criticism, no matter how she stipulates the concept, is not 
going to provide a satisfactory respond to our problem of normativity, because our 
problem of normativity arises partly on the grounds of our dissatisfaction of the claims of 
objectivity in criticism. Even if her diagnosis of conservative understanding of 
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Wittgenstein is to the point, the picture of language Crary draws shares common grounds 
with ‘inviolability interpretations’. Now, instead of shared linguistic conventions, 
objectivity appears to be the inviolable limit Crary erects against some feminists’ claim 
that appeals to objectivity can be a form of injustice.  
Josè Medina criticizes Crary for reproducing the inside/outside dichotomy which, 
she assumes, is a logical conclusion of ‘inviolability interpretations’.237 Crary diagnoses 
that conservative interpretations of Wittgenstein absolutize the limits of intelligibility and 
thereby create a false dichotomy between the inside and the outside of language. In order 
to reject the idea that the structure of language imposes some absolute limits on our 
speech and actions, she trivializes the concept of the limits of sense in Wittgenstein, and 
reduces it to an insignificant linguistic event that hardly has any political bearings. 
Crary’s understanding of the limits of intelligibility implies that feeling discontent and 
dissatisfied about the possibilities of expression we have within linguistic space is a 
metaphysical urge to assume positions outside the linguistic space. For Crary, there is no 
outside of language.  
Medina claims that the vocabulary that springs from the inside/outside dichotomy 
should be completely dismantled if we are to reveal the radical political possibilities in 
Wittgenstein’s account of language. “The problem is not simply that there is no ‘outside’ 
for our language games. For, in an important sense, there is no ‘inside’ either: there is no 
such thing as a symbolic perspective common to all language users.”238 Instead of 
assuming a homogenous linguistic space in which all possible language users uniformly 
participate, Medina introduces the concept of polyphony to underline the irreducible 
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heterogeneity of the linguistic context. In Crary, the linguistic context is a frictionless, 
self-identical space which contains more or less similar language users. The condition of 
the possibility of these language users to play language games is the shared space they 
occupy as language users. Medina thinks that this is a misleading image of the linguistic 
context. As opposed to a smooth and homogenous surface, our linguistic context is like a 
real geographical terrain with its high and low points, rifts and abysses, plains and 
mountains. Moreover, this terrain is not a flat and uniform space where, by virtue of the 
rules of mechanistic determinism, the location of the speaking subject can be codified 
into a binary system, ‘either here or not here’, ‘either inside or outside’.  
In accordance with this image of differentiated linguistic terrain, our moves in the 
language games we play have a hermeneutic depth. In Crary’s linguistic universe, 
language users either articulate or fail to articulate their expressions, and consequently, 
there is either a meaning claim totally transparent to the entirety of the linguistic 
community, or there is obvious nonsense recognized by all the members of the linguistic 
community as such. In such a linguistic universe, there is no suppressed meanings, no 
subtexts, no degrees of articulation, and no possibility of subverted linguistic practices. 
Medina thinks that the problem of the normativity of critical thought becomes a problem 
only when we imagine our linguistic practices in such a sterile context. The linguistic 
terrain is rich enough in terms of its normative sources to support subversive and critical 
activity. He gives the example of heterosexist normativity. On the one hand, heterosexism 
is the predominant normative source which sometimes excludes and silences and 
sometimes assimilates and distorts the voices of those whose experiences do not fit in the 
heterosexist code of meaning and action. On the other hand, the dissent from 
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heterosexism has always been able to establish its own normative sources and subverts 
the heterosexist language.   
To go back to Crary’s concept of ‘intelligible nonsense’, or ‘radical silence’, the 
language of heterosexist desire assigns the articulation and expression of non-
heterosexual love, in its all forms, to the linguistic space of deviation where the 
meaningful sexual experience of some language users cannot be articulated and become 
nonsense. However, this is intelligible nonsense because what is denied the means of 
expression in the heterosexist language can be expressed in other linguistic terrains using 
other normative sources. The heterosexist linguistic domain is bounded and rebounded by 
linguistic practices and these boundaries exclude and silence some language users, in the 
sense that there is no available perspective within the bounded heterosexist space that can 
assign meaning to the experience of these language users. Medina’s point is that the 
exclusion and silencing of these language users do not mean that their experience 
‘disappears in a vacuum’. Thus, intelligible nonsense is not a metaphysical fiction, but a 
form of meaning claim that leaks to the terrain of a normative order which is unable to 
acknowledge it. In this sense, it is indicative of the irreducible heterogeneity of the 
symbolic space as the site of conflicting meaning claims.  
Both Crary’s concept of ‘inviolability interpretations’ and Medina’s criticisms 
against Crary are useful perspectives in the context of charges against Foucault. For 
Crary, conservative interpretations are entailed by a misleading understanding of 
Wittgenstein. Medina is not necessarily against this dimension of Crary’s argument. His 
point is rather that the normativity problem can be solved only by dismantling the 
vocabulary that gives rise to it and not by taking one of the available positions created by 
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that vocabulary. Habermas’ criticisms against Foucault are based on a reading parallel 
with ‘inviolability interpretations’. He also formulates his criticisms in terms of an 
absolutized sense of the inside/outside distinction with respect to discursive practices. In 
this sense Medina’s arguments cuts against Gellner and Habermas as well who, in their 
respective critical accounts of Wittgenstein and Foucault, portray the background of 
linguistic practices and power relations in such a narrow way that one single normative 
system single handedly rules and regulates our speech and actions. Gellner, for example, 
complains that Wittgenstein’s account of language allows no genuine novel linguistic 
practice, because the grand grammatical order makes it impossible to conceive even the 
possibility of radically different language games. Similarly, Habermas criticizes Foucault 
for not leaving any room for alternative critical normative systems in his portrayal of 
power relations. In formulating his criticism, Habermas systematically ignores and 
suppresses Foucault’s emphasis on the indeterminacy and heterogeneity of the sites of 
our practices which, in Foucault, are irreducibly sophisticated to such a degree that 
neither the reifying norms of the human sciences, nor a single resisting normative system, 
like Habermas’ communicative rationality, can establish an absolute hegemony. In this 
sense, Wittgenstein and Foucault abstain from formulating norms of resistance not 
because they are absent, but because they resist the philosophical temptation to formulate 
them in a priori terms like ‘ideal speech conditions’, or ‘communicative rationality. 
 
Cavell and Normativity 
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I would like to finish this chapter by pointing to two points in Cavell’s 
interpretation of Wittgenstein that are relevant to the problematic of normativity in 
Wittgenstein and Focault.  
1-As we have seen, among other things, Habermas accuses Foucault of being a 
positivist due to Foucault’s preference for purely descriptive accounts as opposed to 
explanatory models. In Michael Kelly’s words, Habermas’ basic question is the 
following: “Are Foucault’s studies of the modern subject and forms of rationality 
intended to be descriptive or critical?”239 Obviously, for Habermas, there is a line that 
demarcates the descriptive and the normative. The reason why Habermas would ask this 
question is because he is, in fact, sympathetic to Foucault’s genealogical descriptions of 
disciplinary mechanisms. He is not as much dismissive to Foucault as he is to other 
‘young conservatives’. His basic problem is with Foucault’s stoic voice in describing 
disciplinary mechanisms. In fact, the way Habermas formulates the normativity problem 
in Foucault is based on his idea that in order for a critical discourse to communicate its 
critical content, it must have a separate source of normativity like communicative 
rationality in his own theory. In Habermas’ criticism, Foucault, in committing to a 
descriptive methodology, in fact claims to register fragments of historical experience as 
they happened. In this sense, a positivist spirit envious of natural sciences pervades 
Foucault’s thought. In a similar fashion, Gellner also thinks that Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of philosophy as a descriptive articulation of ordinary linguistic practices 
is, at best, a trivial activity, avoiding the task of serious explanatory thinking.  
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Cavell’s insight about the distinction between the normative and descriptive is a 
good reply to both Gellner and Habermas: “…both statements of fact and judgments of 
value rest upon the same capacities of human nature; that, so to speak, only a creature 
that can judge of value can state a fact.”240 What Cavell means by this statement is that 
facts and values or descriptions and normative statements do not belong to such different 
regions of our language. Needless to say, the grammars of the statement “A murders B” 
and “Murder is wrong” are different. That is to say, these two statements belong to 
different language games. However, our ability to recognize an event as murder is in 
itself a normative act. “We do not first know the object to which, by means of criteria, we 
assign a value; on the contrary, criteria are the means by which we learn what our 
concepts are, and hence ‘what kind of object anything is’”241 Only after getting familiar 
enough with the criteria of a linguistic community can we state a fact like “A murders B” 
or pass a judgment like “Murder is wrong”. As Cavell argues with respect to 
Wittgenstein, describing our linguistic practices as language games and their connections 
to one another as family resemblances is not simply a way of accurately describing our 
lives. It also reformulates our moral and political standing as language users. In the same 
fashion, Foucault’s descriptions of modern punitive practices as disciplinary mechanisms 
are based on criteria that tell what disciplining is. The normative content of Foucault’s 
work is in its textual force to enable us to recognize these punitive practices as 
disciplinary mechanisms. His genealogical descriptions have a claim on us to question 
and reformulate our political/moral standing with respect to these mechanisms of power. 
In the same fashion, his genealogies of the discourses of sexuality are liberating in that 
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his descriptive account of what he calls ‘biopolitics’ enables and motivates us to notice an 
aspect of our erotic lives which would have otherwise remained unnoticed in the shadows 
of ‘the repressive hypothesis’. If, as Habermas thinks, the only form of being 
normative/critical is to tell the audience of philosophy what is wrong with certain 
practices, then, Foucault’s thought is not critical. However, as I mentioned in the previous 
chapter in reference to David Owen’s concept of aspectival captivity, the varieties of the 
ways our concepts, our forms of thinking, captivate us pressure critical thought to be 
inventive. Genealogical descriptions, like Wittgenstein’s are critical in their ability and 
capability to allow us to see the plurality of constraints in what we take to be normal and 
ordinary. 
2-According to Habermas, Foucault’s transition from his archaeological period to 
his genealogical works is marked by the difficulty he faces within archaeological 
methodology to connect practices to formal rules of discourses. Foucault develops his 
concept of power partly as a response to this difficulty. Accordingly, power is the missing 
link between discourses and practices. Yet, in Habermas’ criticisms, while the concept of 
power seems to offer a way to solve the problem of the relations between discourses and 
practices, it creates a larger set of problems than it solves, normativity being the most 
significant one. As formulated in Foucault’s genealogical account, the authority of the 
forms of rationality over our lives appears to be despotic due to their unresponsiveness to 
rational criticisms. The way Habermas describes the emergence of the concept of power 
together with its cryptonormative aspects in Foucault reveals common features between 
his reading of Foucault and above mentioned ‘inviolability interpretations’ of 
Wittgenstein. According to Habermas, what leads Foucault from his more or less sterile 
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formal inquiries of discourses to the genealogy of historically specific junctions—where 
technologies of power and epistemic structures are entwined with each other—is a 
conceptual difficulty that springs from his archaeological methodology. Foucault’s 
archaeology seeks to reveal, as he puts it, ‘the historical a priori’ and ‘a positive 
unconscious of knowledge’ of human sciences that are implicit rules governing the 
formation of statements in a given discourse.  However, 
…these rules can make a discourse comprehensible only as regards its conditions of possibility; 
they do not suffice to explain the discourse practice in its actual functioning – for there are no rules 
that could govern their own application. A rule-governed discourse cannot itself govern the 
context in which it is implicated.242  
   
The problem of the gap between discursive rules and discursive practices in Foucault’s 
archaeology, as formulated by Habermas, is in the same vein with the way Wittgenstein 
describes the rule following paradox: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of 
action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if any action can be made out to 
accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here.243  
 
The formulation of a rule is stationary and stable by definition in the sense that it does not 
change from context to context. If it does, it simply becomes another rule. Yet the 
number of contexts in which the rule can be applied is infinite in principle. Hence, a rule 
seems to require an interpretation in each context that functions as a rule (a super rule, a 
meta-rule) governing the application of the original rule in a specific context. The same 
applies to the super rule itself as well, and therefore we need a superior super rule that 
governs the application of the super rule. As a result, we have an infinite series of rules 
that postpones the act of following a rule ad infinitum. Thus, a rule, by itself, cannot 
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respond to the question whether an action is correct according to criteria set by the rule in 
question, because such a questioning triggers an infinite regress.  
Wittgenstein thinks that this is a false paradox for it is based on the assumption 
that rule following is a purely abstract mental (in)activity which incessantly demands 
rule-governance. However, rule following is a practice the terminal point of which is in 
actuality doing certain things in an established way. How can we be certain that the 
action is really conducted in the established way, if the governing set of rules is not 
responsive to our inquiries? Wittgenstein thinks that we can be certain for most of the 
cases, where certainty is understood as knowing how to go on.244 However, the certainty 
is available only from within the perspectives of the participants of the language game 
who are trained to gain mastery in conducting the action in question. For Wittgenstein, 
then, the question of the gap between grammatical rules and their application should be 
addressed in such a way that the actual practices associated with the rules should have 
analytic priority over the abstract formulations of the rules. In short, Wittgenstein points 
to the actual practices as the site of the possible (dis)solutions to the problem of rule 
following. As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s philosophical move to point to the practices 
is interpreted as endangering the rationality of our actions because it seems that the only 
normative standpoint is from within the agreement of the participants of language games.  
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In a similar fashion, Foucault also points to the practices as the site of the 
intelligibility of the discursive rules and discursive practices. In the spirit of the 
‘inviolability interpretations’ of Wittgenstein, Habermas argues that Foucault’s shift from 
inherent rules of discursive formations to discursive practices leaves no room for a 
critical perspective. In Habermas’ language, in order to avoid the methodological 
problem of the archaeological mode of inquiry, Foucault seeks the ‘foundations of the 
forms of knowledge’ in the technologies of power. By doing so, he reduces the binding 
authority of reason to the effects of disciplinary technologies. Consequently, in 
Foucault’s work critique of reason is equated with the genealogy of these technologies of 
power. For Habermas, in this fatal move, the very criticality of Foucault’s genealogy is at 
stake. Attacking the autonomy of truth and discourses of science as coercive power 
relations, Foucault, in fact, attacks the ground that renders his own genealogical voice 
possible. The claim that there is no distance between power and reason is only possible 
on the basis of a distance the very existence of which is denied by the same claim.  
This way of depicting Foucault’s work amounts to arguing that the Foucauldian 
world is a frictionless monolithic space where disciplinary mechanisms and 
accompanying discursive formations leave no room for human agency. A subject’s 
speech and action, even before she speaks and acts, are, in fact, moments of subjugation 
to a discursive authority, because the place of subjectivity she speaks from is constructed 
by this or that discourse. Discourses provide norms and terms of our speech and action 
and therefore when one speaks what we hear is the voice of the discourse rather than the 
expression of the speaking subject. In this line of criticism, if we replace the word 
‘discourses’ with the words ‘social conventions’, what we get is the criticism against 
 251
Wittgenstein’s account of language. ‘Inviolability interpretations’ also assume that 
however oppositional and resisting the contents of one’s speech seem to be, speaking and 
acting are ultimately forms of submitting and conforming to the shared social 
conventions.  
In this context, Cavell’s account of the relationships between language users and 
grammatical rules is helpful to develop a response to Habermas’ criticisms of Foucault. 
Grammar, for Wittgenstein, is simply language users’ knowledge and skill to apply a 
limited vocabulary in various, and indeed potentially an unlimited number of, contexts. 
Grammar, however, is not just a linguistic know-how in the technical sense of the term, 
because, in Wittgenstein’s account, meaning something, i.e. using a word meaningfully, 
is not a transfer of the part of the contents of one’s mind to the other minds but mainly a 
practical engagement with the world and with other language users. In Cavell’s account 
of language, what grammar does is to enable the language user to project the concept in 
different contexts. Projection of a concept is not a matter of imposing a pre-given 
meaning on a new context, but a matter of practical engagement with the context. In this 
sense, the rules of grammar are the rules of engagement with the world and with the other 
language users. These rules are as enabling as they are constraining. They are 
constraining because the grammar of a word excludes some of its uses from the existing 
circulation of words. This exclusion is based on an implicit yet very deep agreement 
among a community of language users whose standards and criteria constitute the limit, 
or rather, the threshold of meaningful use of language.  
From this perspective the authority of grammar looks despotic and non-
negotiable. However, in Wittgenstein, these rules are enabling to such a degree that far 
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from being a mechanical repetitive process of following rules, using language always has 
a creative dimension in varying degrees. Grammar does not determine the meaning, i.e, 
the use of a concept: 
Here I should first of all like to say: your idea was that that act of meaning the order had 
in its own way already traversed all those steps: that when you meant it your mind as it 
were flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one. 
Thus you were inclined to use such expressions as: “The steps are really already taken, 
even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought.” And it seemed as if they were 
in some unique way predetermined, anticipated – as only the act of meaning can 
anticipate reality.245   
 
The steps we take are never taken before. It is needless to say that our language use is 
reiterative. However, this does not mean that reiteration is empty repetition. In fact, for 
our reiterating the use of a concept to be meaningful, it has to be singular and unique to 
the context. (A rule that children and non-native speakers of a language tend to violate 
often.) Even if the rules of the application of words in different contexts can be taught 
and transferred to new generations of language users, or to non-native speakers, that is, 
even if the rules of grammar can be completely and perfectly represented and described, 
the actual practice of following a grammatical rule and applying words to the world 
defies any attempt to fully and exhaustively explain how language users use language. 
The actual practice of using language, in this sense, is the terminal point of any analysis 
of language. This is the facticity of language use in Wittgenstein’s account of language 
which overrides the despotic picture of grammatical rules above and depicts language as 
the site of freedom and indeterminacy. 
According to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following, questioning, criticizing, 
resisting, and transforming what we say and what we do is always available in varying 
degrees in different regions of our language and practices. This is precisely because the 
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agreement that keeps us within certain boundaries is as fragile and fluctuating as it is 
solid enough to ‘hold us captive’. As Cavell shows in The Claim of Reason, skepticism is 
not only a threat that the values and the world that we hold dear may appear as empty 
illusions under critical scrutiny because our language is not fully responsive to demands 
for rational justifications. In fact, skepticism is also a bearer of a truth that rational forms 
are not exhaustive of our experience. Skepticism points to a gap between the forms of 
rationality and our experience of being in the world and that is the reason why Cavell 
thinks that each and every speech act is in fact a ‘leap’. This leap can be threatening, but 
it is also the site in which we question and transform our speech and practices, because in 
each and every engagement with the world and with other language users there is a 
moment of indeterminacy with respect to the way we apply rules and criteria of our 
grammar.  
In Cavell’s understanding of Wittgenstein, which also sheds light on the power 
effects of discursive formations, grammar and forms of rationality limit our speech and 
actions but the appropriate visual metaphor for that limit is not a stone wall we bump into 
each time we attempt to transgress what is given in a certain form of life. The appropriate 
visual metaphor is an abyss, or an uncharted region into which we must leap. 
Wittgenstein’s comment that we follow the rules blindly can be read to point to our 
uncritical and unquestioning attitude toward our ordinary employment of concepts. 
However, if we are to follow Cavell’s reading, Wittgenstein’s comment can also be read 
as pointing to human predicament to leap blindly, never being able to see where our leap 
will take us. And, the necessity of leaping in our speech and actions is the very possibility 
of our freedom.  
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Foucault’s description of his project as a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ also 
emphasizes the critical task of articulating the possibilities of freedom through 
genealogical inquiries into the historical limits of our practices. For him, such a ‘critical 
ontology of ourselves’ should not be defined as theories, doctrines, and bodies of 
knowledge. Rather it should be understood as ‘an attitude, an ethos’ and most 
importantly, as ‘an experiement with the possibility of going beyond’ the formative limits 
of what we do and who we are. The immediate objective of such a critical ontology is to 
chart the limits of our present so that we can unmake ourselves to exercise our freedom to 
leap into who we will become. One might argue that unmaking ourselves without a 
rational projection of who we will become defies the logic of political transformations 
that seek better forms of life. The unmaking of ourselves as a critical task should not be 
understood as such a mindless destructive attack on our forms of subjectivity. 
Genealogical inquiries into our present inform our quest for better forms of life with a 
specific emphasis on the ethos of freedom that calls for an acknowledgement of the 
responsibilities and risks of human predicament ‘leap blindly’ at the end.  
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Afterword 
 
Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s thoughts show us how deep our existence is rooted 
in the micro structures of the ordinary and the present which constitute the horizon of our 
speech and actions. These structures affect our lives in two related ways. On the one 
hand, they are the sources of identity in reference to which we define ourselves. On the 
other hand, they bound our field of action by drawing limits between the meaningful and 
the absurd, acceptable and unacceptable, and normal and abnormal. In this sense, what is 
at stake in our complex relations to the ordinary and the present is nothing less than our 
freedom, and therefore the structures of the ordinary and freedom are the immediate 
objects of inquiry for the politics of Wittgenstein and Foucault.  
However, it is extremely difficult to philosophically engage with the ordinary and 
the present for two reasons. First, we are so immersed in the ordinary and the present that 
it is enormously difficult to establish a reflexive distance between ourselves and our 
ordinary and the present. Second, the systematicity, orderliness, and determinations of the 
structures of the ordinary and the present and their contingency, disorderliness, and 
indeterminations coincide and entangle with each other in such a way that it is possible to 
picture them either as sites of absolute freedom and sites of absolute bondage. With 
respect to the first difficulty, both Wittgenstein and Foucault think that a descriptive 
account attentive to the minute details of our ordinary and our present can remind us how 
uncanny our daily lives are. Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s descriptions are not meant to 
be all inclusive on a general level but they are designed to capture specific aspects of our 
lives by focusing on the unique elements of the local fields of our ordinary and the 
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present. With respect to the second difficulty, they both welcome the thought that the 
systematicity and indeterminacy can exist simultaneously in our lives. Especially 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about grammatical rules and their application point to the fact that 
the systematicity of grammatical rules and regulations render the moment of speech and 
action indeterminate, enabling the language user to make her move in the language game 
she plays. It should be noted here that in addressing these difficulties of engaging with 
the ordinary and the present, neither Wittgenstein nor Foucault claim that their ways to 
handle these difficulties are the only available ways. In this sense, they do not provide 
models of thought applicable to all philosophical problems.  
Another political lesson we learn from Wittgenstein and Foucault is that we 
cannot express our political concerns and act upon them if we try fitting all of them in 
one all-inclusive global political discourse. As our ordinary and the present captivate us 
not in one global system but in a series of ‘criss-crossing and overlapping’ structures, the 
forms of our resistance to the captivating effects of these structures have to have the same 
level of multiplicity and sophistication. Enriching our forms of resistance definitely 
requires us to produce rational analyses and knowledge of the political field. But 
Wittgenstein and Foucault also remind us that creativity in politics together with a 
reasoned suspicion about the effectiveness of our existing forms of resistance are required 
by the very conditions of modern politics.  
Lastly, and probably most importantly, Wittgenstein’s and Foucault’s works urge 
us to widen the projection range of our political concepts while keeping a reflexive 
distance to our own definitions of politics and political action. The projection range of the 
concept of politics cannot be determined a priori. The meaning of the concept of politics 
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is an immediate object of our political struggles, therefore the indeterminacies in its 
meaning is an essential element in our political language games. Wittgenstein and 
Foucault enable us to articulate the micro structures of the ordinary and the present in 
political terms. In their efforts to problematize the ordinary and the present, they define 
new contexts to which we can project our political concepts. In this sense, they widen the 
projection range of our political concepts to articulate more justice claims.  
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